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Abstract 
 
In this dissertation I use a quasi-experimental approach across five different applied microeconomic 
studies. These studies are diverse in the range, covering police and crime, the political economy of 
lobbying, the effects of the minimum wage, and ‘induced innovation’ by firms in response to different 
incentives. However, each study outlines a comprehensive quasi-experimental approach that addresses 
potential threats to the given identification strategy. As a result, these studies provide credible, causal 
estimates of a number of important economic parameters including: the police-crime elasticity, the value 
of political connections among US Federal lobbyists, the impact of the minimum wage, and different 
incentives affecting technology adoption and innovation at the firm-level. 
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the early 2000s wave of Chinese imports on economic outcomes in developed economies. 
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OVERVIEW 
 
In this dissertation I present five studies that use the ‘quasi-experimental’ or ‘research design’ 
approach to applied economic work. Specifically, each chapter addresses the issue of statistical causality 
and establishes a detailed identification strategy to validate the quasi-experiment being considered. In this 
overview I briefly summarise the main question being addressed in each study and the most important 
elements of the supporting identification strategy. 
The work in chapter 1 (“Panic on the Streets of London”) studies the link between police and 
crime, using the police deployment that followed the 2005 London terrorist attacks as the basis of a 
natural experiment. The reallocation of police after the attacks (principally, the 6-week-long, 35% increase 
in police presence across central London boroughs) is used to build a treatment-comparison group design 
that compares crime trends in different areas. Empirically, the ultimate result is an estimate of the police-
crime elasticity of approximately -0.3. This estimate is in line with previous estimates but importantly is a 
more precise estimate than has been achieved before, in part due to the police deployment information 
used (which has not been used in previous, similar studies) and also due to the identification strategy.  
The empirical strategy explicitly deals with the issue of correlated observable and unobservable 
shocks that may interfere with the interpretation of the police deployment effect. The intuition here is that 
post-attack changes in social and economic behavior not directly related to the police deployment may 
have affected crime independently. This chapter takes a number of steps to rule this possibility out. In 
particular, the empirical work shows that the drop in crime is closely timed with the shifts in police 
deployment – if the correlated shocks were driving crime trends then they would need to have a very 
unusual place-specific, 6-week duration to explain the police deployment effect.  
Chapter 2 looks at the labour market for lobbyists in Washington and the role of political 
connections (defined in terms of past employment experience on the staff of Congressional politicians) as 
a determinant of revenues. This is a important policy question given recent concerns about the role of 
special interests in influencing political decisions. The empirical strategy studies what occurs to lobbyist 
13 
 
revenues after an affiliated Senator or House Representative leaves the Congress. Practically, when an 
affiliated politician leaves the Congress then a lobbyist suffers a loss in ‘politician-specific capital’, that is, 
a premium that is received for their (the lobbyist’s) expertise in the legislative preferences of an individual 
politician. The estimate provided in this chapter is that losing a connection to a Senator or senior House 
Representative leads to a 25% drop in revenues.  As expected, this drop is even higher for connections to 
longer tenured politicians who sat on major committees prior to their exit from the Congress. Empirically, 
the work presented in this chapter addresses identification concerns about ‘anticipated’ exits by showing 
that the drop in revenues is highly discontinuous and concentrated around the exit point. 
In the third chapter I address the impact of the minimum wage on firm profitability. A wave of 
research during the 1990s considered the impact of the minimum wage on employment and was not able 
to pin down the decisive negative effects that were widely expected in some quarters. This leaves open the 
question of how the wage effects of the policy are being transmitted through the economy? The empirical 
work in this chapter provides evidence that firm profitability may be one channel. Using two UK datasets 
– one on a large sample of companies and the other on the care homes industry – I find that wages 
increased and profits fell in firms after the introduction of the UK National Minimum Wage (NMW) in 
1999. The magnitude of this effect is consistent with a ‘no behavioral response’ model whereby firms 
absorbed the increase in the wage bills with no (observable) countervailing adjustment.   
Firms are also the focus of Chapter 4 which looks at the effects of rising Chinese import 
competition on technology adoption, productivity and innovation in a large sample of European firms. The 
major contribution of this chapter is that it shows that there is a specific technology upgrading effect of 
low-wage country import competition. Importantly, this upgrading effect is not just a reallocation effect 
that operates via a more intense selection effect with lower tech firms and products exiting the market and 
lifting average technology levels. Instead, this chapter identifies a distinctive within-firm technology effect 
that is equivalent in magnitude to the reallocation effect.  This finding is validated using a quasi-
experiment based on the entry of China into the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The accession of 
China into the WTO led to the relaxation of import quotas in the European textiles, clothing and footwear 
14 
 
(TCF) industries and therefore a large increase in import competition for a subset of manufacturing 
industries.  
The final chapter follows up on this theme of ‘induced innovation’ by examining the effects of 
government demand for high-tech goods in the US, as represented by defense spending. This demand 
channel for induced innovation has not been considered previously and I show that the effect is large both 
in terms of a parameterized demand effect and in terms of the historical magnitude. Specifically, I use 
shifts in spending associated principally with the ‘Reagan build-up’ of the 1980s to track firm-specific 
shifts in demand. I am able to track these shifts by relating how the product composition of defense 
procurement spending impacted on individual firms. The demand effect of defense procurement is 
estimated as an elasticity of approximately 0.07, which is nearly twice the benchmark established for 
civilian-sourced demand. Finally, in terms of magnitudes, the contribution of defense procurement to 
innovation peaked during the early Reagan build-up, accounting for 11.4% of the total change in patenting 
intensity and 6.5% for R&D. This compares to a defense sector share in output of around 4%. The later 
defense cutbacks under Bush Senior and Clinton then curbed the growth in technological intensity by 
around 2%.                          
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CHAPTER 1:  PANIC ON THE STREETS OF LONDON: POLICE, CRIME 
AND THE JULY 2005 TERROR ATTACKS 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we study the causal impact of police on crime, looking at what happened to crime and police 
before and after the terror attacks that hit central London in July 2005. The attacks resulted in a large 
redeployment of police officers to central London as compared to outer London – in fact, police 
deployment in central London increased by over 30 percent in the six weeks following the July 7 
bombings, before sharply falling back to pre-attack levels. During this time, crime fell significantly in 
central relative to outer London. Study of the timing of the crime reductions and their magnitude, the 
subsequent sharp return back to pre-attack crime levels, the types of crime that were more likely to be 
affected and a series of robustness tests looking at possible biases all make us confident that our research 
approach identifies a causal impact of police on crime. The instrumental variable approach we use 
uncovers an elasticity of crime with respect to police of approximately -0.3 to -0.4, so that a 10 percent 
increase in police activity reduces crime by around 3 to 4 percent. 
 
JEL Classifications:  H00, H5, K42. 
Keywords:  Crime;  Police; Terror attacks. 
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1.1  Introduction  
    Terrorism is arguably the single most significant topic of political discussion of the 
past decade. In response, a small economic literature has begun to investigate the causes and 
impacts of terrorism (see Krueger, 2007, for a summary or Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, 2003, 
for some empirical work). Terror attacks, or the threat thereof, have also been considered in 
research on one important area of public policy, namely the connections between crime and 
policing. Some recent studies (such as Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2004 and Klick and 
Taborrak, 2005) have used terrorism-related events to look at the crime-police relationship 
since terror attacks can induce an increased police presence in particular locations. This 
deployment of additional police can be used, under certain conditions, to test whether or not 
increased police reduce crime. 
In this paper, we also consider the crime-police relationship before and after a terror 
attack, but in a very different context to other studies by looking at the increased security 
presence following the terrorist bombs that hit central London in July 2005. Our application is a 
more general one than the other studies in that it covers a large metropolitan area following one 
of the most significant and widely known terror attacks of recent years. The scale of the security 
response in London after these attacks provides a potentially useful setting to examine the 
relationship between crime and police.   
Moreover, and unlike the other studies in this area, we have very good data on police 
deployment. We can use these to identify the magnitude of the causal impact of police on crime.1 
A major strength of this paper is therefore that we are able to offer explicit instrumental variable-
based estimates of the crime-police elasticity, which can be compared to other estimates like 
Levitt (1997), Corman and Mocan (2000) and Di Tella and Schargrodsky’s (2004) implied 
                                                          
1  Neither Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) nor Klick and Tabarrok (2005) have data on police activity. 
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elasticity.2 In fact, the sharp discontinuity in police deployment that we able to identify using this 
data means we are able to pin down this causal relation between crime and police very precisely. 
The natural experiment that we consider also has some important external validity in the sense 
that it involves the deployment of a clear “deterrence technology” (that is, more police on the 
streets) rather than a measure of increased expenditures on police (e.g. as in Evans and Owens, 
2007, or Machin and Marie (2011)). Arguably, this type of visible increase in police deployment 
is the main type of policy mechanism under discussion in public debates about the funding and 
use of police resources.        
 Furthermore, the effectiveness of police is important in the context of a large 
criminological literature that has generally failed to find significant impacts of police on crime, 
even in quasi-experimental studies. Sherman and Weisburd (1995) review some of the 
conclusions from this work. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990: 270) state “no evidence exists that 
augmentation of police forces or equipment, differential police strategies, or differential 
intensities of surveillance have an effect on crime rates”. Similarly emphatic arguments are made 
in Klockars (1983).        
The focus of the current paper is on what happened to criminal activity following a large 
and unanticipated increase in police presence. The scale of the change in police deployment that 
we study is much larger than in any of the other work in the crime-police research field. Indeed, 
results reported below show that police activity in central London increased by over 30 percent 
in the six weeks following the July 7 bombings as part of a police deployment policy stylishly 
titled “Operation Theseus” by the authorities. This police intervention represented the 
deployment of a very strong deterrence technology. The coverage of police was more sustained, 
widespread and complete than in the previous studies in the existing literature. We therefore 
view the scale of this change as important in addressing the paradox of the criminology literature 
                                                          
2 Whilst the Levitt (1997) paper is well known and widely cited, Justin McCrary’s (2002) comment 
highlights some concerns about the data and the approach used (see also Levitt’s, 2002, response).  
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discussed above where it proves hard to detect crime reductions linked to increased police 
presence. This is particularly the case since, during the time period when police presence was 
heightened, crime fell significantly in central London relative to outer London. Both the timing 
of the crime reductions and the types of crime that were more affected make us confident that 
this research approach identifies a causal impact of police on crime. Moreover, when police 
deployments returned to their pre-attack levels some six weeks later, the crime rate rapidly 
returned to its pre-attack level. Exploiting these sharp discontinuities in police deployment, we 
estimate an elasticity of crime with respect to police of approximately -0.3 to -0.4, so that a 10 
percent increase in police activity reduces crime by around 3 to 4 percent. Furthermore, we are 
unable to find evidence of either temporal or contemporaneous spatial displacement effects 
arising from the six-week police intervention.  
A crucial part of identifying a causal impact in this type of setting is establishing the 
exclusion restriction that terrorist attacks affect crime through the post-attack increase in police 
deployment, and not via other observable and unobservable factors correlated with the attack or 
shock. Establishing this is important to generate credibility that our findings inform the crime-
police debate rather than being just about an episode where a terror attack occurred. In this 
regard, the police deployment data we use are invaluable as their availability make it possible to 
distinguish the impact of police on crime from any general impact of the terrorist attack. In 
particular, the research design features two discontinuities related to the police intervention. The 
first is the introduction of the geographically focused police deployment policy in the week of 
the terrorist attack. The immediate period surrounding the introduction of the policy was also 
characterized by a series of potentially correlated observable and unobservable shocks related to 
the attack. In contrast, the second discontinuity associated with the withdrawal of the policy 
occurred in a very different context. In this case, the observable and unobservable shocks 
associated with the attack were still in effect and dissipating gradually. Crucially though, the 
police deployment was discretely “switched off” after a six week period and we observe an 
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increase in crime that is exactly timed with this change. Thus, we argue that is difficult to 
attribute such a clear change in crime rates to observable and unobservable shocks arising from 
the terrorist attacks. If these types of shocks significantly affected crime rates, we would expect 
this to continue even as the police deployment was withdrawn. Indeed, an interesting feature of 
our empirical results is just how clearly and definitively crime seems to respond to a police 
presence.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the events of July 2005 
and goes over the main modeling and identification issues. In Section II we describe the data and 
provide an initial descriptive analysis. Section III presents the statistical results and a range of 
additional empirical tests. Section IV concludes.  
1.2 Crime, Police and the London Terror Attacks 
1.21  The Terror Attacks 
In July 2005 London’s public transport system was subject to two waves of terror attacks. 
The first occurred on Thursday 7th July and involved the detonation of four bombs. The 32 
boroughs of London are shown in Figure 1. Three of the bombs were detonated on London 
Underground (the tube) train carriages near the stations of Russell Square (in the borough of 
Camden), Liverpool Street (Tower Hamlets) and Edgware Road (Kensington and Chelsea). A 
fourth bomb was detonated on a bus in Tavistock Square, Bloomsbury (Camden). The second 
wave of attacks occurred two weeks later on the 21st July, consisting of four unsuccessful 
attempts at detonating bombs on trains near the underground stations of Shepherds Bush 
(Kensington and Chelsea), the Oval (Lambeth), Warren Street (Westminster) and on a bus in 
Bethnal Green (Tower Hamlets). Despite the failure of the bombs to explode, this second wave 
of attacks caused much turmoil in London. There was a large manhunt to find the four men who 
escaped after the unsuccessful attacks and all of them were captured by 29th July.  
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1.22  Terror Attacks, Crime and Correlated Shocks 
 Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) were first to use police allocation policies in 
the wake of terror attacks to circumvent the endogeneity problem of crime and police. Using a 
July 1994 terrorist attack that targeted the main Jewish center in Buenos Aires, they show that 
motor vehicle thefts fell significantly in areas where extra police were subsequently deployed 
compared to areas several blocks away that did not receive extra protection. Their effect is large 
(approximately a 75 percent reduction in thefts relative to the comparison group) but also 
extremely local with no evidence that the police presence reduced crime one or two blocks away 
from the protected areas. Another study by Klick and Tabarrok (2005) uses terror alert levels in 
Washington DC to make inferences about the crime-police relationship. The deployments they 
consider cover a more general area but (as already discussed) in the end are speculative since 
they are not able to quantify them with data on police numbers or hours.  
 Both of these papers touch on the issue of correlated shocks to observables and 
unobservables. However, in our case of London this could be a greater concern since the terrorist 
attacks were a more significant, dislocating event for the city. Therefore, in thinking about the 
question of correlated shocks, it is helpful to first consider a basic equation, specified in levels, 
that describes the determinants of the crime rate in a set of geographical areas (in our case, 
London boroughs) over time:= 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 
jt jt jt j t jtC = α + δP + λX + μ + τ + ε                       (1.1) 
where Cjt is the crime rate for borough j in time period t, Pjt the level of police deployed 
and Xjt is a vector of control variables that could be comprised of observable or unobservable 
elements. The next set of terms are: jμ , a borough level fixed effect; tτ , a common time effect 
(for example, to capture common weather or economic shocks) and εjt is a random error term. In 
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(1) t denotes weeks as we estimate weekly crime equations, in which we are careful to recognise 
that crime displays a strong seasonal persistence.3 
 Consider a seasonally differenced version of equation (1), where the dependent 
variable is the change in the area crime rate relative to the rate in the same week of the previous 
year. This is highly important in crime modeling since crime is strongly persistent across areas 
over time. In practical terms, differencing eliminates the borough-level fixed effect yielding:  
                   
jt j(t-k) jt j(t-k) jt j(t-k) t t-k jt j(t-k)(C - C ) = δ(P -P ) + λ(X -X ) + (τ -τ ) + (ε - ε )         (1.2) 
note that the τt – τt-k difference term can now be interpreted as the year-on-year change in 
factors that are common across all of the areas. By expressing this equation more concisely we 
can make the correlated shocks issue explicit as follows: 
                              k jt k jt k jt k t k jtΔ C = δΔ P + λΔ X + Δ τ + Δ ε                                     (1.3) 
where Δ is a difference operator with k indexing the order of the seasonal differencing.  
Using this framework we can carefully consider how a terrorist attack – which we can 
denote generally as Z - affects the determinants of crime across areas.  Following the argument in 
the papers discussed above, the terror attack Z affects jtΔP , shifting police resources in a way 
that one can hypothesise is unrelated to crime levels. This hypothesis is, of course, a crucial 
aspect of identification that needs serious consideration.  For example, it is possible that Z could 
affect the elements of jtΔX  creating additional channels via which terrorist attacks could 
influence crime rates.  
 What are these potential impacts or channels? The economics of terrorism 
literature stresses that the impacts of terrorism can be strong, but generally turn out to be 
temporary (OECD, 2002; Bloom, 2009) in that economic activity tends to recover and normalize 
                                                          
3 These types of effects could prevail where seasonal patterns affect different boroughs with varying levels 
of intensity.  For example, the central London boroughs are more exposed to fluctuations due to tourism 
activity and exhibit sharper seasonal patterns with respect to crime.  
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itself fairly rapidly. Of course, a sharp but temporary shock would still have ample scope to 
intervene in our identification strategy by affecting crime in a way that is correlated with the 
police response. In particular, three channels demand consideration. First there is the physical 
dislocation caused by the attack. A number of tube stations were closed and many Londoners 
changed their mode of transport after the attacks (e.g. from the tube to buses or bicycles). This 
would have reshaped travel patterns and could have affected the potential supply of victims for 
criminals in some areas. Secondly, the volume of overall economic activity was affected. Studies 
on the aftermath of the attack indicate that both international and domestic tourism fell after the 
attacks, as measured by hotel vacancy rates, visitor spending data and counts of domestic day 
trips (Greater London Authority, 2005). Finally, there may be a psychological impact on 
individuals in terms of their attitudes towards risk. As Becker and Rubinstein (2004) outline, this 
influences observable travel decisions as well as more subtle unobservable behavior. 
 To summarize, we think of these effects as being manifested in three elements of 
the Xjt vector outlined above: 
                                                      
1 2
jt jt jt jtX = [X , X , θ ]                                      (1.4) 
In (4), 
1
jtX  is a set of exogenous control variables (observable to researchers), that 
includes observable factors such as area-level labour market conditions that change slowly and 
are unlikely to be immediately affected by terrorist attacks (if at all). The second 
2
jtX  vector 
represents the observable factors that change more quickly and are therefore vulnerable to the 
dislocation caused by terrorist attacks. As discussed above, here we are thinking primarily of 
factors such as travel patterns that could influence the potential supply of victims to crime across 
areas. The final element jtθ  then captures an analogous set of unobservable factors that are 
susceptible to change due to the terrorist attack. In the spirit of Becker and Rubinstein’s (2004) 
discussion, the main factor to consider here is fear or how individuals handle the risks associated 
with terrorism. For example, it is plausible that, in the wake of the attacks, commuters in London 
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became more vigilant to suspicious activity in the transport system and in public spaces. This 
vigilance would have been focused mainly on potential terrorist activity, but one might expect 
that this type of cautious behaviour could have a spillover onto crime. 
 The implications of these correlated shocks for our identification strategy can 
now be clearly delineated.  For our exclusion restriction to hold it needs to be shown that the 
terrorist attack Z affected the police deployment in a way that can be separately identified from 
Z’s effect on other observable and unobservable factors that can influence crime rates. Practically, 
we show this later in the paper by mapping the timing and location of the police deployment 
shock and comparing it to the profiles of the competing observable and unobservable shocks. 
1.23  Possible Displacement Effects 
 Another issue that could affect identification is crime displacement. Since the 
police intervention affected the costs of crime across locations and time, it may be that criminals 
take these changes into account and adjust their behavior. This raises the possibility that criminal 
activity was either diverted into other areas (e.g. the comparison group of boroughs) during 
Operation Theseus or postponed until after the extra police presence was withdrawn. The 
implication is that simple differences-in-differences estimates of the police effect on crime would 
be upwardly biased if these offsetting spatial displacement effects were not taken into account. 
Temporal displacement can have the opposite effect and we discuss this more in the final 
empirical section. 
  
1.3  Data Description and Initial Descriptive Analysis 
1.31  Data 
We use daily police reports of crime from the London Metropolitan Police Service 
(LMPS) before and after the July 2005 terrorist attacks. Our crime data cover the period from 1st 
January 2004 to 31st December 2005 and are aggregated up from ward to borough level and 
from days to weeks over the two-year period. There are 32 London boroughs as shown on the 
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map in Figure 1.1.4 There are also monthly borough level data available over a longer time 
period that we use for some robustness checks.   
The basic street-level policing of London is carried out by 33 Borough Operational 
Command Units (BOCUs), which operate to the same boundaries as the 32 London borough 
councils apart from one BOCU which is dedicated to Heathrow Airport. We have been able to 
put together a weekly panel covering 32 London boroughs over two years giving 3,328 
observations. Crime rates are calculated on the basis of population estimates at borough level, 
supplied by the Office of National Statistics (ONS) online database.5  
The police deployment data are at borough level and were produced under special 
confidential data-sharing agreements with the LMPS. The main data source used is CARM 
(Computer Aided Resource Management), the police service’s human resource management 
system. This records hours worked by individual officers on a daily basis. We aggregate the 
deployment data to borough-level since the CARM data is mainly defined at this level. However, 
there is also useful information on the allocation of hours worked by incident and/or police 
operation.6 While hours worked are available according to officer rank, our main hours measure 
is based on total hours worked by all officers in the borough adjusted for this reallocation effect. 
In addition to crime and deployment, we have also obtained weekly data on tube journeys for all 
stations from Transport for London (TFL). It is daily borough-level data aggregated up to weeks 
based on entries into and exits from tube stations. Finally, we also use data from the UK Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) to provide information on local labour market conditions.  
                                                          
4 The City of London has its own police force and so this small area is excluded from our analysis. 
5 Web Appendix Table A1 shows some summary statistics on the crime data. 
6 Since the CARM information is also used for calculating police pay it is considered a very reliable 
measure of police activity. We gained access to this data after repeated inquiries to the MPS. The main 
condition for access was that we not reveal any strategic information about ongoing or individual, 
borough-specific police deployment policies.     
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1.32  Initial Approach 
Our analysis begins by looking at what happened to police deployment and crime before 
and after the July 2005 terror attacks in London using a differences-in-differences approach. This 
rests upon defining a treatment group of boroughs in central and inner London where the extra 
police deployment occurred and comparing their crime outcomes to the other, non-treated 
boroughs. The police hours data we use facilitates the development of this approach, with two 
features standing out. First, the data allow us to measure the increase in total hours worked in the 
period after the attacks. The increase in total hours was accomplished through the increased use 
of overtime shifts across the police service and this policy lasted approximately six weeks. 
Secondly, the police data contain a special resource allocation code denoted as Central Aid. This 
code allows us to identify how police hours worked were geographically reallocated over the six-
week period. For example, we can identify how hours worked by officers stationed in the outer 
London boroughs were reallocated to public security duties in central and inner London. The 
extra hours were mainly reallocated to the boroughs of Westminster, Camden, Islington, 
Kensington and Chelsea, and Tower Hamlets, with individual borough allocations being 
proportional to the number of tube stations in the borough.7 These boroughs either contained the 
sites of the attacks or featured many potential terrorist targets such as transport nodes or 
significant public spaces. Using these two features of the data we are able to define a treatment 
group comprised of the five named boroughs. A map showing the treatment group is given in 
Figure 1.1. In most of the descriptive statistics and modeling below we use all other boroughs as 
the comparison group in order to simplify the analysis.   
What did the extra police deployment in the treated boroughs entail? The number of 
mobile police patrols were greatly increased and officers were posted to guard major public 
                                                          
7 We say “mainly reallocated” due to the fact that some mobile patrols crossed into adjacent boroughs and 
because some bordering areas of boroughs were the site of some small deployments. A good case here is 
the southern tip of Hackney borough (between Islington and Tower Hamlets). However, the majority of 
Hackney was not treated by the policy (since this borough is notoriously lacking in Tube station links) so 
we exclude it from the treatment group.       
 26 
spaces and transport nodes, particularly tube stations. In areas of central London where many 
stations were located this resulted in a highly visible police presence and this is confirmed by 
public surveys conducted at the time.8 This high visibility  potentially exerted a deterrent effect 
on public, street-level crimes such as thefts and violent assault. We test for this prediction in the 
empirical work.   
1.33  Basic Differences-in-Differences 
 In Table 1.1 we compare what happened to police deployment and to total crime 
rates before and after the July 2005 terror attacks in the treatment group boroughs as compared to 
all other boroughs. Police deployment is measured in a similar way to crime rates, that is, we 
normalize police hours worked by the borough population. Following the discussion in Section 2 
we define the before and after periods in year-on-year, seasonally adjusted terms. This ensures 
that we are comparing like-with-like in terms of the seasonal effects prevailing at a given time of 
the year. For example, looking at Table 1.1 the crime rate of 4.03 per 1000 population in panel B 
represents the treatment group crime rate in the period from the 8th of July 2004 until the 19th of 
August 2004. The post-period or “policy on” period then runs from July 7th 2005 until August 
18th 2005 with a crime rate of 3.59.9  Thus by taking the difference between these “pre” and “post” 
crime rates we are able to derive the year-on-year, seasonally adjusted change in crime rates and 
police hours. These are then differenced across the treatment (T = 1) and comparison (T = 0) 
groups to get the customary differences-in-differences (DiD) estimate. 
 The first panel of Table 1.1 shows unconditional DiD estimates for police hours. 
It is clear that the treatment boroughs experienced a very large relative change in police 
deployment. Per capita hours worked increased by 34.6 percent in the DiD (final row, column 3). 
Arguably, the composition of this relative change is almost as important for our experiment as 
                                                          
8 Table 1.A2 of the chapter Appendix reports the results of a survey of London residents in the aftermath 
of the attacks.  Approximately 70 percent of respondents from inner London attested to a higher police 
presence in the period since the attacks. The lower percentage reported by outer London residents also 
supports the hypothesis of differential deployment across areas. 
9 The one day difference in calendar date across years ensures we compare the same days of the week.  
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the scale. The relative change was driven by an increase in the treatment group (of 72.8 hours per 
capita) with little change in hours worked for the comparison group (only 2.2 hours more per 
capita). This was feasible because of the large number of overtime shifts worked. In practice, this 
means that, while there was a diversion of police resources from the comparison boroughs to the 
treatment boroughs, the former areas were able to keep their levels of police hours constant. 
Obviously, this ceteris paribus feature greatly simplifies our later analysis of displacement 
effects, since we do not have to deal with the implications of a zero-sum shift of resources across 
areas. The next panel of Table 1.1 deals with the crime rates. It shows that crime rates fell by 
11.1 percent in the DiD (final row, column 6). Again, this change is driven by a fall in treatment 
group crime rates and a steady crime rate in the comparison group. This is encouraging since it is 
what would be expected from the type of shift we have just seen in police deployment.  
 Weekly police deployment and crime rates are shown in Figures 1.2a and 1.2b. 
Here we do two things. First, we normalize crime rates and police hours across the treatment and 
comparison groups by their level in week one of our sample (i.e. January 2004). This re-scales 
the levels in both groups so that we can compare their evolution over time. Secondly, we mark 
out the attack (“policy-on”) period in 2005, along with the comparison period in the previous 
year. As Figure 1.2a shows, this reveals a clear, sharp discontinuity in police deployment. Police 
hours in the treatment group rise immediately after the attack and fall sharply at the end of the six 
weeks of Operation Theseus.   
 The visual evidence for the crime rate in Figure 1.2b is less decisive because the 
weekly crime rates are clearly more volatile than the police hours data. This is to be expected 
insofar as police hours are largely determined centrally by policy-makers, while crime rates are 
essentially the outcomes of decentralized activity. This volatility does raise the possibility that 
the fall in crime rates seen in the Table 1.1 DiD estimates may simply be due to naturally 
occurring, short-run time series volatility rather than the result of a policy intervention – a classic 
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problem in the literature (Donohue, 1998). After the correlated shocks issue this is probably the 
biggest modeling issue in the paper and we deal with it extensively in the next section. 
1.4  Statistical Models of Crime and Police 
 In this section we present our statistical estimates.  We begin with a basic set of 
estimates and then move on to focus on specific issues to do with different crime types, timing, 
correlated shocks and displacement effects. 
1.41  Statistical Approach 
 The starting point for the statistical work is a DiD model of crime determination. 
We have borough level weekly data for the two calendar years 2004 and 2005. The terror attack 
variable (Z as discussed above) is specified as an interaction term Tb*POSTt, where T denotes 
the treatment boroughs and POST is a dummy variable equal to one in the post-attack period.  
In this setting the basic reduced form seasonally differenced weekly models for police 
deployment and crime (with lower case letters denoting logs) are: 
               52 bt 1 1 t 1 b t 1 52 bt 52 1btΔ p = α + β POST + δ (T *POST ) + λ Δ x + Δ ε               (1.5) 
              52 bt 2 2 t 2 b t 2 52 bt 52 2btΔ c = α + β POST + δ (T *POST ) + λ Δ x + Δ ε              (1.6) 
Due to the highly seasonal nature of crime noted above, the equations are differenced 
across weeks of the year (hence the k = 52 subscript in the Δk differences).  The key parameters 
of interest are the δ’s, the seasonally adjusted differences-in-differences estimates of the impact 
of the terror attacks on police deployment and crime. 
 These reduced form equations can be combined to form a structural model 
relating crime to police deployment, from which we can identify the causal impact of police on 
crime.  The structural equation is: 
                     52 bt 3 3 t 3 52 bt 3 52 bt 52 3bt
Δ c = α + β POST + δ p + λ Δ x + Δ ε                  (1.7) 
where the variation in police deployment induced by the terror attacks identifies the 
causal impact of police on crime.  The first stage regression is equation (1.5) above and so 
equation (1.7) is estimated by instrumental variables (IV) where the Tb*POSTt variable is used as 
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the instrument for the change in police deployment.  Here the structural parameter of interest, δ3 
(the coefficient on police deployment), is equal to the ratio of the two reduced form coefficients, 
so that δ3 = δ2/δ1. 
 Finally, note that in some of the reduced form specifications that we consider 
below we split the POSTt*Tb into two distinct post 7/7 time periods so as to distinguish the 
“post-policy” period after the end of Operation Theseus. This term is added in order to directly to 
test for any persistent effect of the police deployment, and importantly to explicitly focus upon 
the second ‘experiment’ when police levels fell sharply back to their pre-attack levels. Thus the 
reduced forms in (1.5) and (1.6) now become:  
     1 2
52 bt 4 4 t 41 b t 42 b t 4 52 bt 52 4btΔ p = α + β POST + δ (T *POST ) + δ (T *POST ) + λ Δ x + Δ ε      (1.8)       
      1 2
52 bt 5 5 t 51 b t 52 b t 5 52 bt 52 5btΔ c = α + β POST + δ (T *POST ) + δ (T *POST ) + λ Δ x + Δ ε      (1.9) 
In these specifications POSTt1 represents the six-week policy period immediately after 
the July 7th attack when the police deployment was in operation while POSTt2 covers the time 
period subsequent to the deployment until the end of the year (that is, from the 19th of August 
2005 until December 31st 2005).10 Also note that a test of δ41 = δ42 (in the police equation, (8)) or 
δ51 = δ52 (in the crime equation, (9)) amounts to a test of temporal variations in the initial six 
week period directly after July 7th as compared to the remainder of the year. 
1.42  Basic Differences-in-Differences Estimates 
Table 1.2 provides the basic reduced form OLS and structural IV results for the models 
outlined in equations (5)-(9). For comparative purposes, we specify three terms to uncover the 
differences-in-differences estimate. Specifically, in columns (1) and (5) we include an interaction 
term that uses the full period from July 7th 2005 to December 31st 2005 to measure the post-
attack period (in the Table denoting Tb*POSTt from equations (5) and (6) as T*Post-Attack). The 
adjacent columns ((2)-(4) and (6)-(8)) then split this period in two with one interaction term for 
                                                          
10 As we discuss later police deployment levels in London boroughs were returned to their pre-attack 
baselines after the end of Operation Theseus.   
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the six-week Operation Theseus period (denoting 1
b tT *POST  from equations (8) and (9) as 
T*Post-Attack1) and another for the remaining part of the year (denoting 2
b tT *POST  as T*Post-
Attack2). As already noted, the second term is useful for testing whether there were any 
persistent effects of the police deployment or any longer-term trends in the treatment group after 
police deployment fell back to its pre-attack levels. 
The findings from the unconditional DiD estimates reported earlier are confirmed in the 
basic models in Table 1.2. The estimated coefficient on T*Post-Attack1 in the reduced form 
police equation shows a 34.1 percent increase in police deployment during Operation Theseus, 
and there is no evidence that this persists for the rest of the year (i.e. the T*Post-Attack2 
coefficient is statistically indistinguishable from zero). For the crime rate reduced form there is 
an 11.1 percent fall during the six-week policy-on period with minimal evidence of either 
persistence or a treatment group trend in the estimates for the T*Post-Attack2 variable.11 Despite 
this we include a full set of 32 borough-specific trends in the specifications in columns (7) and (8) 
to test robustness. The crime rate coefficient for the Operation Theseus period is halved, but the 
interaction term is still significant indicating that there was a fall in crime during this period that 
was over and above that of any combination of trends. 
The coincident nature of the respective timings of the increase in police deployment and 
the fall in crime suggests the increased security presence lowered crime.  The final three columns 
of the Table therefore show estimates of the causal impact of increased deployment on crime.  
Column (11) shows the basic IV estimate where the post-attack effects are constrained to be time 
invariant.  Columns (12) and (13) allow for time variation to identify a more local causal impact. 
The instrumental variable estimates are precisely determined owing to the strength of the first 
stage regressions in the earlier columns of the Table.  The preferred estimate with time-varying 
                                                          
11  Whilst we have seasonally differenced the data one may have concerns about possible contamination 
from further serial correlation.  We follow Marianne Bertrand et al (2004) and collapse the data before and 
after the attacks and obtain extremely similar results:  the estimate (standard error) based on collapsed data 
comparable to the T*Post-Attack 1 estimate in column (6) of Table 1.2 was -.112 (.027). 
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terror attack effects (reported in column (12)) shows an elasticity of crime with respect to police 
of around -0.32.  This implies that a 10 percent increase in police activity reduces crime by 
around 3.2 percent. The magnitudes of these causal estimates are similar to the small number of 
causal estimates found in the literature (they are also estimated much more precisely in statistical 
terms because of the very sharp discontinuity in police deployment that occurred). Levitt’s (1997) 
study found elasticities in the -0.43 to -0.50 range, while Corman and Mocan (2000) estimated an 
average elasticity of -0.45 across different types of offences and Di Tella and Schargrodsky 
(2004) reported an elasticity of motor vehicle thefts with respect to police of -0.33. 
OLS estimates are reported in columns (9) and (10). The column labelled ‘levels’ shows 
a pooled cross-sectional regression with a strongly significant positive coefficient on the police 
deployment variable. In column (10) we show estimates from a seasonally-differenced version of 
this OLS regression, obtaining a negligible, insignificant coefficient. This reflects the  limited 
year-on-year change in police hours to be found when the seasonal difference is taken.  
1.43  Different Crime Types 
So far the results use a measure of total crimes. However, heterogeneity of the overall 
effect by the type of crime is potentially important. The pattern of the impact by crime type is an 
important falsification exercise. The main feature of Operation Theseus was a highly visible 
public deployment of police officers in the form of foot and mobile patrols, particularly around 
major transport hubs. We could therefore expect any police effect to be operating mainly through 
a deterrence technology based on greater visibility, generating an increase in the probability of 
detection for crimes committed in or around public places. As a result, the crime effect 
documented in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 should be concentrated in crime types more susceptible to this 
type of technology.   
We therefore estimated reduced form treatment effects across the six major crime 
categories defined by the Metropolitan Police – thefts, violent crimes, sexual offences, robbery, 
burglary and criminal damage. Separate estimates by crime type are reported in Table 1.3, which 
 32 
shows there to be important differences across these groups.  The estimates show strongly 
significant effects for thefts and violent crimes. These are comprised of crimes such as street-
level thefts (picking pockets, snatches, thefts from stores, motor vehicle-related theft and 
tampering) as well as street-level violence (common assault, harassment, aggravated bodily 
harm). Of considerable note is the lack of any effect for burglary. As a crime that mainly occurs 
at night and in private dwellings, this is arguably the crime category that is least susceptible to a 
public deterrence technology.  
In Table 1.4 we aggregate these major categories into a group of crimes potentially 
susceptible to Operation Theseus (thefts, violent crimes and robberies) and a group of remaining 
non-susceptible crimes (burglary, criminal damage and sexual offences). The point estimate for 
our preferred susceptible crimes estimate is -0.131 (column 3, panel (I)) which compares to an 
estimate of -0.109 for total crimes in column (7) of Table 1.2.  There is a much smaller (in 
absolute terms), statistically insignificant estimate of -0.033 for non-susceptible crimes (reported 
in column (3), panel (II), of Table 4). We therefore use this susceptible crimes classification as 
the main outcome variable in the remainder of our analysis. The estimated elasticity of 
susceptible crimes with respect to police deployment in the column (8) model of the Table is -
0.38 and is again very precisely determined. 
1.44  Timing 
The previous section cited the volatility of the crime rates and timing in general as an 
important issue. Given that we are using weekly data, there is a need to investigate to what extent 
short-term variations could be driving the results for our policy intervention. To test this we take 
the extreme approach of testing every week for hypothetical or “placebo” policy effects. 
Specifically, we estimate the reduced form models outlined in equations (5) and (6) defining a 
single week-treatment group interaction term for each of the 52 weeks in our data. We then run 
52 regressions each featuring a different week*Tb interaction and plot the estimated coefficient 
and confidence intervals. The major advantage of this is that it extracts all the variation and 
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volatility from the data in a way that reveals the implications for our main DiD estimates. 
Practically, this exercise is therefore able to test whether our 6-week Operation Theseus effect is 
merely a product of time-series volatility or variation that is equally likely to occur in other sub-
periods.     
We plot the coefficients and confidence intervals for all 52 weeks in Figures 1.3a and 
1.3b. Figure 1.3a shows the results for police hours repeating the clear pattern seen in Figure 1.2a 
of the police deployment policy being switched on and off. (Note that precisely estimated 
treatment effects in this graph are characterized by confidence intervals that do not overlap the 
zero line). The analogous result for the susceptible crime rate is then shown in Figure 1.3b. The 
decreases in crime are less dramatic than the increases in police hours, but the two clearly closely 
coincide in timing. It is interesting to note that the pattern of six consecutive weeks of significant, 
negative treatment effects in the crime rate is not repeated in any other period of the data except 
Operation Theseus. This is impressive as it shows that the effect of the policy intervention can be 
seen despite the noise and volatility of the weekly data.12 
1.45  Correlated Shocks 
The discussion of timing has a direct bearing on the issue of correlated shocks outlined 
in Section 1.2. In particular, it is important to examine the extent to which any shifts in correlated 
observables do or do not coincide in timing with the fall - and subsequent bounce back - in crime. 
The major observable variable we consider here concerns transport decisions and we study this 
                                                          
12 As a further check on the issue of volatility we made use of monthly, borough-level crime data available 
from 2001 onwards (as the daily crime data we use to construct our weekly panel is only available since 
the beginning of 2004). These data allow us to examine whether there is a regular pattern of negative 
effects in the middle part of the year. In this exercise, we define year-on-year differences in susceptible 
crime for the July-August period over the a range of intervals: 2001-2002, 2002-2003, 2003-2004, and 
2004-2005. The results are shown in chapter Appendix Table 1.A3. We find that a significant treatment 
effect in susceptible crimes is only evident for the 2004-2005 time period. This gives us further confidence 
that our estimate for this year is a unique event that cannot be likened to arbitrary fluctuations of previous 
years.  
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using data on tube journeys obtained from Transport for London. This records journey patterns 
for the main method of public transport around London and therefore provides a good proxy for 
shifts in the volume of activity around the city.  We aggregate the journeys information to 
borough level and normalise it with respect to the number of tube stations in the borough.   
Figure 1.5 shows how journeys changed year-on-year across the treatment and 
comparison groups. There is no evidence of a discontinuity in travel patterns corresponding 
exactly to the timing of the six week period of increased police presence.  In fact the Figure 
shows a smoother change in tube usage, with the number of journeys trending back up and 
returning only gradually to pre-attack levels by the end of the year, but with no sharp 
discontinuity like the police and crime series. 
Table 1.5 formally tests for a difference in journeys across treatment and comparison 
groups. It shows reduced form estimates using tube journeys as the dependent variable to test to 
what extent the fall in tube journeys after the attacks followed the pattern of the police 
deployment. The estimates indicate that total journeys fell by 22 percent (column 2, controls) 
over the period of Operation Theseus. However, some of this fall may have been due to a 
diversion of commuters onto other modes of public transport. This is particularly plausible given 
that two tube lines running through the treatment group were effectively closed down for 
approximately four weeks after 7th July. To examine this we instead normalize journeys by the 
number of open tube stations with the results reported in panel B of the Table. The effect is now 
smaller at 13 percent. Importantly, on timing, notice that reduced use of the tube persisted and 
carried on well after the police numbers had gone back to their original levels.  
This final point about the persistent effect of the terror attacks on tube-related travel 
decisions is useful for illustrating the correlated shocks issue. As Table 1.5 shows, tube travel 
continued to be significantly lower in the treatment group for the whole period until the end of 
2005. For example, columns (2) and (4) show that a persistent 10.3 percent fall in tube travel 
after the police deployment was completed, which is approximately half of the 21 percent effect 
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seen in the Operation Theseus period. If the change in travel patterns induced by the terrorist 
attacks was responsible for reducing crime then we would expect some part of this effect to 
continue after the deployment.  
At this point it is worth re-considering the week-by-week evidence presented in Figures 
1.3a and 1.3b. A unique feature of the Operation Theseus deployment is that it provides us with 
two discontinuities in police presence, namely the way that the deployment was discretely 
switched on and off. The first discontinuity is of course related to the initial attack on July 7th. 
Notably, along with an increased police deployment this first discontinuity is associated with a 
similarly timed shift in observable and unobservable factors. In particular, this first discontinuity 
in police deployment was also accompanied by a similarly acute shift in unobservable factors 
(that is, widespread changes in behaviors and attitudes towards public security risks – “panic” for 
shorthand). Because these two effects coincide exactly it is legitimate to raise the argument that 
the reduction in crime could have been partly driven by the shift in correlated unobservables.  
However, the second discontinuity again provides a useful counterfactual. In this case 
the police deployment was “switched off” in an environment where unobservable factors were 
still in effect. Importantly, the Metropolitan Police never made an official public announcement 
that the police deployment was being significantly reduced. This decision therefore limits the 
scope for unobservable factors to explicitly follow or respond to the police deployment. It is 
therefore interesting to compare the treatment effect estimates immediately before and after the 
deployment was switched off. The estimated treatment interaction in week 85 (the last week of 
the police deployment) was -0.107 (0.043) while the same interaction in the two following weeks 
are estimated as being -0.040 (0.061) and -0.041 (0.045). This shows that crime in the treatment 
group increased again at the exact point that the police deployment was withdrawn. Furthermore, 
this discrete shift in deployment occurred as observable and unobservable factors that could have 
affected crime still strongly persisted (for example, recall the -10.3 percent gap in tube travel in 
Table 1.5 after the deployment was withdrawn).  
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More generally, this second discontinuity illustrates the point that any correlated, 
unobservable shocks affecting crime would need to be exactly and exquisitely timed to account 
for the drop in crime that occurred during Operation Theseus. Our argument then is that such 
timing is implausible given the decentralized nature of the decisions driving changes in 
unobservables. That is, the unobservable shocks are the result of individual decisions by millions 
of commuters and members of the public while Operation Theseus was a centrally determined 
policy with a clear “on” and “off” date. Indeed, the evidence on the police deployment that we 
show in this paper indicates that the Metropolitan Police’s response was quite deterministic. That 
is, deployment levels were raised in the treatment group while carefully keeping levels constant 
in the comparison group. Furthermore, police deployment levels were effectively restored to their 
pre-attack levels after Operation Theseus.13  In contrast, shifts in travel patterns by inbound 
commuters did not match the timing and location of the police response.14                           
The issue of work travel decisions also uncovers a source of variation that we are able to 
exploit for evaluating the possible effect of observable, activity-related shocks. Specifically, any 
basic model of work and non-work travel decisions predicts interesting variations in terms of 
timing. For example, we would expect that faced with the terrorist risks associated with travel on 
public transport people would adjust their behavior differently for non-work travel. That is, the 
travel decision is less elastic for the travel to work decision compared to that for non-work travel. 
We would therefore expect that tube journeys would fall by proportionately more on weekends 
                                                          
13 Our discussions with MPS policy officers indicate that big changes in the relative levels of ongoing 
police deployment in different boroughs occur only rarely. Relative levels of police deployment are 
determined mainly by centralised formulas (where the main criteria are borough characteristics) with 
changes determined by a centralised committee.        
14 More support for the hypothesis that changing travel patterns did not match the timing of changes in 
police presence follows from an analysis of Labour Force Survey (LFS) data. These data gives information 
on where people live and work enabling us to look at whether the number of inbound commuters to inner 
London changed. There is no evidence that the work travel decisions of people commuting in from outer 
London and the South East were affected by the attacks in that changes in the proportion of inbound 
commuters before and after the attacks are statistically insignificant, supporting the idea that modes of 
transport activity were affected more than travel volumes (see chapter Appendix Table 1.A4).  
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(when most non-work travel takes place) than on weekdays. This does seem to have been the 
case with tube journeys falling by 28 percent on weekends as compared to 20 percent on 
weekdays (see the lower panel of Table 1.5). 
Thus there is an important source of intra-week variation in the shock to observables. If 
the shock to observables drives the fall in crime, then we would expect this to reflect a more 
pronounced effect of police on crime on weekends. Following this, we have re-estimated the 
baseline models excluding all observations relating to weekends.15 This results in very similar 
coefficient estimates and only slightly larger standard errors, as shown in Table 1.6. Importantly, 
this means that our estimates are unaffected even when we drop the section of our crime data that 
is most vulnerable to the problem of correlated observable shocks. 
  A similar argument can be made in terms of correlated unobservable shocks. As 
already seen, there is a distinctive pattern to the timing of the fall in crime and its subsequent 
bounce back. For unobservable shocks to be driving our results their effect would have to be 
large and exquisitely timed to perfectly match the police and crime changes. However, basic 
survey evidence on risk attitudes amongst inner and outer London residents also suggests no 
significant difference in the types of attitudes that would drive a set of significant, differential 
unobservable shocks across treatment and comparison groups. Indeed, responses on attitudes to 
the terror attacks given by inner and outer London residents are closely comparable.16  The 
attacks almost certainly had an impact on risk attitudes but they seem to be very similar in the 
treatment and comparison areas. From this we conclude that the effect of unobservables is likely 
to be minimal. 
                                                          
15 Recall that our crime, police and tube journeys data are available at daily level for the years 2004-2005. 
This gives us the flexibility to drop Saturday and Sunday prior to aggregating to a weekly frequency. 
16 See chapter Appendix Table 1.A5.   
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1.46  Possible Crime Displacement 
 The final empirical issue we consider is that of crime displacement, both spatial 
and temporal. These two displacement effects have opposing effects on the crime-police 
relationship we have estimated. Firstly, spatial displacement into comparison areas is likely to 
impart a downward bias on our estimate as it will move criminal activity into the non-treated 
boroughs, increasing crime there and lowering the difference-in-difference estimate. Secondly, 
temporal displacement could impart an upward bias on our estimate. Criminals operating in the 
treatment group could delay their actions, thus contributing to a larger fall in crime during the 
policy-on period, but subsequently there will be a compensating increase in crime in the wake of 
the policy. 
  It turns out that we are not able to marshall evidence for either of these.17 The 
paper by Draca, Machin and Witt (2011) looks at spatial displacement due to Operation Theseus 
in more detail. Here, we note the results of a robustness check where the comparison group is 
restricted to a set of adjacent and/or central London boroughs. If crime were displaced to these 
geographically closer boroughs, then we would see different estimates from the baseline 
estimates considered earlier. In particular, if crime rose in these nearby boroughs as a result of 
displacement then we would expect a smaller differences-in-differences estimate. Using these 
more matched boroughs (Adjacent and Central Ten18) produces very similar results to the earlier 
estimates. Compared to the baseline estimates discussed earlier (-0.132, with associated standard 
error 0.031), for susceptible crimes the estimated effects (standard errors) were -0.129 (0.040) for 
Adjacent and -0.108 (0.051) for Central Ten. Thus the estimates are similar, identifying a crime 
                                                          
17 On the face of it, the lack of displacement for the kind of susceptible street-level crimes where we find 
effects might seem surprising. Unfortunately, we do not have data that would enable a stronger test to be 
undertaken (e.g. on tourist traffic in treatment and control boroughs, or on the attitudes of criminals). 
18 Adjacent boroughs were: Brent, Hackney, Hammersmith and Fulham, Lambeth, Newham, Southwark 
and Wandsworth. Central Ten boroughs were: Westminster, Camden, Islington, Kensington and Chelsea, 
Tower Hamlets (Treatment Group) and Brent, Hackney, Hammersmith and Fulham, Lambeth and 
Southwark. 
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fall of around 11-13 percent for susceptible crimes in central London relative to the (respective) 
comparison boroughs. In line with the earlier baseline results there was no impact on non-
susceptible crimes. As such, it does not seem that contemporaneous spatial displacement 
occurred during Operation Theseus.19 
  Finally, the issue of temporal displacement in the treatment group can be looked 
at by referring back to the week-by-week estimates of treatment effects in Figure 1.3. As we have 
already noted, after the bounce-back in treatment borough crime that quickly occurred at the end 
of Operation Theseus, there is no evidence in the differenced models of any subsequent increase 
in treatment area crime. This seems to run against the hypothesis of inter-temporal substitution 
where criminal activity rebounds after the police deployment was withdrawn from the treatment 
boroughs.20 
1.5  Conclusions 
In this paper we provide new, highly robust evidence on the causal impact of police on 
crime. We find strong evidence that more police lead to reductions in what we refer to as 
susceptible crimes (i.e. those that are more likely to be prevented by police visibility including 
street crimes like robberies and thefts). Our starting point is the basic insight at the centre of Di 
Tella and Schargrodsky’s (2004) paper, namely that terrorist attacks can induce exogenous 
variations in the allocation of police resources that can be used to estimate the causal impact of 
police on crime. Using the case of the July 2005 London terror attacks, our paper extends this 
strategy in two significant ways. First, the scale of the police deployment we consider is much 
                                                          
19  As a further check for displacement effects, we also followed the approach of Grogger (2002) in 
contrasting crime trends between adjacent and non-adjacent comparison boroughs. However, again we 
could not uncover decisive evidence of between-borough displacement effects.  
20 Closer inspection of Figure 1.2(b) does show something of an upturn in crime in the comparison 
boroughs in the latter part of 2005. Indeed, it is possible that this could reflect a delayed spatial 
displacement effect. However, and counter to this, in the differenced statistical models treatment-control 
borough differences in the post-Operation Theseus period are not statistically significant (see the 
insignificant coefficients on T*Post-Attack 1.2 in Tables 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 and 1.6). 
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greater than the highly localized responses that have previously been studied. Together with the 
unique police hours data we use, this allows us to provide new, highly robust IV-based estimates 
of the crime-police elasticity. Furthermore, there is a novel ceteris paribus dimension to the 
London police deployment. By temporarily extending its resources (primarily through overtime) 
the police service was able to keep their force levels constant in the comparison group that we 
consider, while simultaneously increasing the police presence in the treatment group. This 
provides a clean setting to test the relationship between crime and police.  
 The research design delivers some striking results. There is clear evidence that 
the timing and location of falls in susceptible crimes closely coincide with the increase in police 
deployment. Crime rates quickly returned to pre-attack levels after the six week “policy-on” 
period. Shocks to observable activity (as measured by tube journey data) cannot account for the 
timing of the fall and it is hard to conceive of a pattern of unobservable shocks that could do so. 
However, as with other papers that adopt a ‘quasi-experimental’ approach, one might have 
concerns about the study’s external validity. Using a very different approach from other papers 
looking at the causal impact of crime, our preferred IV causal estimate of the crime-police 
elasticity is approximately -0.38 (for susceptible crimes), which is strikingly similar to existing 
results in the literature (e.g. those of Levitt, 1997, Corman and Mocan, 2000, and Di Tella and 
Schargrodsky, 2004).  Moreover, because of the scale of the deployment change and the very 
clear coincident timing in the crime fall, this elasticity is precisely estimated and supportive of 
the basic economic model of crime in which more police reduce criminal activity. 
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1.6 Figures for Chapter 1. 
 
FIGURE 1.1: MAP OF LONDON BOROUGHS 
 
  
Notes: 32 boroughs of London. Treatment group for Operation Theseus police intervention includes: Camden, Kensington and Chelsea, 
Islington, Tower Hamlets and Westminster.  See Table A1 of the Web Appendix for descriptive statistics on crime levels for the 
treatment and comparison groups.   
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FIGURE 1.2:  
POLICE HOURS AND TOTAL CRIME (LEVELS) 2004-2005, 
TREATMENT VERSUS COMPARISON GROUP 
 
(a) Police Hours (per 1000 population)       (b) Total Crimes (per 1000 population) 
 
            
 
Notes: This Figure plots levels of police and crime for the treatment and comparison groups. Horizontal axis covers the period from 
January 2004 – January 2006. The values of police and crime have been normalised relative to the values in the first week of January 
2004. Treatment and Comparison groups defined as per Figure 1. 
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FIGURE 1.3: 
WEEK-BY-WEEK PLACEBO POLICY EFFECTS-POLICE HOURS AND SUSCEPTIBLE CRIMES 
 
            (a) Year-on-Year Change in Police Hours (per 1000 population)  (b) Year-on-Year Change in Susceptible Crime Rate 
 
Notes: This Figure plots the coefficients and confidence intervals for week-by-week treatment*week interactions from January 2005-
January 2006. These are estimated following the reduced form specifications in the main body of the paper. Standard errors clustered 
by borough. Note that since this is year-on-year, seasonally differenced data it reflects an underlying sample extending from January 
2004-January 2006.     
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FIGURE 1.4:  
YEAR-ON-YEAR CHANGES IN NUMBER OF TUBE JOURNEYS, 
JANUARY 2004-JANUARY 2006. 
 
 
Notes: Horizontal axis covers the period from January 2005-January 2006. Note that since this is year-on-year, seasonally differenced 
data it reflects an underlying sample extending from January 2004-January 2006. The vertical axis measures the year-on-year log 
change in tube journeys. Tube journeys per station are measured as the sum of station entry and exit (i.e. inward and outward journeys) 
as recorded at station gates. Journeys per station are then aggregated to the borough and treatment/comparison group level for this 
graph. Data provided by Transport for London (TfL).      
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1.7 Tables for Chapter 1. 
TABLE 1.1:  
POLICE DEPLOYMENT AND MAJOR CRIMES, DIFFERENCES-IN-DIFFERENCES, 2004-2005 
  (A) 
Police Deployment 
(Hours worked per 1000 Population) 
(B) 
Crime Rate 
(Crimes per 1000 Population) 
   (1) 
Pre-Period 
 
(2) 
Post-Period 
(3) 
Difference 
(Post – Pre) 
(4) 
Pre-Period 
 
(5) 
Post-7/11 
(6) 
 Difference 
(Post – Pre) 
 
T = 1 
  
169.46 
 
242.29 
 
72.83 
 
4.03 
 
3.59 
 
-0.44 
 
T = 0 
  
82.77 
 
84.95 
 
2.18 
 
1.99 
 
1.97 
 
-0.02 
 
Differences-in-
Differences (Levels) 
 
Differences-in-
Differences (Logs) 
   
 
      70.65*** 
(7.52) 
 
    0.35*** 
(0.04) 
  
 
     -0.43** 
(0.16) 
 
     -0.11*** 
(0.04) 
 Notes:  Post-period defined as the six weeks following 7/7/2005. Pre-period defined as the six weeks following 8/7/2004. Weeks defined in a Thursday-
Wednesday interval throughout to ensure a clean pre and post split in the 2005 attack weeks. Treatment group (T = 1) defined as boroughs of Westminster, 
Camden, Islington, Tower Hamlets and Kensington-Chelsea. Comparison group (T = 0) defined as other boroughs of London.  Police deployment defined as 
total weekly hours worked by police staff at borough-level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 1.2: 
DIFFERENCES-IN-DIFFERENCES REGRESSION ESTIMATES, POLICE DEPLOYMENT AND TOTAL CRIMES, 2004-2005. 
 
(A) 
Police Deployment 
(Hours Worked per 1000 Population) 
 (B) 
Total Crimes 
(Crimes per 1000 Population) 
(C) 
OLS 
 
(D) 
IV Estimates 
 
 Full Split +Controls +Trends Full Split +Controls +Trends Levels Differences Full  Split +Trends 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
T*Post-Attack 0.081***    -0.052**         
 (0.010)    (0.021)         
T*Post-Attack1  0.341*** 0.342*** 0.356***  -0.111*** -0.109*** -0.056*      
  (0.028) (0.029) (0.027)  (0.027) (0.027) (0.030)      
T*Post-Attack2  -0.001 0.001 0.014  -0.033 -0.031 0.024      
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.016)  (0.027) (0.028) (0.054)      
ln(Police Hours)         0.785***     
         (0.053)     
∆ln(Police Hours)          -0.031 -0.641** -0.318*** -0.183*** 
                    (0.051) (0.301) (0.093) (0.066) 
Controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Trends No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No No Yes 
Number of 
Boroughs 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32  
Number of 
Observations 1664 1664 1664 1664 1664 1664 1664 1664 3328 1664 1664 1664 1664 
Notes: All specifications include week fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by borough in parentheses. Weighted by borough population. Post-period for baseline models (1) and (5) defined as all weeks 
after 7/7/2005 until 31/12/2005 attack inclusive. Weeks defined in a Thursday-Wednesday interval throughout to ensure a clean pre and post split in the attack weeks. T*Post-Attack is then defined as 
interaction of treatment group with a dummy variable for the post-period. T*Post-Attack1 is defined as interaction of treatment group with a deployment “policy” dummy for weeks 1-6 following the July 7th 
2005 attack. T*Post-Attack2 is defined as treatment group interaction for all weeks subsequent to the main Operation Theseus deployment. Treatment group defined as boroughs of Westminster, Camden, 
Islington, Tower Hamlets and Kensington-Chelsea. Police deployment defined as total weekly hours worked by all police staff at borough-level. Controls based on Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) 
data and include: borough unemployment rate, employment rate, males under 25 as proportion of population, and whites as proportion of population (following QLFS ethnic definitions).  
 49 
 
TABLE 1.3:  
TREATMENT EFFECTS BY MAJOR CRIME CATEGORY 
  THEFTS, VIOLENCE AND SEX CRIMES 
Crime Category   Thefts   Violence   Sex Crimes 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
T*Post-Attack1  -0.139*** -0.082*  -0.124*** -0.108***  -0.078 -0.102 
  (0.044) (0.045)  (0.043) (0.034)  (0.123) (0.138) 
T*Post-Attack2  -0.017 0.044  -0.054 -0.038  -0.080 -0.094 
  (0.039) (0.085)  (0.032) (0.056)  (0.082) (0.084) 
Trends  No Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Number of Boroughs  32 32  32 32  32 32 
Number of 
Observations  1664 1664  1664 1664  1664 1664 
  ROBBERY, BURGLARY AND CRIMINAL DAMAGE 
Crime Category  Robbery  Burglary  Criminal Damage 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
T*Post-Attack1  -0.131 -0.012  -0.035 -0.029  -0.047 -0.005 
  (0.119) (0.129)  (0.057) (0.067)  (0.052) (0.041) 
T*Post-Attack2  -0.089 0.024  -0.093 -0.078  -0.018 0.020 
  (0.098) (0.149)  (0.059) (0.075)  (0.043) (0.057) 
Trends  No Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Number of Boroughs  32 32  32 32  32 32 
Number of 
Observations  1664 1664  1664 1664  1664 1664 
Notes: All specifications include week fixed effects. Standard clustered by borough in parentheses. Weighted by borough 
population. T*Post-Attack1 and T*Attack2 defined as per Table 2. Treatment group also defined as per Table 2. See Table A6  
in the Web Appendix for definitions of the Major Crime categories in terms of the constituent Minor Crimes. Crime categories 
used follow the definitions provided by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). 
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TABLE 1.4: 
SUSCEPTIBLE CRIMES VERSUS NON-SUSCEPTIBLE CRIMES, 2004-2005. 
                 
I. SUSCEPTIBLE  CRIMES        
  
(A) 
Reduced Forms 
(B) 
OLS 
(C) 
IV Estimates 
  Full Split +Controls +Trends Levels Differences Full Split +Trends 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
T*Post-Attack  -0.056**         
  (0.023)         
T*Post-Attack1   -0.131*** -0.132*** -0.067*      
   (0.031) (0.031) (0.035)      
T*Post-Attack2   -0.033 -0.033 0.033      
   (0.030) (0.030) (0.063)      
ln(Police Hours)      0.952***     
      (0.056)     
∆ln(Police Hours)       -0.019 -0.694** 
-
0.383*** -0.223*** 
        (0.063) (0.336) (0.105) (0.074) 
           
Controls  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Trends  No No No Yes No No No  No Yes 
Number of Boroughs  32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Number of Observations  1664 1664 1664 1664 3328 1664 1664 1664 1664 
Notes: All specifications include include week fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by borough in parentheses. Weighted by borough population. Susceptible Crimes defined as: 
Violence Against the Person; Theft and Handling; Robbery. Non-Susceptible Crimes defined as: Burglary and Criminal Damage; Sexual Offences.   Treatment group definitions and 
T*Post-Attack terms defined as per Table 2. Controls also defined as per Table 2. 
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TABLE 1.4: 
SUSCEPTIBLE CRIMES VERSUS NON-SUSCEPTIBLE CRIMES, 2004-2005. 
(continued) 
 
(II) NON-SUSCEPTIBLE  CRIMES   
  
(A) 
Reduced Forms 
(B) 
OLS 
(C) 
IV Estimates 
   Full Split +Controls +Trends Levels Differences Full Split 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
T*Post-Attack  -0.048*        
  (0.024)        
T*Post-Attack1   -0.033 -0.023 -0.015     
   (0.026) (0.027) (0.031)     
T*Post-Attack2   -0.053 -0.043 -0.033     
   (0.034) (0.037) (0.045)     
ln(Police Hours)      0.327***    
      (0.046)    
∆ln(Police Hours)       -0.056 -0.597* -0.065 
        (0.094) (0.337) (0.078) 
          
Controls  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Trends  No No No Yes No No No  No 
Number of Boroughs  32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Number of Observations  1664 1664 1664 1664 3328 1664 1664 1664 
          
Notes: All specifications include include week fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by borough in parentheses. Weighted by borough population. Susceptible Crimes defined as: 
Violence Against the Person; Theft and Handling; Robbery. Non-Susceptible Crimes defined as: Burglary and Criminal Damage; Sexual Offences.   Treatment group definitions and 
T*Post-Attack terms defined as per Table 2. Controls also defined as per Table 2. 
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TABLE 1.5:  
CHANGES IN TUBE JOURNEYS, BEFORE AND AFTER JULY 7TH  2005. 
 
 
 log(Journeys/ Number of 
Stations) 
 log(Journeys/ Number of Open 
Stations) 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
  Baseline Add Controls  Baseline Add Controls 
T*Post-Attack1      -0.212***     -0.215***     -0.133***     -0.137*** 
  (0.018) (0.021)  (0.016) (0.020) 
T*Post-Attack2     -0.105***     -0.103***      -0.105***    -0.103*** 
  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008) 
Controls   No Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  104 104  104 104 
 
 log(Journeys/ Number of 
Stations) 
 log(Journeys/ Number of 
Stations) 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
  Weekdays Weekends  Weekdays Weekends 
 T*Post-Attack1      -0.196***    -0.281***      -0.197***    -0.294*** 
  (0.018) (0.034)  (0.022) (0.045) 
 T*Post-Attack2      -0.097***   -0.106***      -0.093***     -0.112*** 
  (0.010) (0.032)  (0.010) (0.030) 
       
Controls  No No  Yes Yes 
Observations  104 104  104 104 
Notes: Borough level data collapsed by treatment and comparison group, 2 units over 52 weeks. All columns 
include week fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by treatment group unit in parentheses. All regressions 
weighted by treatment and comparison group populations. Results adjusted for closed stations (i.e. using the 
Number of Open Stations as denominator) do not count closed stations along the Piccadilly Line (Arnos Grove 
to Hyde Park Corner) and Hammersmith and City Line (closed from July 7th to August 2nd, 2005). Note that 
stations that intersect with other tube lines are not counted as part of this closure.  
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TABLE 1.6: 
ESTIMATED CRIME TREATMENT EFFECTS WHEN EXCLUDING WEEKENDS 
 
  (A) 
Susceptible Crimes 
 (B) 
Non-Susceptible Crimes 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
   Reduced 
Form 
IV 
 
 Reduced Form IV 
T*Post Attack1  -0.138*** 
(0.046) 
 
  0.005 
(0.025) 
 
T*Post Attack2 
 
 -0.032 
(0.031) 
 
  -0.037 
(0.043) 
 
ln(Police 
Deployment) 
       -0.400*** 
(0.150) 
 
  0.017 
(0.072) 
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
No of Boroughs 
 
32 32  32 32 
No of Observations 
 
 
1664 1664  1664 1664 
Notes: All specifications include week fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by borough in parentheses. 
Weighted by borough population. These models estimate similar models to Table 4 but using a count of 
crimes per 1000 population that excludes all crimes occurring on weekends (i.e.: using only Monday-
Friday). Treatment groups, T*Post-Attack terms and Crime Categories defined as in Table 4. 
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1.7 Appendix for Chapter 1 
 
TABLE 1.A1: DISTRIBUTION OF CRIME IN LONDON BY MAJOR CATEGORY, 
2004-2005 
 
 (1) 
% of All 
Crimes 
(2) 
Crime  
Rate 
(per 1000) 
  
(3) 
% Occurring  
in Treatment 
Group   
(4) 
Crime Rate in 
 Treatment 
Group 
(per 1000) 
(A) Susceptible Crimes     
Theft and Handling 44.0 106.1 28.0 234.0 
Violence Against the Person 22.6 54.4 17.7 76.0 
Robbery 4.6          11.1 15.5 13.5 
(B) Non-Susceptible Crimes     
Burglary 12.3 29.6 17.4 40.5 
Criminal Damage 15.5 37.4 13.6 40.0 
Sexual Offences 1.1 2.7 21.8 4.6 
Total 100.0 241.1 21.3 204.2 
Notes: All major crimes occurring in the 32 boroughs of London between 1st January 2004 and 31st December 2005. 
Crime rate in column (2) calculated as number of crimes as per 1,000 members of population across all of London. 
Figures in columns (3) represent the proportion of crimes that take place in the treatment group by major category 
(for example, 28% of all Theft and Handling offences take place in the treatment group boroughs).  Treatment group 
defined as boroughs of Westminster, Camden, Islington, Tower Hamlets and Kensington-Chelsea. 
 
 
TABLE 1.A2:  POLICE PATROLS AFTER JULY 7TH, 2005 
 
Q: Have you seen more, less or 
about the same police patrols 
across London? 
Inner 
London   
 
Outer  
London 
   
More (%) 70 62 
About the Same (%) 20 27 
Less (%) 5 3 
Don’t Know (%) 5 8 
 
Total Respondents (Number) 
 
248 
 
361 
Notes: Source is IPSOS MORI Survey. Exact wording of question: “Since the attacks in 
July, would you say you have seen more, less or about the same amount of police patrols 
across London?” Interviews conducted on 22-26 September 2005. 
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TABLE 1.A3: EXTENDED TIME PERIOD ANALYSIS BASED ON MONTHLY DATA, 
(BOROUGH LEVEL MODELS, DIFFERENCED ACROSS YEARS, 2001-2005) 
 
 
  Change in log(Susceptible Crimes Per 1000 Population)  
 
Year on Year Changes            
(1) 
July/August 
2001 – 
July/August 
2002 
(2) 
July/August 
2002 – 
July/August 
2003 
(3) 
July/August 
2003 – 
July/August 
2004 
(4) 
July/August 
2004 – 
July/August 
2005 
     
Treatment boroughs (T) 0.029 -0.060 -0.057 -0.098 
Control boroughs (C) 0.072 -0.021 -0.028 0.007 
 
T – C Gap 
 
-0.043 
(0.029) 
 
-0.039 
(0.030) 
 
-0.029 
(0.043) 
 
  -0.105*** 
(0.031) 
Notes: All models estimated in terms of seasonal differences (i.e. differenced relative to the same month in the 
previous year).  Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Boroughs weighted by population. Treatment group 
defined as boroughs of Westminster, Camden, Islington, Tower Hamlets and Kensington-Chelsea. “Policy-on” 
period defined as July-August. Crime defined according to Susceptible category given in Table 4 of the main 
paper. 
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TABLE 1.A4: WORK TRAVEL PATTERNS INTO CENTRAL LONDON,  
BEFORE AND AFTER JULY 7TH 
 
 (1) 
Outer London 
Resident 
(2) 
 Rest of South-East 
Resident 
(A) Short-Run   
6 Week Before 
 
0.166 0.035 
6 Weeks After 
 
0.175 0.037 
Difference 0.005 
(0.022) 
 
0.002 
(0.008) 
(B) Medium-Run   
12 Weeks Before 
 
0.145 0.038 
12 Weeks After 
 
0.157 0.031 
Difference 
 
0.012 
(0.021) 
 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
(C) Long-Run   
6 Months Before 
 
0.155 0.034 
6 Months After 
 
0.160 0.031 
Difference 
 
0.005 
(0.015) 
 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
Notes: Source is UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS), 2004-2005. Standard errors clustered by 
week. Defined for all employed person aged 18-65 working in Central or Inner London. Column 1 defines 
all those residing in Outer London and working in Central or Inner London. Column 2 defines all those 
residing in the South East of England region and working in Central or Inner London. 
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TABLE 1.A5: SURVEY EVIDENCE ON COMMUNITY ATTITUDES,  
INNER VERSUS OUTER LONDON 
 
 
Question & Response 
(1) 
Inner London (%) 
(2) 
Outer London(%) 
(1) As a result of the attacks have you 
considered moving to live outside London 
or not? 
  
Yes 
No 
11 
89 
11 
89 
(2) How likely do you think it is London 
will experience another attack in the near 
future? 
  
Very likely 
Somewhat likely 
Not very likely 
Not at all likely 
Don’t Know 
36 
43 
11 
4 
6 
48 
37 
8 
3 
4 
(3) As a result of the attacks, have you 
spent more or less time in Central London? 
  
More time 
Less time 
Made No Difference 
2 
19 
78 
2 
21 
76 
(4) Since the July attacks have you 
personally or friends and relatives 
experienced any hostility on the basis of 
race or religion? 
  
Yes: Verbal Abuse 
Yes: Physical Abuse 
Yes: Felt Under Suspicion or Stared At 
Yes: Generally Felt Hostility 
6 
2 
2 
2 
6 
1 
2 
2 
  Source: IPSOS MORI Survey. 
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TABLE 1.A6: LIST OF MINOR CRIMES BY MAJOR CATEGORY, 2004-2005. 
 
Major Category 
 
Minor Category As Proportion of Major Category 
Crimes (%) 
Violence Against  
Persons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sexual Offences 
Common Assault 
Harassment 
Aggravated Bodily Harm (ABH) 
Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH) 
Murder 
Offensive Weapon 
Other Violence 
 
 
Rape 
Other Sexual 
31.5  
21.4 
34.5 
2.7 
0.1 
4.0 
5.8 
 
 
77.5 
22.5 
 
 
Theft and 
Handling 
 
 
 
 
Picking Pockets  
Snatches 
Theft from Shops 
Theft / Taking of Pedal Cycles 
Theft / Taking of Motor Vehicles 
Motor Vehicle Interference and 
Tampering 
Theft from Motor Vehicles 
Other Theft 
Handling Stolen Goods 
 
 
  
 5.2 
 3.9 
 10.5 
 5.3 
12.6 
  
0.1 
23.7 
37.6 
0.1 
Robbery Business Property 
Personal Property 
 
6.4 
93.6 
Burglary Burglary in a Dwelling 
Burglary in Other Buildings 
 
62.9 
37.1 
Criminal Damage 
 
Criminal Damage to Motor Vehicles 
Criminal Damage to a Dwelling 
Criminal Damage to Other Buildings 
Other Criminal Damage 
 
44.3 
28.7 
 
14.0 
13.0 
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Notes: All crimes occurring in the 32 boroughs of London between 1st January 2004 and 31st December 
2005. Proportions calculated as share of the total crimes for the relevant Major Crime category.  Both the 
Minor and Major Crime categories reported are those defined and used by police.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: REVOLVING DOOR LOBBYISTS 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Washington’s ‘revolving door’ -the movement from government service into the 
lobbying industry- is regarded as a major concern for policy-making. We study how ex-
government staffers benefit from the personal connections acquired during their public 
service. Lobbyists with experience in the office of a US Senator suffer a 24% drop in 
generated revenue when that Senator leaves office. The effect is immediate, 
discontinuous around the exit period and long-lasting. Consistent with the notion that 
lobbyists sell access to powerful politicians, the drop in revenue is increasing in the 
seniority of and committee assignments power held by the exiting politician. 
Keywords: Lobbying, Revolving Door, US Congress, Political Connections, Political 
Elites.  
JEL Classification: H11, J24, J45. 
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2.1 Introduction. 
Lobbying is widely regarded as an important component of the US political sys- tem 
and has received considerable attention among scholars of political institutions and policy 
outcomes (Grossman and Helpman 2001; Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003; 
Baumgartner et al. 2009). 
One important characteristic of the US lobbying industry is the extent to which it is 
dominated by the “revolving door” phenomenon—i.e., the movement of federal public 
employees into the lobbying industry. For example, 56 percent of the revenue generated by 
private lobbying firms between 1998 and 2008 can be attributed to individuals with some type 
of federal government experience (see Table 2.1). Reflecting this, a recent ranking of the 50 top 
Washington lobbyists identified 34 as having federal government experience (Eisler 2007). 
Discussions of the revolving door often feature prominently in journalistic and watchdog group 
accounts of the lobbying industry (Attkisson 2008; Overby 2011), and unsurprisingly, regulation 
of the lobbying indus- try often devotes special attention to the revolving door phenomenon 
(Maskell 2010). 
There are two main views regarding the importance of former government employees in 
the lobbying industry. The first view contends that revolving door lobbyists are valuable because 
“Washington is all about connections.” In this view, experience in government allows former 
officials to develop a network of friends and colleagues that they can later exploit on behalf of 
their clients (Revolving Door Working Group 2005; Zeleny 2006). To illustrate, a recent profile 
of a top Washington lobbyist states that: 
(Nancy) Taylor is a onetime health-policy director on Senator Orrin Hatch’s 
Labor and Human Resources Committee, which had jurisdiction over much drug-patent 
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legislation and food-and-drug laws. . . . Colleagues say as long as Hatch is in the 
Senate, Taylor will continue to bring in business (Eisler 2007). 
A second view, often put forward by lobbyists themselves, is that the importance of 
individuals with prior government experience is due to higher innate ability Burger 2006; see 
also Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo 2005; and Mattozzi and Merlo 2008) and/or human capital 
accumulation (Heinz et al. 1993; Esterling 2004). The higher expertise of revolving door 
individuals can refer to policy matters, the inner workings of the legislative process, or even the 
preferences of particular constituencies. For example, a staffer-turned-lobbyist interviewed by 
the Washington Post argues that “[t]he technical processes of the House and Senate are not 
intuitive or widely known. Like with any service, people who have experience are going to be 
valuable to people who don’t” (Eggen and Kindy 2009). 
Evaluating the relative importance of political connections is therefore critical for 
understanding the value that lobbyists provide for their clients and, more generally, to assess the 
role of intermediaries in the lobbying process. It can also both contribute to our understanding of 
the incentives and selection issues facing government officials and help guide attempts to 
regulate the revolving door phenomenon. 
In this paper we evaluate the extent to which ex–government officials convert their 
political contacts into lobbying revenue. We do this by studying how the lobbying revenue of 
congressional staffers–turned-lobbyists depends on the power of the congressional politicians 
for whom they have worked in the past. Ex–congressional staffers represent the largest single 
group of revolving door lobbyists (Table 2.1) and have been the focus of much of the popular 
discussion regarding the revolving door. 
Our main finding is that lobbyists connected to US senators suffer an average 24 percent 
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drop in generated revenue when their previous employer leaves the Senate. The decrease in 
revenue is out of line with preexisting trends, it is discontinuous around the period in which the 
connected senator exits Congress, and it persists in the long term. Measured in terms of median 
revenue per staffer-turned-lobbyist, this estimate indicates that the exit of a Senator leads to 
approximately a $182,000 per year fall in revenues for each affiliated lobbyist. We also find 
evidence that ex-staffers are less likely to work in the lobbying industry after their connected 
senators exit Congress. 
We regard the above findings as evidence that connections to powerful, serving 
politicians are key determinants of the revenue that lobbyists generate. Consistent with this 
interpretation, we also find that the political power of the exiting politician is a good predictor of 
the drop in revenue suffered by the connected lobbyist. Lobbyists connected to exiting Senators 
who served in the Finance and Appropriations Committees and to representatives who served in 
the Ways and Means Committee suffer a substantial drop in revenue when the connected 
politician leaves office. Lobbyists connected to congressmen in neither of these powerful 
committees are statistically unaffected by their exits. 
We interpret the connections that we study as relational capital (Burt 1992; Kale, Singh, 
and Perlmutter 2000): links of friendship, mutual trust, or even politician-specific knowledge 
that allow certain lobbyists to be more effective when particular politicians hold power. Of 
course, our results do not imply that lobbyists’ general human capital is an irrelevant input for 
the lobbying production process. In fact, the best way to interpret our results is as estimates of 
the marginal effect of connections in this industry, with the other factors of production, such as 
ability and expertise, held constant and at sample levels. Nevertheless, the large magnitude of 
our estimates does indicate that connections to people in power represent a critical asset for the 
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actors who serve as intermediaries in the lobbying process. 
Studies on the congressional revolving door and on the personal relationships between 
lobbyists and congressmen are scarce, a surprising fact given the popular interest in, and policy 
relevance of, this topic. Early research used surveys of lobbyists to argue that policy and process 
knowledge is more important than personal connections (Salisbury et al. 1989; Heinz et al. 1993; 
Esterling 2004). Very recent evidence, using data made available thanks to the Lobbying 
Disclosure Act, emphasizes instead the role of personal connections. Eggers (2010) shows that 
revolving door lobbyists benefit from additional business when their affiliated party has control 
of the House or the Senate. Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi (2011) measure connections using 
the contributions that lobbyists make to congressional election campaigns. They first show that 
the committee assignments of the congressmen who lobbyists are connected to represent a good 
predictor of the issues that lobbyists work on. More importantly, they also find that lobbyists 
switch issues in a predictable way as their connected congressmen switch committee 
assignments. Their conclusion that lobbyists’ connections to politicians determine strongly what 
they do is consistent with the findings of this paper. 
More generally, our paper is related both to the vast literature on the impact of money 
on politics (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003; Stratmann 2005) and to relatively 
recent research arguing that political connections matter for firm value (Fisman 2001; Johnson 
and Mitton 2003; Khwaja and Mian 2005; Knight 2006; Faccio 2006; Ferguson and Voth 2008). 
A remaining issue in the latter body of work is whether such connections can be traded. In other 
words, if connections to serving politicians are valuable assets, is there a market for them? Our 
findings suggest that the relation between clients and connected lobbyists in the US federal 
lobbying industry can be regarded as a market for political connections (arguably the largest in 
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the world) in which companies or interest groups can acquire indirect links to serving politicians 
by hiring their former employees. Interestingly, this market appears to react quite rapidly to 
changing circumstances. For instance, we find below that the lobbying revenue generated by ex-
staffers drops by a very large percentage one single semester after their ex-employers have left 
Congress. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2 we present our data, 
in Section 2.3 we discuss our empirical strategy, and in Section 2.4 we discuss our main results. 
In Section 2.5, we conclude. 
2.2 Data 
The dataset used for this study is a lobbyist-level panel constructed from two main parts: 
a database of lobbying reports released under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (hereafter, 
LDA) and a database of political employment that we construct from two new sources. 
2.21 Lobbying database 
The LDA required organizations to register and report information on their lobby- ing 
activities to the Senate Office of Public Records (SOPR). According to the act, lobbying activity 
is defined as contacts with officials, including background work performed to support these 
contacts. Two types of registrants are obliged to report under the LDA: lobbying firms and “self-
filing” organizations that conduct in-house lobbying activities. The lobbying firm sector is 
comprised of firms who take on work for a number of different corporate and noncorporate 
clients. Self-filing organizations include corporations as well as peak industry groups and 
nonprofit single-issue organizations. Both types of registrants are required to report good-faith 
estimates of lobbying expenditures (for self-filing organizations) or lobbying revenue (for 
lobbying firms) every six months.  
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In this paper we focus on lobbyists working at lobbying firms21. The LDA defines a 
person as a “lobbyist” if they spend 20 percent or more of their time engaged in lobbying 
activities. Under the LDA, lobbying firms are required to file a separate report for each of their 
clients. The report must specify the revenue generated from that client, the issues for which the 
firm was engaged in lobbying, the house(s) of Congress and federal agencies contacted, and the 
names of the individual lobbyists serving that particular client during that period. 
We use the version of the data compiled by the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), a 
Washington-based nonprofit organization for the promotion of political transparency. Further 
details on how CRP has processed and compiled the SOPR informations are displayed in the 
online Appendix. 
2.22  Political Employment 
Our study utilizes two databases on the political employment and career histories of 
lobbyists. The first database is Lobbyist.info, a professional directory of lobbyists published by 
Columbia Books. This is an extensive lobbyist directory that contains contact information as 
well as career histories, biographical information, educa- tional background, and areas of 
expertise. From this, we extract information on lob- byists who have had periods of political 
                                                          
21  The main reason for omitting in-house lobbyists from our analysis is the absence of meaningful 
individual-level productivity or earnings measures for this group of lobbyists. Expenditures of self-filing 
organizations include employee compensation, office overheads, and payments to vendors (which include 
but are not necessarily restricted to lobbying firms). Clearly, expenditures by an organization do not 
indicate whether a particular lobbyist is effective and/or well compensated at his or her job. For instance, 
it may be that the lower effectiveness of a lobbyist losing a connection translates into both a decrease in 
compensation and higher expenditures in other areas (such as outside vendors) in order to counteract this 
loss in effectiveness. 
 
 67 
 
federal employment. The second database that we use is the Congressional Staffer Salaries (CSS) 
database. The CSS database is obtained by LegiStorm (a political information company) from 
published reports by the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives22. 
We match names from each of the political employment databases against the lobbying 
reports data using a string-based algorithm. Numerous checks are made to ensure the accuracy 
of the match, with details reported in the online Appendix. 
2.23. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1.1 gives some descriptive statistics of our dataset. We find in panel A that the 
average private lobbying firm employs 2.8 lobbyists and generates close to $700,000 in revenue. 
Panel B reports information on the prevalence of former political employees. They 
represent 41.6 percent of all lobbyist-year observations. Over half of the group of former 
political employees is made up of former congressional staffers (22.6 percent of the total sample) 
while the remainder is comprised of ex-congressmen and former employees of government 
agencies, executive bodies, and presidential administrations. The focus of our study is the 
subgroup of former congressional staffers of politicians who served at some point in the 1998–
2008 period covered by the LDA data. 
Panel C reports the average revenue per lobbyist/year, for different types of private 
sector lobbyists. We calculate revenue per lobbyist in two alternative ways by summing what we 
                                                          
22 The main information provided is: staffer name; start and end dates for a given employment spell; 
office of employment within Congress; the job title or position; and the total salary amount for a given job 
spell. We extract this information for all staffers working in personal and committee offices since the 
beginning of the database in 2000. 
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call “unweighted” and “weighted” revenues across lobbying con- tracts. For example, consider a 
$40,000 contract that is serviced by four lobbyists. The unweighted measure we define allocates 
each lobbyist an equal $40,000 in revenues from this contract. The weighted measure allocates 
$10,000 to each lobbyist. These revenues are then added up across all the contracts a lobbyist 
works on in a given period. 
The two measures of revenue capture complementary aspects of the individual lobbyist–
generated revenue. The unweighted measure essentially captures the revenue value of the 
“practice” with which each lobbyist is associated, since it aggregates the value of all the 
contracts in which an individual lobbyist is involved. Note that the revenue of a practice will 
typically be a subset of a lobbying firm revenue, especially if the firm is large. The weighted 
measure divides the value of each contract by the number of workers in it. It therefore captures 
the revenue per worker of the practice associated with an individual lobbyist. 
The average weighted revenue per lobbyist/year ranges around $349,000 for the 
subgroup of congressional staffers we consider. This figure is closely in line with the reported 
salaries of lobbyists in this group. For example, the Washington Post reported in 2005 that 
“[s]tarting salaries have risen to about $300,000 a year for the best-connected aides eager to 
‘move downtown from Capitol Hill’”. Industry news reports such as Brush (2010) also regularly 
use average revenue figures as a credible proxy for salary trends among Washington lobbyists. 
The average annual unweighted revenue per lobbyist takes much higher values. This is 
unsurprising since the full dollar value of a contract is assigned to each of the lobbyists involved 
in it. Figure 1 displays the distribution of unweighted revenue for ex-staffers and other lobbyists. 
Panel C also reveals that revolving door lobbyists generate significantly more revenue than other 
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lobbyists. Lastly, note in panel D that revolving door lobbyists generate around 56 percent of 
total industry revenue. Out of this, more than half is accounted for by ex–congressional staffers. 
2.3 Empirical Strategy 
Our objective is to relate a measure of period-by-period revenues associated with each 
lobbyist to the number of distinct, currently serving politicians that the lobbyist has worked for 
prior to his entry into the lobbying industry. Our empirical model is as follows: 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜃 + 𝛾𝑡
𝑝𝑐 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡         (2.1) 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡  is the (log) dollar revenue per individual lobbyist i in time period t. The 
vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′  represents time-varying characteristics measured at the individual level, 𝛼𝑖𝑡  is the 
lobbyist-specific fixed effect, and 𝛾𝑡
𝑝𝑐
 is a set of distinct time period effects for each subgroup of 
lobbyists. The time periods used are the 6-month periods required for reporting under the LDA, 
giving us 22 periods from 1998–2008, inclusive. 
The key variable of interest is Pit, the count of currently serving politicians the lobbyist 
is linked to through his previous employment experience (note, however, that few lobbyists are 
connected to more than one senator or representative). There are two points worth highlighting 
here. Firstly, Pit only measures links with former political employers. Since we ignore the wider 
set of connections acquired by ex-staffers, we are probably undercounting the total value of 
political connections. Secondly, Pit is time-varying, as it goes down in value when a connected 
politician leaves office. The underlying hypothesis here is that politicians in office are 
particularly relevant for contemporary legislative outcomes. Serving politicians are able to vote 
on and influence the development of current legislation and this will be of interest to potential 
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lobbying clients. The access that a lobbyist has with respect to his connected politician is 
therefore made obsolete when that politician is no longer in office. 
Clearly, individual ability and expertise can be correlated with government experience 
as well as being a predictor of generated revenue. The inclusion of the 𝛼𝑖 fixed effects implies, 
however, that 𝛽  is identified from the variation in Pit described above. In other words, we 
compare the revenues of lobbyists who lose a political connection to the revenue of lobbyists 
whose connections remain constant. 
We further narrow the comparison group by including 𝛾𝑡
𝑝𝑐
 which are separate time 
effects for lobbyists connected to politicians in different parties (Democrat versus Republican) 
and chambers (House versus Senate). The inclusion of these time effects accounts for the fact 
that congressmen exits are likely to be correlated with shifts in party influence that can 
independently affect the ability to generate revenue. After including separate time dummies, our 
identifying assumption is that the revenue of lobbyists suffering a loss of a connection would 
have evolved similarly to the revenue of lobbyists connected to non-exiting politicians in the 
same party and chamber combination. 
One relevant variation of equation (2.1) relates to timing. To study how lobbyists’ 
revenues evolve in the individual periods just before and after the change in Pit, we can estimate: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙𝑃𝑖(𝑡0+𝑙)
𝐿
𝑙=−𝐿 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡
𝑝𝑐 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                (2.2) 
where 𝑡0 represents the transition period (i.e., when a politician exited Congress) and l 
flags the periods either before or after this period. This provides a set of time effects leading up 
to and following the transition period. We can use these, for instance, to examine whether 
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revenue was already falling even before a connected politician’s exit23. We can also study 
whether revenue spikes up in anticipation of an exit. Finally, equation (2.2) also allows us to 
study whether revenue recovers in the short or medium terms following the politician’s exit. 
Clearly, our identification strategy depends on the nature of the variation in Pit. Figures 
2.2A and 2.2B show the number of lobbyists in the sample affected by the exit of a connected 
politician. In total, there are 257 lobbyists affected by these exits (94 for Senate exits, 163 for 
House exits), representing 20.9 percent of all ex-staffer lobbyists. Approximately half of exits 
are due to voluntary retirement of politicians. The next largest group of exits occurs as a result 
of defeats at reelection. The remainder of the exits is made up variously of lobbyists affected by 
politicians who die, leave due to a scandal, or run for another office (either successfully or 
unsuccessfully). 
Finally, it should be noted that measurement error has the potential to attenuate our 
estimates in two ways. Firstly, there is the potential measurement error related to the name 
matching of lobbyists between our political employment and lobbying reports databases24 .
 
Secondly, there is measurement error related to Rit , arising from the fact that the size of the 
team serving a client is potentially an endogenous variable. For example, in a single-person firm 
it is straightforward to attribute revenues from clients to an individual lobbyist. But this becomes 
more complicated as the size of a firm increases, since as this happens team size becomes a firm 
                                                          
23 This could be due, for instance, to the presence of “shared trends” between politicians and lobbyists. If 
low-ability lobbyists sort toward employment with low-ability politicians facing electoral defeat (and 
ability affects trends as well as levels), then revenue could be trending downward before exit. 
24 That is, lobbyists may have been either falsely matched to a politician or not assigned a true connection. 
It can be shown that this type of binary measurement error imparts a downward bias to β (Aigner 1973; 
Khwaja and Mian 2005). 
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choice variable. To minimize this problem, our regressions below use the unweighted measure 
of lobbyist revenues where we count the full value of contracts where a lobbyist is named and 
do not divide by team size before summing across a lobbyist contracts25. 
2.4 Main Results 
2.41  Average Effects of Revolving Door Connections 
Table 2.2 displays the estimates of empirical model (1). In column 1 we control only for 
individual lobbyist dummies. We find that being connected to a serving Senator is associated 
with 23 percent higher revenue, whereas the point estimate for a connection to a serving 
representative is only 9 percent and not statistically different from 0. Note that the difference in 
the estimated effects across the two chambers is consistent with the notion that it is the political 
power of the connected serving politician that matters. Senators are typically more powerful 
than representatives. For example, there are four times fewer senators than representatives and 
senators are uniquely able to wield filibuster powers that can slow down or completely block 
legislation. 
                                                          
25 A second, more subtle, reason to use the unweighted measure is that it allows us to provide a better 
approximation to the marginal value of a political connection. To see this, consider a revolving door 
lobbyist A working with another lobbyist B. Imagine that together they generate $40,000 before the loss 
of A’s connection and $30,000 after (and, obviously, that the loss in connection is orthogonal to other 
events affecting both lobbyists). While we cannot measure each individual’s overall contribution to the 
team, we can reasonably conclude that the marginal value of A’s connection was $10,000. This is what we 
would predict using the unweighted measure of revenue, while using the weighted measure we would 
instead estimate the value of A’s connection as $5,000. Note, lastly, that we have estimated the full range 
of models reported in Section 2.5 using the weighted measure and have found very similar results. We 
report our main results using the weighted measure in the chapter Appendix. 
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As discussed earlier, other ex-staffers may not represent a valid comparison group for a 
lobbyist connected to an exiting politician. In the next three columns we successively narrow the 
comparison groups and we also control for lobbyist experience effects. In column 2 we add a 
full set a party-time dummies (allowing demand shocks to differ across former Republican and 
Democratic ex-staffers) while column 3 splits this further into party-chamber effects. Column 4 
adds controls for lobbyist experience and its square. In this last and most comprehensive 
regression the exit of a connected senator is associated with 24 percent lower revenue. 
Remarkably, the inclusion of extra controls only translates into very minor shifts in the 
coefficients for the senators and representatives variables. This suggests that politician exits are 
in practice a source of variation that is separate from party and chamber-related revenue shifts26. 
In the chapter Appendix we examine the robustness of our baseline results to the 
estimation of more stringent specifications. In particular, (i) we interact individual lobbyist 
dummies with the identity of the party in power; (ii) we include individual-specific time trends; 
and (iii) we add lobbying firm fixed effects to the individual lobbyist fixed effects. The point 
estimates are very consistent across specifications and the effect of being connected to a senator 
is always statistically significant at conventional levels. 
Our estimate for connections to serving senators is economically as well as statistically 
significant. Evaluated at the mean of the yearly revenue generated by an ex-staffer’s practice in 
our sample ($1,551,600 from Table 2.1), our estimate suggests that an active Senate connection 
                                                          
26 In the chapter Appendix we explore whether lobbyists connected to the Democratic party earn more 
revenue in periods in which the Democrats control Congress. We find major revenue effects of party 
control of approximately 18%; see also Eggers (2010) for an estimate of party effects. 
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translates into approximately $372, 000 per year. We believe, however, that the median, rather 
than the mean, value of revenue represents a better measure for the typical ex-staffer. The reason 
is that, as Figure 2.1 shows, the distribution of unweighted revenue has a very long right tail, 
with the median value being $760,000, around half of the mean value. Evaluated at the median, 
our estimate suggests that an active Senate connection translates into approximately $182,000 
per year higher revenue for the value of an ex-staffer practice27. 
2.42  Timing Effects  
In Table 2.2 we have presented evidence on the effect of political transitions on lobbyist 
revenue averaged over time. That is, we were comparing lobbyists’ revenues in the average 
period before, and average period after, a given change in Pit. In Figure 2.3 we plot the results 
of estimating equation (2) for connections to serving senators. We use a window of 12 time 
periods (i.e., 6 years) around the time at which a politician’s transition takes place. We have 
normalized the baseline to be period t0, the last period in which a senator was still serving in 
Congress. The estimates should therefore be interpreted as relative to period t0. 
Several conclusions emerge from Figure 2.3. First, there is no strong evidence of either 
an upward or a downward trend in the periods leading up to a connected politician’s exit. We 
can therefore reasonably rule out that our estimated average effects are due to the presence of 
shared trends between the fortunes of lobbyists and the politicians that they are connected to. 
                                                          
27 What share of these $182,000 reverts in terms of salary to the ex-staffer holding the connection is of 
course difficult to establish. Under the assumption that each of the lobbyists included in a contract gets 
rewarded according to the value of the assets that he contributes to the team, there would be a proportional 
loss in earnings for the individual ex-staffer. 
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Second, Figure 3 also seems inconsistent with the notion that abnormally high revenues occur 
prior to a politician’s exit. It appears therefore that anticipation effects do not seem important, 
either because most exits are unanticipated or because lobbyists are unable or unwilling to 
extract higher revenue while a connection is still valuable. Third, there is also no evidence of 
reverse causality from lobbying revenue into the connected politician’s exit. Note that period t0 
captures the last semester in which a politician served in Congress.
 
We find that lobbying 
revenue during that semester, which could have potentially affected the politician’s reelection 
chances, is very similar to that of previous semesters. It is only in the following semester, once 
the senator has already left office, that the connected lobbyist’s revenue collapses. Thus, the 
timing of the drop in revenues relative to the timing of the politician’s exit does not hint to the 
existence of reverse causality28. 
Our last conclusion from Figure 2.3 is that the negative effect of a connected politician’s 
exit is highly persistent. There is evidence of a large drop in the period immediately after a 
politician’s exit followed by some reversion. Lobbyists, however, are still subject to a 20 percent 
drop in revenues even 6 semesters after a politician’s exit. This suggests both that lobbyists’ 
links to their former employers are a major component of their overall political network and that 
lobbyists are not able to compensate for the loss of such a valuable connection using unobserved 
margins of adjustment. 
                                                          
28 For politicians leaving at the end of their term, perhaps due to a reelection defeat, this comprises the 
period between July and December, which includes the November election date. 
 
 76 
 
2.43 Effects Disaggregated by Political Power 
Our interpretation of the average effects in Table 2.2 is that being connected to an 
individual holding political power allows a lobbyist to generate higher revenue. If our 
interpretation is correct we should expect individuals connected to more powerful politicians to 
suffer a larger drop in lobbying revenue when those politicians leave Congress. 
One way to examine the hypothesis that it is political power that matters is to split 
politicians by their committee responsibilities at the legislator’s point of exit. Ideally, we would 
like to create a different variable for connections to politicians in each of the different 
committees in the House and Senate. Our sample sizes, however, do not allow for such a level of 
disaggregation. We therefore decided to concentrate on what are arguably the two most 
important committees in the House and Senate—the Finance and Appropriations Committees in 
the Senate and the Ways and Means and Appropriations Committees in the House (Groseclose 
and Stewart 1998; Stewart and Groseclose 1999). These are committees with budget 
responsibilities and there- fore are particularly prone to be lobbied. These are also large 
committees that offer bigger cell sizes for our testing. We split lobbyists according to the service 
of their connected politicians on these committees at the time of the politicians’ exits from 
Congress. 
Table 2.3 displays the results. We find that lobbyists connected to Senators serving in 
the Finance and Appropriations Committees suffer losses in revenue of 36 percent and 45 
percent, respectively, when those senators leave office. Similarly, we find that lobbyists 
connected to representatives serving on the Ways and Means Committee suffer losses in revenue 
of 35 percent when those representatives leave office. On the other hand, politicians serving in 
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neither of these committees do not affect their affiliated lobbyists’ revenue when they leave 
Congress29. 
As an additional exercise, we also studied whether there is evidence of an increase in 
generated revenue when connected politicians remain in Congress and join important 
committees. We found that being connected to senators in the Finance Committee and 
Representatives in the Ways and Means Committee is indeed associated with significant revenue 
premiums. We regard this evidence as consistent with the main message of the paper, and we 
display it in the online Appendix. 
2.44. Participation in the Lobbying Industry 
The models and estimates presented above show a strong effect of changes in political 
connections on lobbyist revenues. As a result of this revenue effect, changes in political 
connections could also affect an ex-staffer’s decision about whether to work in the lobbying 
industry at all. To study whether this is the case, we expand our dataset to include, for each 
individual, every period following the end of their employment as a staffer30.
 
We then define the 
variable Ait = 1 if individual i served any client during period t and 0 otherwise. Our new dataset 
contains 16,882 observations and the mean of Ait is 0.62. We then estimate a variation of 
equation (2.1) using Ait as our new dependent variable. 
                                                          
29 In the Senate, the “neither” group is statistically different from the “Finance” and “Appropriations” 
groups at the 1 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. In the House, the “neither” group is 
statistically different from the “Ways and Means” group at the 1 percent level. 
30 For instance, if an individual left his or her job in Congress at the end of 2002 then our sample contains 
observations for this individual over the period 2002–2008, whether or not he or she was actually working 
as a lobbyist. 
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Table 2.4 displays the results of estimating our variation of equation (1) using linear 
probability models. We find that being connected to a currently serving senator is associated 
with 27 percent higher likelihood of working as a lobbyist. Our estimate for the representative 
effect is much smaller and statistically insignificant. Again, including or excluding lobbyist 
experience and separate subgroup time effects has little impact on our coefficients. 
Our findings from Table 2.4 are robust to the use of nonlinear (logit) models. We also 
find very similar effects when we expand our dataset further to include, for every lobbyist, each 
period between 1998 and 2008. This evidence can be found in the online Appendix31. 
 2.5 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we show that ex–government officials extract monetary rents in terms of 
generated lobbying revenue from their personal connections to elected representatives. Overall, 
our findings suggest that access to serving officials is a scarce asset that commands a premium 
in the market for lobbying services. 
Before we discuss the contributions to existing research, it is worth pointing out some 
limitations of our study. While our focus on ex-staffers provides us with a strong identification 
strategy, the extent to which our findings apply to other lobbyists can be debated. Some 
revolving door lobbyists (e.g., ex-congressmen) may benefit even more from connections to 
                                                          
31  The existence of a participation effect suggests that we may be underestimating the value of 
connections in our main regressions. This is because we would expect the hardest-hit lobbyists to be more 
likely to exit the industry. To study this, we assigned the exiting lobbyists revenue observations equal to 
their final observation before dropping out of the industry. We regard this final revenue figure as an upper 
bound for what the exiting lobbyist would have earned had he decided to remain in the industry. The 
effect of applying this bound is shown in the Chapter Appendix. 
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serving government officials, while others (e.g., ex–agency staffers) may rely less on 
connections and more on the expertise acquired while in government. Obviously, our estimates 
are not easily extrapolated to lobbyists with no government experience, although they help to 
explain the fact that these lobbyists generate substantially less revenue (Table 2.1) and are 
known to command lower salaries (Brush 2010). While acknowledging our exclusive focus on 
ex-staffers, we note that these represent a leading fraction of the lobbying industry, accounting 
for 34 percent of total revenue (Table 2.1). 
A related limitation stems from our unique focus on the relationship between ex-staffers 
and their former employers. We would expect staffers to have developed a wide range of 
relationships with both elected representatives and other staffers. Since our study is based on 
one single relationship (albeit an important one), it probably undercounts the value of political 
connections. 
Lastly, we provide no direct evidence on the existence of a “payback” for lobbying 
clients. Our contribution to the vast literature estimating the returns to lobbying and campaign 
contributions (de Figueiredo and Silverman 2006) is therefore only indirect. Namely, the fact 
that firms and interest groups are eager to hire the services of well-connected individuals 
suggests that they expect a return in terms of favorable legislative outcomes. Likewise, our 
findings cannot discriminate between alternative theories of what lobbying is. Our connected 
lobbyists could arguably serve as a conduit of both quid pro quo offers (Grossman and Helpman 
1994) and information (Austen-Smith 1996). That said, existing theories do not account for the 
role of intermediaries in the lobbying process and this is an area where our findings suggest that 
future research could provide valuable insights. 
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With the caveats above, we believe that our findings have implications in terms of the 
career incentives of staffers (and probably other government officials). We have shown that 
staffers’ political connections are a perishable asset; in other words, they last only as long as the 
connected politicians remain holding office. This implies that staffers may have relatively short 
careers. Once a connection to a powerful senator has been established, it may make sense to 
move into lobbying and cash in on this unique asset while it is still valuable. Of course, the 
existence of rents associated with post-government employment could widen the pool of 
applicants for staffer positions, and potentially allow congressmen to hire high-ability 
individuals at the lower salaries that the public sector typically offers (Caselli and Morelli 2004; 
Besley 2005). 
Our paper also has the potential to inform policy. One common instrument to regulate 
the revolving door phenomenon is to impose “cooling off” periods to officials leaving public 
office (Ethics Reform Act of 1989; Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007; for a 
review, see Maskell 2010). The perishable nature of ex-staffers’ assets suggests that such 
restrictions could in fact be quite useful to a legislator interested in significantly decreasing the 
attractiveness of a lobbying career for ex–government officials. 
Finally, this paper contributes to our more general understanding of what makes 
workers valuable in professional services industries. The empirical results show that 
professional experts working in the lobbying industry are valued not only for their technical 
knowledge but in large part also for their personal connections (Oyer and Schaefer 2010; Singh, 
Hansen, and Podolny 2010). Hence, one insight from our study is that a large proportion of the 
premia that experts command in professional industries is likely to be comprised of so-called 
relational capital (Burt 1992; Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter 2000). Furthermore, the relational 
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capital that this paper has studied is clearly valuable only in a very specific geographic and 
sectoral setting. A second insight from our paper is therefore that relational capital is likely to 
represent a large part of what is usually classified as industry-specific human capital (Neal 1995). 
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2.6 Tables for Chapter 2. 
TABLE 2.1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: US FEDERAL LOBBYING FIRMS, 1998-2008. 
Panel A – By Lobbying Firms   
Mean Number of Lobbyists 2.8 
Total Revenue/Expenditures  687.8 
Total Number of Firms/Organizations  3,960 
Panel B - Types of Lobbyists 
 Revolving Door Lobbyist 0.416 
Ex-Congressman 0.029 
Ex-staffer:  0.226 
- of politician serving pre-1998 0.064 
- of politician serving post-1998 0.134 
- of a congressional committee 0.027 
Outside Congress 0.162 
Panel C - Mean Revenue  or Expenditure 
 Weighted 
 Revolving Door Lobbyists 309.9 
    -Ex-Congressmen 339.6 
    -Ex-staffers:  349.7 
    -Outside Congress 253.6 
Other lobbyists 170.0 
Unweighted 
 Revolving Door Lobbyist 1355.5 
    -Ex-Congressmen 1287.8 
    -Ex-staffers:  1551.6 
    -Outside Congress 1109.8 
Other lobbyists 682.8 
Panel D - Share of total industry  
 Revenue, by type of lobbyist 
 Revolving Door Lobbyist 0.559 
    -Ex-Congressmen 0.043 
    -Ex-staffers:  0.343 
    -Outside Congress  0.182 
Number of Lobbyists (Total) 15,315 
Number of Lobbyist-Period Observations 98,705 
 86 
 
 Note: Panel(A) based on 1998-2008 panel. Panels (B) and (C) based on 1998-2008 lobbyist-level panel. Panel (C) presents annualised measures 
of revenue or expenditure per lobbyist.  Panel (D) aggregates the weighted revenues of lobbyists in order to calculate revenue shares by type. ‘Ex-
Congressman’ denotes former members of the House or Senate who are lobbyists.  ‘Ex-staffer’ represents lobbyists who have employment 
experience as Congressional staffers.  
 
 
TABLE 2.2: AVERAGE EFFECTS OF REVOLVING DOOR CONNECTIONS ON 
LOBBYING REVENUE. 
 
Dependent Variable: (log) revenue per lobbyist 
 
 
(1) 
Plus Party 
(2) 
Plus Chamber 
(3) 
Plus experience 
(4) 
Number of Senators 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.24*** 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Number of Representatives 0.09* 0.07 0.08 0.10* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Individual dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Yes No No No 
Time*Party No Yes No No 
Time*Party*Chamber No No No Yes 
Lobbyist Experience No No No Yes 
Individuals 1,113 1,113 1,113 1,113 
Observations 10,418 10,418 10,418 10,418 
Notes: This table presents the average effects of political connections on ex-staffers lobbying revenue. The dependent 
variable is the log of the revenue generated from all the clients that an individual lobbyist serves in a time (semester) 
period. The two main independent variables are the number of senators and representatives that an individual lobbyist 
worked for previous to entering the lobbying industry and are serving in Congress in that time period. All regressions 
use a sample containing ex-staffers-turned-lobbyists and include both individual lobbyist dummies and time effects 
(i.e., semester dummies). Column 2 allows for different time effects for lobbyists connected to politicians in different 
parties (i.e., Democrats versus Republicans). Columns 3 and 4 allow for different time effects for lobbyists connected 
to politicians in different party/chamber combinations (i.e., Democrats in the Senate, etc.). Column 4 includes lobbyist 
experience (i.e., number of periods that a lobbyist appears in the sample) in quadratic form. Standard errors are 
clustered by lobbyist. ***Significant at the 1 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. *Significant at the 10 
percent level. 
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TABLE 2.3: EFFECTS DISAGGREGATED BY POLITICIAN COMMITTEE 
ASSIGNMENTS. 
 Dependent Variable: (log) revenue per lobbyist 
 
(1) 
Plus party-chamber  
and experience 
(2) 
Number of Senators 
  in Finance 0.36*** 0.36*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
in Appropriations 0.40*** 0.45*** 
 (0.16) (0.15) 
in Neither -0.12 -0.11 
 (0.12) (0.12) 
   Number of Representatives 
  in Ways and Means 0.37*** 0.35*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
in Appropriations 0.07 0.06 
 
(0.11) (0.11) 
in neither -0.01 0.03 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Individual dummies Yes Yes 
Time Yes No 
Time*Party*Chamber No Yes 
Lobbyist Experience No Yes 
Individuals 1,113 1,113 
Observations 10,418 10,418 
Notes: This table presents the effects of Table 2 separately for different levels of politician committee 
assignments. The dependent variable is as in Table 2. The main independent variables are as in Table 2, 
with the exception that connections to senators and representatives are disaggregated by the politician 
committee assignments at the time of leaving Congress. All regressions use a sample containing ex-
staffers-turned-lobbyists and include individual lobbyists dummies and time effects (i.e., semester 
dummies). Column 2 allows for different time effects for lobbyists connected to politicians in different 
party-chamber combina- tions (i.e., Democrats in the Senate, etc.) and also includes lobbyist experience 
(i.e., number of periods that a lobbyist appears in the sample) in quadratic form. Standard errors are 
clustered by lobbyist. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. *Significant at the 10 percent 
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level. 
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TABLE 2.4 – PARTICIPATION IN THE LOBBYING INDUSTRY. 
 
Dependent variable: Ait = 1 if individual i generated 
positive revenue in period t  
 
(1) 
Plus party-chamber and 
experience 
(2) 
Number of Senators 0.19*** 0.27*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Number of Representatives 0.02 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Individual dummies Yes Yes 
Time Yes No 
Time*Party*Chamber No Yes 
Lobbyist Experience No Yes 
Individuals 1,113 1,113 
Observations 16,882 16,882 
Notes: This table presents the effects of political connections on ex-staffers’ participation in the lobbying 
industry. The dataset contains, for each individual, every period following the end of their employment as 
a staffer. The dependent variable takes value 1 when an individual generates positive lobbying revenue in 
a time (semester) period and 0 otherwise. For instance, if an individual left his or her job in Congress at 
the end of 2002, then our sample contains observations for this individual over the period 2002–2008, 
whether or not he or she was actu- ally working as a lobbyist. The main independent variables are as in 
Table 2. All regressions include individual lobbyists dummies and time effects (i.e., semester dummies). 
Column 2 allows for different time effects for lobbyists connected to politicians in different party/chamber 
combinations (i.e., Democrats in the Senate, etc.) and also includes lobbyist experience (i.e., number of 
periods that a lobbyist appears in the sample) in quadratic form. Standard errors are clustered by lobbyist. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. *Significant at the 10 percent 
level. 
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2.7 Figures for Chapter 2 
 
FIGURE 2.1 
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FIGURE 2.2: REASONS FOR LOSS OF SENATE AND HOUSE CONNECTIONS, BY 
NUMBERS OF LOBBYISTS. 
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FIGURE 3: TIMING EFFECTS AND THE LOSS OF 
CONNECTIONS. 
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2.8 Appendix for Chapter 2 
In this appendix we provide additional information on various segments of the data used 
to construct the lobbyist-level panel used in the paper. We also provide more details on the name 
matching procedure used to link the databases on lobbying reports and political employment. 
Lobbying Reports 
We use the LDA data sourced from the Senate Office of Public Records (SOPR) and 
compiled by the Centre for Responsive Politics (CRP) as part of their ’Open Secrets’ database. 
The CRP is a non-profit and non-partisan organization with a stated mission of collating 
information on all types of politically related expenditures (i.e. campaign contributions, 
lobbying expenditures, member personal finances, etc.) and facilitating the availability of this 
data. We use the lobbying reports provided as part of their bulk data facility. This is the full 
universe of available LDA-sourced reports (approximately 35,000 per year) that CRP has 
formatted, cleaned and modified. For example, the CRP reconciles different types of reports 
(taking account of amendments to original mid-year and end-of-year reports) and constructs 
lobbyist, firm and client identifiers. We conduct further cleaning and consolidation of the CRP 
identifiers in cases where the same individuals are split across different identifier codes. The 
LDA requires the reporting of lobbying spending above a $10,000 threshold and rounded to the 
nearest $20,000. In the case of self-filing organizations, the LDA requires the reporting of all 
expenses made on lobbying activities, including payments to outside entities as well as in-house 
employees. 
The lobbying reports data is collapsed to the lobbyist-period level. Revenue is 
aggregated by lobbyist-period according to the ’unweighted’ and ’weighted’ measures defined 
in Section 2.3 of the main CHPATER. As a robustness check we re-estimated the main models 
and trimmed outliers at the 1 per cent and 2.5 per cent thresholds. This lead to only minor 
changes in coefficients and the results are available from the authors on request. Note that a 
manual check of outlier observations indicated that the majority of these high revenues belonged 
to well-known ‘superstar’ lobbyists. 
Columbia Books Lobbyist Directory 
Columbia Books publishes a comprehensive directory of Federal lobbyists under its 
suite of Lobbyists.info products. This directory initially began as a hard copy directory (titled 
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Washington Representatives) containing contact information on lobbyists and potential clients 
published in the late 1970s. Since this time Columbia Books has expanded the directory with 
further information on career histories, bio- graphical information, educational background and 
areas of expertise. The publisher then consolidated this directory in electronic form in 2006 as 
Lobbyists.info with daily updates and related supplementary databases. 
This online version of the directory contains records on approximately 15,000 lobbyists. 
The career history information in Lobbyists.info includes the employer, job title and period of 
tenure for lobbyists’ current and previous jobs, inclusive of private and public sector positions. 
We extract information on lobbyists who have had periods of political employment (that is, 
working as congressional staffers, in government agencies or as part of Presidential 
administrations) which is then matched by name into the CRP Lobbying Reports data. 
LegiStorm Congressional Staffer Salaries 
The second political employment database that we use is the LegiStorm Congressional 
Staffer Salaries (CSS) database. Based on Capitol Hill, LegiStorm is a company that aims to 
improve the availability of political information on the operations of the US Congress. For 
example, it provides easy-to-use versions of public data on Congressional remuneration; 
privately financed travel for Congress members and staff; financial disclosures; foreign gifts to 
members; and spending earmarks attached to bills. 
The CSS database that we use is obtained by LegiStorm from published reports by the 
Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives. These reports are not 
actually made available in electronic form and LegiStorm takes the step of transferring the 
information from hard copy into an electronic format. As part of this process, LegiStorm also 
creates consistent set of identifiers for the staffers, offices and politicians that appear in the 
database. 
LegiStorm’s database contains information from late 2000 onwards. The main 
information provided is: staffer name; start and end dates for a given employment spell; office 
of employment within Congress; the job title or position; and the total salary amount for a given 
job spell. The full staffers database contains information on approximately 90,000 staffers over a 
nine-year period. This large number of staff is due to the inclusion of non-partisan institutional 
staff such as Capital Police. Our analysis focuses on the pool of approximately 40,000 staffers 
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working in political or policy related offices over the 2000-2008 period. 
Name Matching of Lobbyists 
The full list of lobbyists represented in the CRP lobbying reports database is matched 
with individ- uals appearing in our two political employment databases, Lobbyists.info from 
Columbia Books and Congressional Staffer Salaries from LegiStorm. The name matching is 
implemented using a string- based algorithm which cleans the raw names for punctuation and 
shortened names (for example, ”JIM” becomes ”JAMES” and so on). The same algorithm is 
applied to each set of names and each politi- cal employment database is separately matched 
with the CRP lobbying reports list. The subsequent matches are then compiled into one list of 
political employees-turn-lobbyists. Middle names or initials are used as part of the name 
matching procedure where available. 
We then score matches on their accuracy according to two criteria. Firstly, each match 
receives a 1-4 score based on how often a particular first or last name appears. We call this 
a ’name frequency’ score. Commonly occurring names such as ’SMITH’ are given a score of 4 
while the least common names are given a score of 1. This process is repeated separately for 
first and last names to produce a 2-8 score. For example, a name such as ’JOHN SMITH’ is 
given an overall score of 8 since it is comprised of two common names while ’MILLICENT 
SMITH’ receives a score of 5 (+4 for the common last name but +1 for the relatively uncommon 
first name). 
Secondly, we score the matches according to how well the timing of employment 
transitions links up across the data. Staffers leaving employment in the Congress should appear 
in the lobbying reports data within 1-2 years of their final employment spell. We construct a 0-1 
flag for whether the timing of the transitions is consistent across the data. In the final stage of 
the matching we then manually check the accuracy of the matches characterised by very 
common names and/or inconsistent timing. We do this by manually cross-referencing names 
with online CVs and biographies. This final step of manual checks is done for all names with a 
name frequency score above 5. In order to evaluate the cut-off we ran regressions where we 
interacted the name score with our main variables of interest. These results indicated that 
measurement error in the name matching increased with the name score (ie: the Senate/House 
coefficient for the 8’s was lower than that for the 7’s which was in turn lower than the 
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coefficient for the 6’s). However, we did not pick up a significant difference in coefficients 
between the 5’s and observations with a name score between 1-4. 
In our final sample we also condition on the maximum number of politicians a lobbyist 
can be connected to, setting this to 5. Approximately 8% of lobbyists have experience working 
as personal staff for more than one politician. The number of lobbyists with experience working 
for 5 or more politicians represents less than 0.25% of this total. Furthermore, on inspection 
most lobbyists with 5 or more connections were classified officially in the Legistorm job titles 
as ’Shared Employees’ rather than as exclusive members of personal staff. 
Congressional Politicians 
Our final major dataset contains information on the service and characteristics of 
politicians in the House and Congress since the beginning of the available lobbying reports in 
1998. The specific data used is Stewart and Woon’s (2009) compilation focusing on committee 
membership and updated periodically from the Congressional Record. This membership data 
here contains periods of service and reasons for exit (retirement, defeat for re-election etc) 
where applicable. The politicians appearing in the data have been allocated the ICSPR ’member 
id’ that is common across political science studies in this area. We have name matched the list of 
politicians given in the political employment databases against the Stewart and Woon (2009) list 
using the same string-based algorithm developed for the lobbyist-level matching. 
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TABLE A2.1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – IN-HOUSE ORGANIZATIONS. 
Panel A - Organizational Level 
 
 
In House 
Mean Number of Lobbyists 1.5 
Total Revenue/Expenditures  786.1 
Total Number of Firms/Organizations 3233  
Panel B - Types of Lobbyists 
 Revolving Door Lobbyist 0.185 
Ex-Congressman 0.004 
Ex-staffer:  0.137 
- of politician serving pre-1998 0.017 
- of politician serving post-1998 0.101 
- of a congressional committee 0.019 
Outside Congress 0.044 
Panel C - Mean Revenue  or Expenditure 
 Weighted 
 Revolving Door Lobbyists 292.5 
    -Ex-Congressmen 368.4 
    -Ex-staffers:  280.5 
    -Outside Congress 323.1 
Other lobbyists 204.9 
Unweighted 
 Revolving Door Lobbyist 2319.8 
    -Ex-Congressmen 2134.0 
    -Ex-staffers:  2287.5 
    -Outside Congress 2438.3 
Other lobbyists 1752.1 
Panel D - Share of total industry  
 expenditure, by type of lobbyist 
 Revolving Door Lobbyist 0.222 
    -Ex-Congressmen 0.005 
    -Ex-staffers:  0.159 
    -Outside Congress  0.060 
Number of Lobbyists (Total) 21,374 
Number of Lobbyist-Period Observations 127,960 
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 Note: Panel(A) based on 1998-2008 panel of organizations by period. Panels (B) and (C) based on 1998-2008 
lobbyist-level panel. Length of each period is 6 months. Panel (C) presents annualised measures of expenditure per 
lobbyist.  Panel (D) aggregates the weighted expenditures of lobbyists in order to calculate expenditure shares by 
type.  
TABLE A2.2: AVERAGE EFFECTS OF REVOLVING DOOR CONNECTIONS ON 
LOBBYING REVENUE, WEIGHTED MEASURE OF REVENUE 
 
Dependent Variable: (log) revenue per lobbyist 
 
 
(1) 
Plus Party 
(2) 
Plus Chamber 
(3) 
Plus experience 
(4) 
Number of Senators    0.20***     0.19***     0.20***    0.24*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Number of Representatives -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Individual dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Yes No No No 
Time*Party No Yes No No 
Time*Party*Chamber No No No Yes 
Lobbyist Experience No No No Yes 
Individuals 1,113 1,113 1,113 1,113 
Observations 10,418 10,418 10,418 10,418 
Notes: This table presents the average effects of political connections on ex-staffers lobbying revenue. The dependent 
variable is the log of the weighted revenue generated from all the clients that an individual lobbyist serves in a time 
(semester) period. The two main independent variables are the number of senators and representatives that an 
individual lobbyist worked for previous to entering the lobbying industry and are serving in Congress in that time 
period. All regressions use a sample containing ex-staffers-turned-lobbyists and include both individual lobbyist 
dummies and time effects (i.e., semester dummies). Column 2 allows for different time effects for lobbyists connected 
to politicians in different parties (i.e., Democrats versus Republicans). Columns 3 and 4 allow for different time effects 
for lobbyists connected to politicians in different party/chamber combinations (i.e., Democrats in the Senate, etc.). 
Column 4 includes lobbyist experience (i.e., number of periods that a lobbyist appears in the sample) in quadratic form. 
Standard errors are clustered by lobbyist. ***Significant at the 1 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE A2.3: EFFECTS OF PARTY CONTROL. 
 
Dependent Variable (log) Weighted Revenue per Lobbyist 
 
(1) (2) 
Number of Senators     0.25***     0.25*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
Number of Representatives    0.12**    0.11** 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
House Dem Control*Dem     0.18*** 0.19 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Senate Dem Control*Dem 0.14 
  (0.05) 
2001-2002*Dem 
 
0.08 
 (0.08) 
2007-2008*Dem 
 
     0.18*** 
 (0.06) 
Individual Dummies Yes Yes 
Time Yes Yes 
Lobbyist Experience Yes Yes 
Individuals 1,113 1,113 
Observations 10,418 10,418 
Note: This table presents the effects of a party’s control of Congress on the revenues of its affiliated lobbyists. One 
period of Democrat control in the House is considered (2007-2008) along with two periods of Democrat control in the 
Senate (2001-2002 and 2007-2008). In the second column we include the two periods of Democrat control in the 
Senate separately. We interact these party control dummies with whether the lobbyist is an ex-staffer for a Democratic 
politician. We also include the main variables in Table 2 as well as individual dummies, time dummies and lobbyist 
experience (and its square). Standard errors are clustered by lobbyist. 
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TABLE A2.4:  ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 
Party Control 
Dummies 
(1) 
 Time  
Trends 
(2) 
 Firm  
Dummies 
(3) 
Number of Senators     0.26*** 0.19*     0.28*** 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) 
Number of Representatives 0.11 0.02 0.04 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) 
Individual dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Time*Party*Chamber Yes Yes Yes 
Lobbyist Experience Yes Yes Yes 
Ind.Dum*Party in Control Yes No No 
Lobbyist Time Trends No Yes No 
Firm Dummies No No Yes 
Individuals 1,113 1,113 1,113 
Observations 10,418 10,418 10,418 
Note: This table presents a number of robustness tests on Table 2. The main independent variables are as in Table 
2.2. Every regression contains individual dummies, lobbyist experience in quadratic form, and different time effects 
for lobbyists connected to politicians in different party/chamber combinations. Column (1) includes the party control 
dummies used in Table A2.3. These dummies are interacted with the individual lobbyist dummies. Column (2) 
introduces 1,113 lobbyist-specific linear time trends. Column (3) includes 726 lobbying firm dummies. Standard 
errors are clustered by lobbyist. 
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TABLE A2.5:  EFFECTS OF ENTRY INTO COMMITTEES. 
 
Dependent Variable: (log) revenue per lobbyist 
 (A) SENATE (B) HOUSE 
 
 
(1) 
  
(2) 
  
(3) 
  
(4) 
One Senator:     
in Finance     0.37***    0.32**   
 (0.13) (0.14)   
in Appropriations 0.03 -0.13   
 (0.35) (0.35)   
One Representative     
In Finance   0.37* 0.36* 
   (0.20) (0.20) 
in Appropriations   -0.19 -0.22 
   (0.22) (0.22) 
Dummies 2 Senators Yes Yes No No 
Dummies 2 Representatives No No Yes Yes 
Time*Party*Chamber Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lobbyist Experience No Yes No Yes 
Individuals 534 534 644 644 
Observations 4,457 4,457 4,727 4,727 
Note: This table presents the effects of Congressmen joining important committees on the revenue of their connected 
lobbyists. The dependent variable is as in Table 2. The Senate regression sample contains only lobbyists connected to 
serving Senators. The displayed variable Finance takes value one when the connected and serving Senator has joined 
the Finance committee. We define similarly the variable Appropriations. The omitted group is being connected to one 
serving Senator in neither of these two Committees. For lobbyists connected to two serving Senators we also define 
and include dummies capturing whether one connected Senator joined the Finance or Appropriations committees. In 
practice, there are very few such cases and the estimated parameters are not displayed. The House sample and 
regressions are constructed equivalently. All regressions include individual lobbyists dummies and time effects (i.e. 
semester dummies). Columns (2) and (4) allow for different time effects for lobbyists connected to politicians in 
different party/chamber combinations (i.e. Democrats in the Senate, etc.) and also include lobbyist experience (i.e. 
number of periods that a lobbyist appears in the sample) in quadratic form. Standard errors are clustered by lobbyist. 
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CHAPTER 3: MINIMUM WAGES AND FIRM PROFITABILITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We study the impact of minimum wages on firm profitability, exploiting the changes 
induced by the introduction of a UK national minimum wage in 1999. We use pre-
policy information on the distribution of wages to implement a difference in differences 
approach. Minimum wages raise wages, but also significantly reduce profitability 
(especially in industries with relatively high market power). This is consistent with a no 
behavioral response model where wage gains from minimum wages map directly into 
profit reductions. There is some weak suggestive evidence of longer-run adjustment 
through falls in net entry rates (JEL J23, L25). 
 
 
 
 
  
  
JEL Classification Codes: J23, L25 
Key Words: Firms, profits, wages. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 106 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In debates on the economic impact of labour market regulation, much work has focused 
on minimum wages. Although the textbook competitive labour market model implies that wage 
floors raise the wages of the low paid and have a negative impact on employment (Borjas 2004; 
Brown 1999), the empirical literature is less clear-cut. Many studies have rigorously 
demonstrated that minimum wages significantly affect the structure of wages by increasing the 
relative wages of the low paid (e.g. DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 1996).32 However, in spite of 
the large number of studies, empirical evidence on employment effects is considerably more 
mixed (see the recent comprehensive review by Neumark and Wascher, 2007). Some have 
found the expected negative impact on employment33, yet others have found no impact or 
sometimes even a positive effect of minimum wages on jobs.34 
In the light of this, it is natural to ask how firms are able to sustain higher wage costs 
induced by the minimum wage. This paper explores the possibility that firm profit margins are 
reduced. A second possibility is that firms simply pass on higher wage costs to consumers in the 
form of price increases. However, there is scant evidence on this score.35 Indeed, even with 
                                                          
32 See also Lemieux (2006) for some recent evidence on the US and DiNardo and Lemieux (1997) for a 
comparison with Canada.  
33  See the discussion of time series studies in Brown, Gilroy and Kohen (1982) and Brown (1999) or the 
US cross-state panel evidence of Neumark and Wascher (1992) and the recent longer run analyses of 
David Neumark and Olena Nizalova (2007). 
34 Examples here are Dickens, Manning and Machin (1999) and Card and Krueger (1994). 
35 This was the conclusion of the survey on minimum wages and prices by Lemos (2008). For exceptions 
on restaurant prices see Aaronson (2001), Aaronson and French (2007) and Fougere, Gautier and le Bihan 
(2008). The only UK evidence to our knowledge is Wadsworth (2009) who finds limited effects on prices. 
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some positive price response, part of the higher wage costs may not be fully passed on to 
consumers and the minimum wage could eat directly into profit margins. A third possibility is 
that minimum wages may “shock” firms into reducing managerial slack and improving 
efficiency. We examine this productivity story but do not find any evidence for it. 
Given this discussion, it is surprising that there is almost a complete absence of any 
study directly examining the impact of minimum wages on firm profitability.  This is the focus 
of this paper. We adopt an identification strategy using variations in wages induced by the 
introduction of the national minimum wage (NMW) in the UK as a quasi-experiment to examine 
the impact of wage floors on firm profitability. The introduction occurred in 1999 after the 
election of the Labour government that ended seventeen years of Conservative administration. 
To date there is evidence that the NMW increased wages for the low paid, but had little impact 
on employment36 and so this provides a ripe testing ground for looking at whether profitability 
changed.  
Our work does uncover a significant negative association between the national 
minimum wage introduction and firm profitability. We report evidence showing wages were 
significantly raised, and firm profitability was significantly reduced by the minimum wage 
introduction. There is also some evidence of bigger falls in margins in industries with relatively 
high market power, but no significant effects on employment or productivity in any sector. Our 
findings can be interpreted as consistent with a simple no behavioral response model where 
wage gains from minimum wages map into profit reductions. There is a hint of a selection effect 
                                                          
36 See Machin, Manning and Rahman (2003) and Stewart (2004). 
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in the longer-run as  net entry rates fall in the most affected industries, but although the 
magnitude of the effect is nontrivial it is statistically insignificant. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we discuss a model of 
profit responsiveness to wage changes from which we derive our empirical strategy. Section 3.3 
discusses the data and the characterisation of firms more likely to be affected by the minimum 
wage introduction. Section 3.4 gives the main results on wage and profitability effects and tests 
their robustness. Section 3.5 offers some further investigations using other datasets (care 
homes), other outcomes and sectoral heterogeneity. Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 Motivation and Modelling Strategy 
3.21. The Scope for Minimum Wages to Impact on Profitability 
 Following Ashenfelter and Smith (1979), consider a profit-maximizing firm 
employing a quantity of labor (L) at wage rate (W), using other factors at price R and selling its 
output at price P. Profits are maximized at P)R,Π(W, given the values of W, R and P. The 
derivative of the profit function with respect to the wage rate is P)R,L(W,WΠ/ −= , the 
negative of the demand for labor. In turn, the second derivative is WL/WΠ/ 22 −= .  
In this setting, the introduction of a minimum wage (M) at a level above that of the 
prevailing wage reduces firm profits by P)R,Π(M,P)R,Π(W,ΔΠ −= . Using a second-order 
Taylor series this can be approximated as: 
2W)(
W
L
2
1
 W LΔΠ 


+−  
(
3.1) 
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where WMΔW −= . The terms on the right-hand side of equation (1) correspond to 
the “wage bill” ( WL-  ) and “labor demand” ( 2W)(
W
L
2
1



) effects on profits. Note that 
equation (3.1) can be re-written as: 














+−=
2
W
ΔW
2
η
W
ΔW
WLΔΠ  
(
3.2) 
where 
W
L
L
W
η


= < 0. 
In a situation of “no behavioural response”, that is no impact on labour demand, the 
second order effect in (2), (
2
W
ΔW
2
η






), is zero and the fall of profits that would result from the 
imposition of a minimum wage M is equal to the proportionate change in the wage multiplied by 
the wage bill. In the case of a labour demand effect the second term can offsets this profit loss to 
the extent that firms can substitute away from low-wage workers into other factors (e.g. capital).  
Equation (3.2) also serves to illustrate the inverse relationship between a firm’s initial 
wage and the post-policy change in its profits. It shows that, the lower the initial wage, then the 
greater the fall in profits associated with the imposition of a minimum wage. The difference-in-
difference models we consider in our empirical modelling strategy (described below) will 
operationalize this idea by defining treatment groups of more affected firms, and comparison 
groups of less affected firms, based on their wages prior to the policy introduction.  
Normalizing profits on sales revenues, S, to define a profit margin shows that, for the no 
behavioral response model, in a statistical regression context the coefficient on the increase in 
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wages caused by the minimum wage 





W
ΔW
should simply be equal to the share of the wage 
bill in total revenue (
S
WL
): 






−=
W
ΔW
θΔ(Π/S)  
(
3.3) 
where 
S
WL
θ = . 
More generally, to the extent there is substitution away from labor, the coefficient on the 
wage increase, θ, will be less (in absolute terms) than the (initial) wage bill share of revenue. 
Interestingly, we will show that our empirical results cannot generally reject the simple 
relationship in equation (3.3). 
It is worth noting that this is consistent with the results in the rather different context of 
John Abowd’s (1989) study of union wage increases and firm performance. Abowd estimates a 
version of equation (3.2) examining the effects of unanticipated increases in the wage bill 
(“union wealth”) on the present discounted value of profits as reflected in changes in stock 
market values (“shareholder wealth”). He also finds that he cannot reject the simple model 
where the second order effect is zero. Abowd interprets this as evidence for strongly efficient 
union bargains as he focuses on a sample of unionized contracts. Strongly efficient (implicit) 
bargaining is also an alternative interpretation of our findings as well.37 
                                                          
37 Although we find this explanation less plausible as the minimum wage mainly binds on those firms and 
sectors where unions are not present or, if they are, are very weak. 
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It is worth focusing on some of the economic issues underlying the adjustment 
mechanisms implicit in the second order term of equation (3.1). Obviously, the magnitude of 
these mechanisms depend on the elasticity of the labor demand curve,  . One element of this 
will be the degree to which labor is substitutable for other factors. Another will be the degree to 
which the higher wage costs can be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices. For 
example, under perfect competition price equals marginal cost so all the wage costs are reflected 
in higher prices for consumers. In most oligopoly models, by contrast, mark-ups will fall as 
some of the wage increase is born by firms (see Appendix 3.A). Consequently, in our empirical 
work, we explicitly distinguish between industries with different degrees of product market 
competition as we expect heterogeneity in the minimum wage effects along this dimension (i.e. 
a larger effect in the less competitive industries).  
The model focuses on the short-run responses when the number of firms is fixed, rather 
than in the long-run when the number of firms varies.38 We believe that the short-run is still 
interesting as researchers cannot be sure how long is the long run (we look up to three years 
after the introduction of the minimum wage, so this is reasonably long run). Since firms that 
employ low-wage workers may well exit the market, so the relevant margin of adjustment will 
be more exit and less entry. We also examine this explicitly in our empirical analysis 
 Finally, when the product market is imperfectly competitive there may also be 
effects of the minimum wage on profitability in both the short-run and the long run. Appendix A 
in Draca et al (2008) discusses these models in some detail, but it is sufficient to note that 
                                                          
38 Note that the short-run negative impact on profits will be larger in competitive labour markets than 
monopsonistic labour markets (see Card and Krueger, 1995). In the latter model, there is an offsetting 
positive effect on profitability when wages increase as worker turnover declines. 
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positive price cost margins are an equilibrium phenomenon in standard industrial organization 
models such as Cournot or differentiated product Bertrand. For example, consider a Cournot 
oligopoly where firms have heterogeneous marginal costs and constant returns to scale. 
Introducing a minimum wage has a differential impact on the firm employing more low skilled 
workers causing this firm to lose market share and suffer a fall in its price cost margin. 
However, so long as profits do not fall below the exit threshold it will remain in the market with 
lower profitability.   
3.22  Modelling Strategy 
 The approach we take to identify minimum wage effects in the context of the 
above theoretical discussion is in line with the existing literature that analyzes the impact of 
national minimum wages. Typically, we look at a group of firms that were more affected by the 
NMW introduction than a comparison set of firms.39  By “more affected”, we mean where 
wages potentially rose by more due to the imposition of the minimum wage floor. This quasi-
experimental setting enables us to compare what happened to profitability before and after 
NMW introduction in low wage firms as compared to what happened to profitability across the 
same period for a comparison group of firms whose wages were not affected as much (or at all) 
by the NMW introduction. 
 For ease of exposition, we begin our discussion of modelling by thinking in 
terms of a discrete treatment indicator of  the minimum wage policy for a set of low wage firms 
with a pre-policy introduction wage, Wpre , beneath the minimum wage threshold M. A treatment 
                                                          
39 See, amongst others, Card’s (1992) analysis of state variations in low pay incidence to identify the 
employment impact of the US federal minimum wage, or Stewart’s (2002) similar analysis of regional 
variations in the UK NMW. 
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indicator variable can be defined as T = 1 for below minimum wage firms (where Wpre < M) and 
T = 0 for a set of firms whose pre-policy wage exceeds the threshold.40 
We can evaluate the impact of minimum wages on firm profitability by comparing what 
happens before and after minimum wage introduction across these treatment and control firms. 
For this procedure to be valid, we first need to establish that our choice of affected firms behave 
as we would expect in response to NMW introduction. The expected response would be that 
wages rise by more in the T = 1 firms before and after introduction as compared to the T = 0 
firms.   
A difference-in-difference estimate of the wage impact of the NMW is
)ww()ww( 0T 0NMW
0T
1NMW
1T
0NMW
1T
1NMW
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
= −−− , where w = ln(W), NMW is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for time periods when the NMW was in place (and 0 for pre-policy periods) and a bar 
denotes a mean. For example, 
1T
1NMWw
=
=  is the mean ln(wage) for the treatment group in the post-
policy period. This difference-in-difference estimate is just the simple difference in means 
unconditional on other characteristics of firms.  It can easily be placed into a regression context. 
If T = 1 for firms with a pre-policy ln(wage), wi,t-1, less than the ln(minimum wage), mwt, and 0 
otherwise, we can enter the indicator function I(wi,t-1< mwt) into a ln(wage) equation for firm i in 
year t as follows: 
it 1 1 it 1 t 1 i,t-1 t 1 i,t-1 t t 1itw  = α + β X + δ Y + θ I(w <mw ) + ψ [I(w <mw )*NMW ] + ε  (
3.4) 
                                                          
40 We also consider various continuous measures of treatment intensity discussed below. 
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where X is a set of control variables, Y denotes a set of year effects (hence a linear term 
in NMWt does not enter the equation since it is absorbed into the time dummies) and ε1it is a 
random error. Here the regression corrected difference-in-difference estimate of the impact of 
NMW introduction on the ln(wage) is the estimated coefficient on the low wage treatment 
dummy in the periods when the NMW was in operation, ψ1. 
 After ascertaining whether the NMW impacts on wages in the expected manner 
we move on to consider whether profitability was affected differentially between the treatment 
group firms (T = 1) and comparison group firms (T = 0). We look at unconditional and 
conditional difference-in-difference estimates in an analogous way to the wage effects.  Thus, 
we can estimate the unconditional difference-in-difference in profit margins, defined as the ratio 
of profits to sales Π/S, as 
T=1 T=1 T=0 T=0
Π Π Π Π
-  - - 
S S S SNMW=1 NMW=0 NMW=1 NMW=0
   
                 
          
   
 and the conditional 
difference-in-difference, ψ2, from the regression model: 
2 2 it 2 t 2 i,t-1 t 2 i,t-1 t t 2it
it
= α  + β Z + δ Y + θ I(w <mw ) + ψ [I(w <mw )*NMW ] + ε
S
 
 
 
 
(
3.5) 
where the controls are now Z  and 2it  is the error term.  
If we compare the econometric models (4) and (5) to the economic models of (1) 
through (3), we see immediately that the no behavioral response model corresponds to a 
restriction on the coefficients in equations (4) and (5), i.e. 
12 θψ-  ψ =  (
3.6) 
We present formal tests of this restriction in the empirical section. 
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The main issue that arises with any non-experimental evaluation of treatment effects is, 
of course, whether the comparison group constitutes a valid counterfactual. The key conditions 
are that there are common trends and stable composition of the two groups (see Blundell, Costa-
Dias, Meghir and Van Reenen, 2004). Much of our robustness analysis below focuses on 
whether these two conditions are met: for example, by examining pre-policy trends and carrying 
out pseudo-experiments (or falsification tests) in the pre-policy period.  
3.3  Data 
3.31  Basic Description of FAME Data  
Accounting regulations in the UK require private firms (i.e. those unlisted on the stock 
market) to publicly report significantly more accounting information than their US counterparts. 
For example, even publicly quoted firms in the US do not have to give total employment and 
wage bills whereas this is required in the UK.41 Accounting information on UK companies is 
stored centrally in Companies House. It is organised into electronic databases and sold 
commercially by private sector data providers such as Bureau Van Dijk from whom we obtained 
the FAME (Financial Analysis Made Easy) database.42 
The great advantage of this data is that is covers a much wider range of companies than 
is standard in firm level analyses and, in particular, it includes firms who are not listed on the 
stock market. This means we are able to include many of the smaller and medium sized firms 
that may be disproportionately affected by the NMW.  Furthermore, the data also covers non-
                                                          
41 The lack of publicly available information on private sector firms and on average remuneration may be 
a reason for the absence of US studies in this area. 
42 FAME is the UK part of BVD’s AMADEUS dataset of European company accounts used by many 
authors (e.g. Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007). 
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manufacturing firms where many low wage workers are employed. By contrast, plant level 
databases in the UK and US typically cover only the manufacturing sector43 and do not have as 
clear a measure of profitability as exists in the (audited) company accounts.  However, UK 
accounting regulations do have reporting exemptions for some variables for the smaller firms so 
our analysis is confined to a sub-sample who do report the required information.44 
Since FAME contains annual accounting information, we have firms reporting accounts 
with different year-end dates. Since the NMW was introduced on April 1st 1999, we therefore 
consider the sub-set of firms who report their end of year accounts on March 31st of each year 
(these are firms who report in the UK financial year).  The accounting period for these firms will 
match exactly the period for which the NMW was in force. Around twenty-one percent of firms 
in FAME who have the accounting data we require report on this day, which corresponds to the 
end of the tax year in the UK.45 
We use data on profits before interest, tax and depreciation from the FAME database 
and model profitability in terms of the profit to sales ratio. There is a long tradition in firm-level 
profitability studies to use this measure, as it is probably the best approximation available in 
                                                          
43 The Annual Business Inquiry (ABI) database does cover non-production sectors, but this database is not 
available until the late 1990s. The US Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) only covers manufacturing. 
44 These firms will tend to be larger than average as the very smallest firms have the least stringent 
reporting requirements.   
45 If we estimated our basic models on the whole FAME sample irrespective of reporting month we 
obtained very much the same pattern of results as our basic findings in Table 3.2 below. The estimated 
effects were a little smaller in magnitude, most likely because of attenuation towards zero owing to 
measurement error in defining treatment. 
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firm-level accounts data to price-cost margins.46 To allow for capital intensity differences we 
also control for firm-specific capital to sales ratio.47 
3.32 Other Data  
We have also matched in industry-level variables aggregated up from the Labour Force 
Survey (similar to the US CPS).  These are used as control variables in the analysis and include 
(at the three-digit industry level) the proportion of (a) part-time workers, (b) female workers and 
(c) union members. We also include skills proxied by the proportion of all workers who have 
college degrees in a particular region by two-digit industry cell.  The control variables in the 
regression models also include a set of region, one-digit industry and time dummies. Exact 
variable definitions are given in the Data Appendix.  Appendix Table 3.B1 shows the 
characteristics of the treatment and comparison groups for each model.48 
Finally, the magnitude of the minimum wage increases over our “Policy On” period 
should be clarified. This period lasts from April 1st 1999 until March 31st 2002 (the end of our 
sample). Along with the introduction of the minimum wage, there were two upratings of the 
                                                          
46 For example, see Machin and Van Reenen (1993) and Slade (2004). Although there are many reasons 
why accounting and economic profits may diverge (Fisher and McGowan, 1983), there is much evidence 
that they are on average highly positively correlated. The relationship between the profit-sales ratio and 
price-cost margins will also break down if there are not constant returns to scale. In this case, controlling 
for capital intensity is important in allowing for differential fixed costs across firms and that is what we do 
empirically in the regression-corrected difference in difference estimates. 
47 We also checked that dropping the capital sales ratio did not change the results as some of the effect of 
the NMW may have come from firms substituting away from more expensive labour towards capital 
equipment. 
48 Interestingly the profitability of low wage firms is higher at the median and mean than comparison 
group firms. This is not true for firms as a whole where there is a positive correlation between average 
firm wages and profits per worker (e.g. Van Reenen, 1996). It is because we are focusing on the lower 
part of the wage distribution that this correlation breaks down. 
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minimum during this time. The first occurred in October 2000 and saw the minimum wage rise 
by 10p to £3.70. The second uprating a year later was more substantial taking the minimum up 
to £4.10.  Together these upratings constitute a 13.9% increase in the minimum between 1999 
and 2002.49  Small cell sizes prevent us from estimating separate models for the 2000 and 2001 
upratings.50   
3.4  Defining Treatment and Comparison Groups 
3.41 Basic Approach 
FAME has a total remuneration figure that can be divided by the total number of 
employees to calculate an average wage.51 This creates a challenge in terms of defining our 
treatment and comparison groups since any given level of average wages is, in principle, 
compatible with a range of different within-firm wage distributions. This makes it hard to 
measure accurately how exposed each firm’s cost structures are to the wage shock brought about 
by the minimum wage. For example, any continuous measure of treatment intensity based on the 
firm average wage is inevitably coarse. 
We have used information from FAME, the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the 
Workplace Employment Relations (WERS) to both construct and validate our treatment group 
indicators. Specifically, the main results use average firm wages from FAME to define our 
                                                          
49 By contrast, the consumer price index grew by 6.3% over the same period. 
50 For example, less than 9% of firms report annually on September 30th (i.e. the 12 months immediately 
before the October upratings).  
51  In almost all firms in the data we use, employment refers to average employment over the accounting 
period. Firms can report employment at the accounting year or the average over the year, but the 
overwhelming number of our firms report averaged employment. 
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treatment and comparison groups, but we also use LFS information for the industry level 
analysis of entry and exit. We use within-establishment information from matched worker-
establishment data in WERS to consider the association between low pay incidence and average 
wages to assess the effectiveness of this empirical strategy.52 
To investigate the impact of the minimum wage we have defined our treatment group, 
T, based upon average remuneration information from FAME. For our main initial analysis we 
define T = 1 for firms with average remuneration of less than £12,000 in the accounting year 
prior to minimum wage introduction (“low wage firm”). 53  Average remuneration in the 
treatment group for this threshold is £8,400 which, after allowing for a deduction for non-wage 
costs  (such as employers’ payroll tax, pension contributions, etc), is equivalent to a £3.90 
hourly wage for a full-time worker and is close to the NMW (introduced at £3.60 per hour). For 
our research purposes, the key issue is that the wages of firms beneath the threshold we choose 
have a significant wage boost from the NMW relative to higher wage firms and we consider this 
in detail in our analysis. One aspect of this is that we have extensively experimented with the 
threshold cut-off and we discuss this in detail below. In the analysis presented below, we also 
look at associations with the pre-policy average wage in the firm. This gives a continuous 
                                                          
52  Unfortunately, direct linking of data of WERS and FAME is not possible due to confidentiality 
restrictions. 
53 In earlier versions of this paper we also combined the low wage firm information with industry-region 
“cell” data on the proportion of workers beneath the minimum wage in the year before it came in. Using 
LFS data, we defined a low wage industry-region cell if more than 10% of workers  in the given firm’s 
two-digit industry by region cell in the pre-policy period are paid below the minimum wage. In practice 
this made little difference to the overall pattern of results and so we do not report this material (see Draca 
et al, 2008, for all the results).  
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indicator that we can use to compare with the binary treatment variables based upon being 
beneath a particular wage threshold. 
3.42 The Usefulness of Average Wages to Define Treatment 
How accurate are these treatment group definitions at identifying firms most affected 
firms by the minimum wage regulation? This hinges on how segregated low-wage workers are 
between firms. Our threshold-based definition will be more effective if sub-minimum wage 
employees are concentrated in particular firms at the lower end of the wage distribution.  
To assess the usefulness of the approach we adopt we look at segregation and wages in 
the 1998 cross-section of the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS)54. This 
contains matched worker and establishment data that allows us to look at within-workplace 
wage distributions and explore the association between average wages and the intensity of low-
wage workers.  For 26,509 workers in 1,782 WERS workplaces we computed the proportion of 
workers paid less than £3.60 per hour (the value of the minimum wage when introduced in 
1999) and the average hourly wage in the workplace.  There is a strong, negative association 
between the two variables (a correlation coefficient of -0.61, p-value < 0.001). In Figure 3.1 we 
plot the proportion of workers paid at or below the minimum wage against the establishment’s 
average annual wage. This proportion of minimum wage workers tapers off rapidly after an 
average annual wage of £10,000, supporting the idea that exposure to the minimum wage can be 
proxied by using an average wage threshold that is around this level. Workplaces with average 
annual wages of £12,000 or less (our main threshold defining the treatment group) contain 87% 
                                                          
54 WERS is a stratified random sample of British establishments and has been conducted in several waves 
since 1980. It has been extensively used by economists and industrial relations experts to study a range of 
issues. Culley, Woodland, O’Reilly, Dix and et al. (1999) give details of the survey 
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of all minimum wage workers. These patterns give some support to our idea that “at risk” group 
of minimum wage workers are concentrated in firms that pay low average wages.   
3.5 Main Results 
3.51 Changes in Wages Before and After the Introduction of the National 
Minimum Wage 
It is important to see whether we are able to observe a clear change or “twist” in the firm 
average wage distribution as the minimum wage was introduced. To consider this, we started 
our analysis by calculating the change in average wages in the year immediately before and 
immediately after NMW introduction for every firm at each percentile of the pre-policy firm 
wage distribution. If the firms in the FAME data exhibit some of the low pay patterns outlined 
above for WERS, the minimum wage introduction should raise average firm wages by more in 
low wage firms. Thus, we would expect there to be larger changes in firm wages for the lowest 
percentiles of the distribution.   
The results given in Figure 3.2 very clearly confirm this hypothesis. In the post-NMW 
introduction year from April 1 1999 to March 31 2000 (labelled “1999-2000 Change”, and 
denoted by the solid line), the wage change tapers off steadily beyond the lowest decile of the 
firm average wage distribution. After the 13th percentile, firms appear to have had a similar 
increase in nominal wages of around 5.6%. Importantly, there is no evidence of much faster 
wage growth for the bottom decile in the pre-policy year (labelled “1998-1999 Change”, and 
denoted by the dotted line). In fact, wage growth in the bottom thirteen percentiles was on 
average 2.6% in the 1998-1999 financial year compared to 9.9% in the following year. A spike 
is seen for the bottom few percentiles of the wage distribution in both years, which is consistent 
with the notion of some transitory measurement error at the low end of the wage distribution 
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generating mean reversion in both periods. Reassuringly, the general picture follows a similar 
pattern to that found for individual-level wage data (Dickens and Manning, 2004) and again 
provides encouraging evidence that our definition of the treatment group is useful.  
It is critical that we identify wage effects from the treatment group definitions, so that 
our analysis of profitability consequences is validated by the minimum wage introduction 
having a bigger ‘bite’ on low wage firms.  To make this a tighter definition we have also defined 
the comparison group to be those firms with average wages above the £12,000 treatment 
threshold, but less than £20,000 (the median firm wage) by removing any firms with above 
£20,000 average wages from the main analysis. We do so since these firms are quite different in 
terms of their characteristics and therefore subject to different unobservable trends from the 
treatment group. We are careful to test for the sensitivity of the results to definitions of these 
thresholds. 
3.52  Firm-Level Estimates: Wages and Profitability 
 The upper panel of Table 3.1 presents unconditional difference-in-differences in 
the mean ln(wage) for the discrete categorization of treatment and comparison groups, for the 
three years before and after NMW introduction.55 It is evident that wages rose significantly 
faster amongst the low wage firms when the minimum wage became operational. Wage growth 
across the pre- and post-NMW three year time period was higher at 22.9 log points in the low 
initial wage group (T = 1) as compared to wage growth of 11.8 log points in the higher initial 
wage group (T = 0). The difference-in-difference of 11 percent is strongly significant in 
                                                          
55 Note that we are looking across the six financial years from April 1 1996 to March 31 2002 (three years 
before the policy and three years afterwards). In Figure 2, we simply looked one year before and after the 
policy introduction. 
 123 
 
statistical terms. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the NMW significantly increased 
wages for low wage firms56. 
 An analogous set of descriptive results is presented for firm profitability in 
Panel B of Table 3.1. It is clear that, whilst profit margins fell by 0.039 between the pre- and 
post-NMW periods in the pre-NMW low wage firms, they only fell by 0.012 in the pre-NMW 
higher wage firms. Thus, there is a negative difference-in-difference of -0.027. This difference is 
statistically significant and is preliminary evidence that profit margins were squeezed in firms 
that were “at risk” from the introduction of the minimum wage.   
 Comparing these results with the simple models in Section 3.2, we find that no 
behavioral response model does surprisingly well. Using the average wage bill to sales ratio of 
0.27 (see Table 3.B1), the implied change of profit margins using the estimated wage gains in 
Table 1 and equation (3.3) is -0.030 (= -0.111*0.27). This is only slightly above the empirically 
estimated profitability reduction of -0.027 in Table 3.1, suggesting only minor offsetting 
adjustments (the second-order term in equation (3.2)). Below, we will see that this conclusion 
broadly holds up to more rigorous econometric testing. 
Table 3.2 reports results from statistical difference-in-difference wage and profitability 
regressions that additionally control for firm and industry characteristics. The upper panel (A) of 
the Table shows results for the binary low wage firm indicator, whilst the lower panel (B) uses a 
continuous measure, the negative of the pre-policy average wage (reporting the negative so as to 
                                                          
56 As we saw in Figure 3.1, in 1998 (the year prior to the introduction of the National Minimum Wage in 
1999), on average 25% of workers in the treatment group were at or below the minimum wage compared 
to 3% in the comparison group. Based upon this  22 percentage point difference, our coefficients would 
have to be scaled up by a factor of 4.5 if we considered the more radical experiment of switching a firm 
from having none of its workers covered to having all of its workers covered by the minimum wage. 
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have signs on coefficients that are consistently defined with the low wage dummy). The basic 
pattern of results from the unconditional models of Table 3.1 are confirmed in these conditional 
specifications.  For the binary indicator in the upper panel, the estimated effects show a 9.4 
percentage point increase in wages and a 2.9 percentage point decrease in profitability (similar 
to Table 3.1).  The same pattern of results is observed for the (negative of the) continuous pre-
NMW wage, reported in panel B. There is a significant positive connection between wage 
growth and the negative of the pre-NMW wage and a significant negative association with 
profitability. When compared to average profits in the low-wage firms in the pre-policy period, 
the results for the binary low-wage firm model imply a sizable 22.7 per cent (-0.029/0.128) fall 
in profit margins.  The P-values from F-tests of the no behavioral response model are at the 
bottom of each panel and again indicate that we cannot reject the simple model underlying 
equation (3).  
3.53 Further Probing of the Baseline Results 
 There are many reasons to probe these baseline results more deeply. The first, 
and obvious, reason is to judge the sensitivity of our definition of pre-policy low wages.  
Because we do not have data on the individual workers within our FAME firms, we rely on pre-
policy low wage status as being a function of the average wage in the firm.  This is less than 
ideal, even though we have (at least partially) validated its use above with the WERS data, and it 
is important to study whether the results are robust to alternative ways of defining the threshold 
between treatment and comparison groups. 
 We therefore re-estimated the models in Table 3.2 for a range of different wage 
thresholds, running from an average wage of £10,000 at £1,000 intervals up to £15,000. The 
results are reassuring in that they all establish a significant NMW effect of reducing profit 
 125 
 
margins, with magnitude of the impact varying and becoming slightly larger (in absolute terms) 
for lower thresholds as we would expect (so there is a bigger impact on the very low wage 
firms).57 
 A second possible concern is that our results are simply picking up a 
relationship between changes in profit margins and initial low wage status that exists, but has 
nothing to do with the NMW introduction. We have thus looked at estimates, structured in the 
same way, from periods before the NMW was introduced. One such ‘placebo experiment’ is 
reported in Table 3.3 where we examine an imaginary introduction of the NMW on April 1st 
1996 (instead of April 1999) and repeat our analysis of wage and profitability changes. Table 3 
very much reinforces the results reported to date, as we are unable to find any difference in 
margins between low and high wage firms in the period when the policy was not in place. This 
is consistent with the NMW introduction being the factor that caused margins to fall in low 
wage firms.  
A related issue is the possibility of pre-sample trends (possibly due to mean reversion) 
in the wage model. If initially low wage firms had lower than average profitability growth even 
in the absence of the policy this would be conflated with the causal effect of the NMW impact 
on profits. The evidence from Table 3.3 suggested that there is no trend for wages or 
profitability in the pre-policy period. Nevertheless, we investigated this issue in more detail by 
estimating the profits model of Table 3.2 with a rolling threshold from £10,000 to £15,000 for 
both the policy and pseudo-experiment periods. That is, we estimate the model for thresholds at 
                                                          
57 The profitability impacts for the different T = 1 thresholds were: -0.029 (0.014) for £10,000; -0.027 
(0.013) for £11,000 ; -0.029 (0.012) for £12,000 ; -0.024 (0.010) for £13,000; and -0.014 (0.009) for 
£14,000.   
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each £100 interval in this range and plot the coefficients (see Figure 3.3). In the policy-on period 
there is a consistently negative effect of around 2-3% no matter how we draw the exact profit 
threshold. By contrast, in the pre-policy period there is essentially a zero effect with the point 
estimates actually positive and around 1%.    
Draca et al (2008) report a number of further robustness tests.  First, a statistical 
matching technique by trimming the sample according to the propensity scores of the treatment 
and comparison groups did not affect the pattern of results.58 As discussed earlier our sample 
seems well chosen with relatively few observations needing to be trimmed to ensure common 
support. More importantly, the estimated effect of the policy on wages and profitability are 
significant and similar to those in the baseline Low Wage Firm specification.59 Second, we 
included a full set of three-digit industry time trends. Although this is a strong test, the 
profitability effect was almost identical when these industry time trends were included with an 
estimate of -0.032 (0.015).  
                                                          
58 The basic method used is that of Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) where propensity scores are 
estimated and the sample then trimmed to exclude poorly matched observations without common support.  
To generate the propensity scores, we used a probit model that included all the control variables used in 
Table 3.2. We trimmed at the 1st percentile of the treatment group and the 99th percentile. 
59 Few observations are lost under propensity score matching because the comparison group is already 
chosen to be of relatively low wage firms (under £20,000 average annual wages). If we had used the entire 
FAME sample (including firms with average wages of over £20,000) we would have had to lose the vast 
majority of the sample to ensure that the comparison group had common support with the treatment 
group. Results are not presented for the pre-policy average wage since that is a continuous variable. If, 
however, the specification including that variable was estimated on the trimmed sample from columns (2) 
or (3) this produced very similar results to the baseline estimates of Table 3.2. 
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3.6 Further Investigation of the Minimum Wage Effect 
The baseline results of Section 3.4 show very clearly that low wage firms in the FAME 
data experienced faster wage growth coupled with falling profit margins before and after the 
introduction of the UK National Minimum Wage.  The results also seem consistent with the no 
behavioral response theoretical model introduced in Section 3.2 above. The model has a number 
of other salient features that we explore more fully in this Section, in an attempt to understand 
the effect of minimum wages on firm profitability and mechanisms that underpin the negative 
effect our baseline results have uncovered. 
3.61.  Minimum Wages and Profitability in UK Residential Care Homes 
In this sub-section we look at the wage and profitability effects of the minimum wage in 
a rather different context, UK residential care homes.60 There are three reasons to focus on care 
homes to juxtapose with the FAME results. First, it is a very low wage sector so offers a good 
testing ground for studying minimum wage effects on profitability and other economic 
outcomes.61 Second, the sector is price regulated so one of the margins of adjustment (passing 
on higher wage costs in higher prices) is constrained. Finally, we have individual level data so 
can observe the entire within-firm wage distribution in this exercise, something we could not do 
in the FAME dataset. 
                                                          
60 To date these data have mostly been used for studies of minimum wage effects on wages and jobs (e.g. 
Machin, Manning and Rahman, 2003), but see also Machin and Manning’s (2004) test of competitive 
labour market theory. 
61 Prior to the minimum wage introduction in April 1999 average hourly wages were very low in the 
sector (at around £4 per hour). On average, 32.2% of workers were paid below the incoming minimum 
wage with this figure falling to 0.4% after the introduction of the policy. 
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The more sophisticated definition of treatment we are able to use is the initial firm wage 
gap relative to the minimum, namely the proportional increase in a firm’s wage bill required to 
bring all of its workers up to the minimum wage. This variable, GAP, is defined as: 
min
ji ji ji
j
ji ji
j
h max(W -W )
h W
iGAP =


 
(
3.7) 
where hji is the weekly hours worked by worker j in firm i, Wji is the hourly wage of 
worker j in firm i, and Wji
min is the minimum wage relevant for worker j in firm i . 
For care homes, we do not have accounting data and so the profit variable we study is a 
derived one based on total revenues less total costs. Total revenue of each home is measured 
directly as the product of the number of beds, the home-specific average price of beds and the 
home occupancy rate. Total costs are calculated by dividing the total firm wage bill by the share 
of labour in total costs.62  Home profitability is then defined as the ratio of profits to revenue. 
We therefore estimate the following care homes specification: 
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(
3.8) 
where it is the equation error. Under the no behavioral response model the coefficient 
on GAP ( 1 η ) should be equal to the wage bill share of revenues. 
                                                          
62 Total sales and profits are not reported directly in the care homes data. We calculated them from the 
underlying home-specific components. Sales (S) is calculated as Occupancy Proportion* Number of Beds 
* Average Price (all reported in the survey). The wage bill (WB) and the share of labor in total costs 
(SHARE) are also reported directly in the data.  We can then calculate total costs (TC) as the ratio of the 
wage bill to the labor share (WB/SHARE). Profits are then simply sales less total costs (S - TC). 
Profitability is the ratio of profits to sales, (S - TC)/S. 
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Table 3.4 presents estimates of home-level wage change and profitability change 
equations for the period surrounding NMW introduction (1998-99). The upper panel (A) focuses 
on wages, and presents results showing that wages clearly rose by more in homes with a larger 
pre-NMW wage gap. The lower panel (B) shows profitability estimates, where the coefficient on 
the pre-NMW wage gap variable is estimated to be negative and significant. In the column (2) 
specification with controls the coefficient is -0.492. Thus there is clear evidence of profitability 
falls in homes that were more affected by the minimum wage introduction.  This very much 
corroborates the FAME findings of the previous section. 
 There was also some evidence that wages rose more in the pre-policy period (1992-93) 
in homes with a bigger initial wage gap.63 Nevertheless, the relationship is much weaker in the 
earlier period so the trend-adjusted estimate is statistically significant and large in magnitude (at 
0.678). Under the no behavioural response model, the coefficient on the initial wage gap 
measure should equal the share of the wage bill in sales. The (trend adjusted) point estimate on 
the wage gap term in the profitability equation turns out to be -0.396 for the model with controls 
(and -0.343 for the no controls specification), which in absolute terms is very close to the wage 
bill to sales ratio in our sample of care homes (0.398).  Hence, like the FAME results the 
magnitude of the estimated impact in care homes is very much in line with what we would 
expect from the simple no behavioral response model.  
                                                          
63 We define a counterfactual minimum wage at the same percentile of the wage distribution as the real 
1999 minimum, so we can compute a GAP measure for the earlier pre-policy time period. Note that this is 
the only previous wage change information that exists, as the data was not collected in other (non-
election) years. 
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3.62  Sectoral Heterogeneity: Industries With High and Low Market Power 
As noted in Section 3.2, a condition for the existence of long-run effects of minimum 
wages on profitability is that there is some degree of imperfect competition in the product 
market. To examine this idea in Table 5 we split industries into “high” and “low” competition 
industries based on a proxy for the Lerner Index (constructed as in Aghion et al, 2005). 
Consistent with the idea of imperfect competition, the effects of the NMW policy on 
profitability were stronger in the less competitive sectors (defined as those with above the 
median value of three-digit industry Lerner index). Table 3.5 shows that the impact of the policy 
on wages was not so different (10.9% vs. 8.1%). By contrast, the effect of the minimum wage on 
profitability was almost two and a half times as large in the less competitive industries as in the 
more competitive sectors (as well as being significant only in the more competitive sectors).  
Under perfect competition, an industry facing a common increase in marginal costs will 
pass on the higher wage costs in the form of higher prices to consumers. In less competitive 
sectors, however, firms will generally adjust by reducing their profit margins, rather than just 
through prices. Therefore, the evidence in Table 3.5 is consistent with the idea that the strongest 
effects of the NMW on profitability will be in the less competitive sectors. 
3.63  Effects of Minimum Wage on Other Outcomes: Employment, Productivity, 
Exit and Entry  
We also examined the effect of the NMW policy on other firm outcomes in the lower 
part of Table 3.5, again split by high and low market power sectors. We do not find any 
significant negative effects on employment, consistent with some of the minimum wage 
literature (e.g. Card and Krueger, 1994). The presence of no significant employment effect is 
also consistent with our tests of the no behavioral response model.  Similarly, there does not 
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appear to be any effect of the policy introduction on labor productivity (as predicted by the 
"shock" theory). 
The FAME database identifies four categories of inactive firms, namely firms that are 
dissolved, liquidated, in receivership or currently non-trading.64 Hence, we have defined all 
firms in these categories as “exiting” firms. We examine three year death rates for a cohort alive 
April 1st 1999 (i.e. did they exit by March 31st 2002) compared to a cohort alive on April 1st 
1996 (i.e. did they exit by 1999). In the final row of Table 3.5 there is no evidence of any faster 
increase in exit rates in initially low wage firms following the minimum wage introduction 
either in the whole sample or in sub-sectors. The same is true in models of the probability of 
closure of care homes (see Machin and Wilson, 2004). 
There are two possible problems with this firm-level analysis of exit. First, we ignore 
the possible entry-deterring effect of the minimum wage may, and second, there may be pre-
policy trends.65 Table 6 takes both of these into account. Obviously, we cannot implement this at 
the firm level, as entrants do not have a pre-policy wage for the entrants. However, we can 
examine an alternative dataset containing all entrants and exits in each three-digit sector (from 
the Department of Trade and Industry’s VAT Registration Database).66  
                                                          
64 So exits by takeover are not coded to be unity in this definition as takeovers may be regarded as a sign 
of success rather than failure. Re-defining the dependent variable to be unity if the exit is to a takeover 
does not change the qualitative nature of the results. 
65 Running the pseudo-policy experiment of Table 3.3 gave a coefficient on the policy variable of 0.021 
with a standard error of 0.106 for employment and 0.077 with a standard error of (0.053) for productivity. 
66 Unlike the firm data, we cannot distinguish between exit due to takeover and exit due to bankruptcy. 
Appendix table 3.B2 describes some key features of these data. 
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The three Panels of Table 3.6 show one-year entry rates, one-year exit rates and the 
difference between the two (“net entry”) three-digit industries.  Column (1) shows estimated 
coefficients on a pre-NMW low pay proportion in the period surrounding NMW introduction. 
Column (2) does the equivalent experiment for an imaginary/placebo policy (as in Table 3) 
introduced in 1996 and column (3) presents the trend-adjusted difference in differences. 
Although the first row shows that entry rates appear to perversely increase for low wage firms 
after the minimum wage, there does appear to be some positive pre-policy trend in column (2) 
suggesting a negative trend-adjusted effect of the NMW policy on entry. Similarly, trend 
adjusted exit rates in Panel B are 1.5 percentage points higher after the minimum wage was 
introduced. The final row shows that trend-adjusted net entry rates had fallen by about 5.1 
percentage points in the low wage industries after the NMW introduction This effect is large in 
magnitude, but not statistically significant. These results do hint that in the long-run a margin of 
adjustment may be in the dimension of lower rates of net entry into the sectors most affected by 
the NMW.67 There is little within firm change, but the margin of adjustment may be through the 
long-run number of firms. 
3.7 Conclusions 
This paper considers a very under-studied research question on the economic impact of 
minimum wages by looking at empirical connections between minimum wage legislation and 
firm profitability. Using the quasi-experiment of the introduction of a national minimum wage to 
the UK labour market in 1999, we utilise pre-policy information on the distribution of wages to 
                                                          
67 Our further indications indicated that there were minimal differences in entry and exit rates between 
high and low market power industries. For example, when split by market power the corresponding 
estimates for column (1), Panel (A) in Table 6 were 0.025 (0.022) for high and 0.019 (0.020) for low. 
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construct treatment and comparison groups and implement a difference in differences approach. 
We report evidence showing wages were significantly raised, and firm profitability was 
significantly reduced by the minimum wage introduction. There is also some evidence of bigger 
falls in margins in industries with relatively high market power, but no effects on firm 
employment or productivity. Somewhat surprisingly, our findings are consistent with a simple 
"no behavioral response" model where wage gains from minimum wages map into profit 
reductions. There is a hint that the long-run adjustment may be through lower rates of net entry. 
There are, of course, a number of caveats to our results. It would have been useful to 
have data on prices and quality to see if these may also have adjusted in response to minimum 
wages.68 It would also be useful to have more information on the within firm distribution of 
workers in other sectors besides care homes. A fuller integration of theory and empirical work in 
the context of imperfect competition in both product and labor markets is another fruitful 
research area for the future. Overall, though given the total sparsity of evidence of the impact of 
minimum wage floors on firm profitability, we believe this study is an important contribution 
looking at the impact of labor market regulation on firms as well as the more developed and 
extensive evidence base that exists studying the impact on individuals. 
  
                                                          
68  Although there is no evidence for these effects in the care homes sector, as it is heavily regulated (see 
Machin, Manning and Rahman, 2003). 
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3.8 Figures for Chapter 3 
 
 
FIGURE 3.1: VALIDATION OF AVERAGE WAGE DATA  
(COMPARISON OF PROPORTION OF LOW WAGE WORKERS AND 
ESTABLISHMENT AVERAGE WAGES, WERS 1998) 
        
 
 
 
Notes:-  
1). These figures are derived from the worker-establishment data (23,319 workers in 1,782 workplaces) from the 1998 
Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS). The y-axis shows the proportion of workers paid below the 
minimum wage (£3.60 per hour) in the establishment. The x-axis shows the average annual wage at the workplace. 
This is divided into bins for of five percentiles from lowest (left) to highest (right) - a total of twenty bins up to an 
annualised wage of £24,000. 
2). We mark the relevant thresholds for our analysis with vertical lines. The £12,000 line represents the main 
treatment group threshold used in our analysis of the FAME data. The £20,000 line is the cut-off for the upper bound 
of the comparison group used in the FAME analysis. 
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FIGURE 3.2: CHANGE IN LN(AVERAGE WAGE) BY PERCENTILE IN THE 
FINANCIAL YEAR BEFORE AND AFTER NMW INTRODUCTION 
 
  
 
Notes:- 
1).  The data is taken from the FAME database of company accounts. The horizontal axis indicates the 
percentile in the firm wage distribution for a given firm in the initial period, the pre-policy financial year 
up to March 31st 1999. The vertical axis shows the proportionate change in average firm wages (between 
the pre-policy financial year and the post policy financial year) for each firm ranked by where it began in 
the wage distribution.  
2). Pre-Policy is defined as the financial year April 1st 1998 to March 31st 1999; Policy On is defined as 
the financial year April 1st 1999 to March 31st 2000. 
3) We show the threshold for the treatment groups by hatched vertical lines. In the baseline specifications 
firms with average wages below £12,000 (the 13th percentile) are in the treatment group and firms with 
average wages between £20,000 (the median) and £12,000 are in the control group. 
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FIGURE 3.3 VARYING TREATMENT EFFECT COEFFICIENTS IN FAME 
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE PROFITABILITY MODELS 
 
 
 
Notes:-   
1). Data taken from is the FAME database of company accounts. The baseline models are as per Pre-
NMW Low Wage Model in Tables 2 (Policy On period) and Table 3 (Pre-Policy period). .   
2). The vertical axis shows the estimated treatment effects. The horizontal axis shows thresholds are 
shifted in units of £100 to define treatment group (T=1) as firms with pre-policy wages of under the 
threshold and comparison group with firms with average wages over the threshold and under £20,000. 
The baseline model is then re-defined and re-estimated using 50 successive treatment group wage 
thresholds between £10,000 and £15,000. 
3). The Policy On sample period covers the six financial years from April 1st 1996 to March 31st 2002, 
NMW introduction on April 1st 1999. The Pre-Policy (pseudo-experiment) period covers the six financial 
years April 1st 1993 to March 31st 1999, with an ‘imaginary’ NMW introduction on April 1st 1996.  
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3.9 Tables for Chapter 3 
 
 
TABLE 3.1: CHANGES IN FIRM AVERAGE WAGES AND PROFITABILITY 
BEFORE AND AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF THE NATIONAL MINIMUM 
WAGE 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  
 
Pre-NMW 
Introduction 
 
Post-NMW 
Introduction 
 
Difference 
 
 
 
A. ln(Average Wage),  lnW    
 
Pre-NMW Low Wage Firm, T=1 2.149 2.378 0.229 
    
Pre-NMW Not Low Wage Firm, T=0 2.775 2.893 0.118 
    
Difference-in-Difference    0.111*** 
   (0.029) 
 
B.  Profit Margin, Π/S 
 
Pre-NMW Low Wage Firm, T=1 0.128 0.089 -0.039 
    
Pre-NMW Not Low Wage Firm, T=0 0.070 0.058  -0.012 
    
Difference-in-Difference     -0.027** 
    (0.014) 
 
Notes:-  
1). Pre-NMW corresponds to the three financial years April 1st 1996-March 31st 1999 and Post-NMW to the 
three financial years April 1st 1999–March 31st  2002.  
2). T = 1 indicates the treatment Group and T= 0 indicates the comparison group. Pre-NMW Low Wage 
Firm – the treatment group is defined as firms with an average wage equal to or below £12,000 per annum 
in the pre-policy financial year up to March 31st 1999; the comparison group is defined as firms with 
average wages between £12,000 and £20,000 in the pre-policy financial year up to March 31st 1999.     
3). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm and sample size is 4,112 (there are 951 firms).    
 
  
 142 
 
TABLE 3.2: WAGES AND PROFITABILITY BEFORE AND AFTER INTRODUCTION 
OF THE NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE (NMW), 1997-2002 
 
 
  
Period Before and After NMW Introduction, 1997-
2002,  (N = 4,112) 
 
  
Change in ln(Average 
Wage), ΔlnW  
 
 
Change in Gross Profit 
Margin, /S)Δ(   
 
A.  Treatment = Low Wage Firm  
 
Pre-NMW Low Wage Firm      0.090*** -0.029** 
 (0.026) (0.012) 
   
Test of  no behavioral response P-value = 0.663 
 
 
B. Treatment = - Pre-Policy ln(W) 
 
- Pre-NMW ln(W)   0.188*** -0.032** 
 (0.033) (0.015) 
   
Test of  no behavioral response P-value = 0.144 
 
 
Notes:-   
1). Coefficients estimated by Ordinary Least Squares and standard errors in parentheses below are 
clustered by firm (there are 951 firms).  
2). The Pre-NMW period covers the three pre-policy financial years April 1st 1996-March 31st 1999 and 
the Post-NMW period the three financial years April 1st 1999–March 31st 2002. Low Wage Firm Pre-
NMW - treatment group is defined as firms with an average wage equal to or below £12,000 per annum in 
the pre-policy financial year up to March 31st 1999; the comparison group is defined as firms with average 
wages between £12,000 and £20,000. Pre-NMW ln(W) - indicates that we use a continuous measure of 
the wage (in the pre-policy year up to March 31st 1999) is used for treatment intensity.  
3). Controls include two digit industry dummies; 18 regional dummies; the proportion of workers who are 
graduates (by region and two-digit industry); and union membership, part-time work and female 
employment rates (by three-digit industry classification).  
4). “Test of  no behavioral response” implements equation (3) in the text. 
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TABLE 3.3: WAGES AND PROFITABILITY BEFORE AND AFTER INTRODUCTION 
OF A PLACEBO NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE (NMW), 1993-1999 
 
 
  
Period Before and After ‘Imaginary 
NMW’ Introduction, 1993-99,  (N = 4,550) 
 
  
Change in ln(Average 
Wage), ΔlnW  
 
 
Change in Gross Profit 
Margin, /S)Δ(   
 
A.  Treatment = Low Wage Firm 
 
Pre-‘Imaginary NMW’ Low 
Wage Firm  
 
0.033 
 
0.015 
 (0.028) (0.011) 
   
 
B. Treatment = - Pre-Policy ln(W) 
   
- Pre-‘Imaginary NMW’ ln(W) 0.079 0.012 
 (0.106) (0.029) 
   
 
Notes:-   
1). Coefficients estimated by Ordinary Least Squares and standard errors in parentheses below are 
clustered by firm (there are 1,047 firms).  
2). The Pre-‘Imaginary NMW’ period covers the three financial years April 1st 1993 – March 31st 1996 
and the Post-‘Imaginary NMW’ period covers the three financial years April 1st 1996 and March 31st 
1999. Low Wage Firm Pre-‘Imaginary NMW’ - treatment group is defined as firms with an average wage 
equal to or below £12,000 per annum in the pre-policy financial year up to March 31st 1996; the 
comparison group is defined as firms with average wages between £12,000 and £20,000. Pre-‘Imaginary 
NMW’ ln(W) - indicates that we use a continuous measure of the wage (in the Pre-‘Imaginary NMW’ 
year up to March 31st 1996) is used for treatment intensity. 
3). Controls include two digit industry dummies; 18 regional dummies, the proportion of workers who are 
graduates (by region and two-digit industry); and union membership, part-time work and female 
employment rates (by three-digit industry classification). 
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TABLE 3.4: NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE INTRODUCTION AND 
WAGES AND PROFITABILITY IN CARE HOMES, 1998-1999. 
 
 
 Period Before and After NMW Introduction, 1998-99, 
(N = 908) 
 
 
A.  Wages 
 
Change in ln(Average Wage), ΔlnW  
 
   
Pre-NMW Wage Gap 0.861*** 
(0.045) 
0.886*** 
(0.052) 
 
   
Controls No Yes 
 
 
B. Profitability 
 
/S)Δ(  , Change in Profit Margin 
 
 
Pre-NMW Wage Gap 
 
 
-0.433*** 
(0.173) 
 
 
-0.492*** 
(0.202) 
 
 
Controls 
 
 
No 
 
Yes 
   
 
Notes:-   
1). Coefficients estimated by Ordinary Least Squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses under 
coefficients.  
2). Sample covers 454 nursing homes in 1998 and 1999.  
3). Initial pre-minimum wage period (t-1) controls include workforce characteristics (proportion female, 
mean worker age, proportion with nursing qualifications), the proportion of residents paid for by the 
government (“DSS”), region dummies and month dummies.  
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TABLE 3.5: SPLITTING INTO HIGH AND LOW MARKET POWER INDUSTRIES 
 
   
Outcome High Market 
Power Industries 
Low Market 
Power industries 
 
A. Wages 
  
Treatment = Low Wage Firm 0.109*** 0.081** 
N = 1,943 (High); N =2,169 (Low) (0.035) (0.038) 
   
B. Profits   
Treatment = Low Wage Firm -0.037** -0.014 
N = 1,943 (High); N =2,169 (Low) (0.018) (0.014) 
   
Test of no behavioral response P-value = 0.646 P-value = 0.531 
C. Employment   
 Treatment = Low Wage Firm 0.104 -0.012 
N = 1,943 (High); N =2,169 (Low) (0.142) (0.121) 
   
D. Labor Productivity   
Treatment = Low Wage Firm  0.075 0.113 
 N = 1,943 (High); N =2,169 
(Low) 
(0.066) (0.090) 
   
E. Exit   
Treatment = Low Wage Firm  -0.023 -0.002 
N=1,150 (High); N= 1,206 (Low) (0.023) (0.027) 
   
 
Notes:-     
1). This table shows the results from a series of separate regressions for the Low Wage Firm models. The 
dependent variable is indicated in the first column, Column (1) is on the sub-sample of firms in high 
market power industries and column (2) is the sub-sample of firms in the low market power industries 
2). High market power industries are defined as those with higher than the median value of the industry-
level Lerner Index in the firm’s three-digit industry. Low market power industries are defined as those 
with below the median value of the industry-level Lerner Index in the firm’s three-digit industry.   
3). Coefficients estimated by Ordinary Least Squares and standard errors in parentheses below are 
clustered by firm.  
4). Employment is total number of workers in the firm. Labor productivity is ln(sales/employment). 
“Exit” is defined for two cohorts in 1996 (pre-NMW) and 1999 post NMW and indicates whether the firm 
ceased to exist in the subsequent 3 years (see text)  
5). Controls include two digit industry dummies; 18 regional dummies, the proportion of workers who are 
graduates (by region and two-digit industry); and union membership, part-time work and female 
employment rates (by three-digit industry classification). 
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TABLE 3.6: FIRM ENTRY AND EXIT (BY THREE-DIGIT INDUSTRY). 
 
  
Period Before and 
After NMW 
Introduction, 1996-
2001,  (N = 1,020) 
 
 
Period Before and 
After ‘Imaginary 
NMW’ Introduction, 
1994-98,  (N = 850) 
 
 
Difference 
 
A.  Change in Industry Entry Rates 
    
Pre-NMW Low Pay 
Proportion 
0.021  
(0.015) 
 
0.057*  
(0032) 
-0.036  
(0.038) 
    
 
B. Change in Industry Exit  Rates 
    
Pre-NMW Low Pay 
Proportion 
-0.013  
(0.016) 
-0.028 
 (0.018) 
0.015 
 (0.024) 
    
 
C. Change in Industry Net Entry Rates 
    
Pre-NMW Low Pay 
Proportion 
0.034 
 (0.025) 
0.085** 
 (0.027) 
-0.051  
(0.037) 
    
 
Notes:- 
1).  Data taken from Value-Added Tax (VAT) Registrations and Deregistration Data,  Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI). Entry rate is the proportion of firms who are newly registered in a year in a 
three-digit industry. Exit rate is the proportion of firms who are deregistered in the year. Net entry is entry 
rate – exit rate. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by three-digit industry.  
2). Pre-NMW low pay proportion is the proportion of workers with an hourly wage less than £3.60 in the 
three-digit industry in real terms over the pre-policy period (the minimum wage threshold of £3.60 is 
deflated by the retail price index for the years 1994-1998).   
3). All specifications include controls for two digit industry dummies, time dummies, and the proportion 
of employees in the three-digit industry that are female, part-time and the proportion of employees in the 
three-digit industry that are female, part-time and unionized. 
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3.10 Appendix for Chapter 3 
3.A1. Introduction 
In order to obtain a long-run effect of the minimum wage on profitability we need to 
have some degree of imperfect competition in the product market. We therefore consider several 
industrial organization models. Aaronson and French (2007) consider in detail the effects on the 
minimum wage on prices and costs in a competitive and monopsonistic labor market model. 
However, in these models firms do not have positive price-cost margins so profits remain zero 
by assumption, regardless of the minimum wage. 
We separate our analysis into the short-run and long-run, where we define the short run 
as the period where all variables are able to change (including capital, labor, prices, etc) but the 
number of firms is held fixed. In the long-run entry and exit can occur and the number of firms 
can change. Our analysis of exit and entry is directly applicable to the long-run results. 
 
3.A2. Imperfect Competition in the Product market 
Short-run effects with symmetric and asymmetric costs 
Consider a two-stage game where firms pay a sunk entry cost (K) and, conditional on 
entering engage in competition with other firms (total number of firms in market is denoted N). 
The instruments of competition can be price or quantity.  
We begin with the workhorse industrial organization model of an asymmetric Cournot 
model69 where firms have heterogeneous marginal costs. Below we discuss alternative imperfect 
competition models that lead to similar qualitative results. 
The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in quantities gives a well-know expression for 
the price-cost margin: 

iii MS
p
qcp
=
− )(
                                                         (A1) 
                                                          
69 Cournot competition can be considered the reduced form of a two-stage game where firms set capacities 
in the first stage and then compete in prices in the first stage (Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983).  
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Where   is the (absolute value of the) price elasticity of product demand, p is output price, ci is 
marginal cost of firm i, qi is firm output and MSi  is the market share (

=
i i
i
S
S
iMS ) with Si 
denoting firm sales. Note that equation (A1) nests the special cases of monopoly (N = 1). If we 
assume constant returns then marginal costs do not depend on output (ci = )(' ii qc ) so the price-
cost margin can be characterised by the ratio of profit (  ) to sales (S):  

i
i
MS
S
=




 
                                                                 (A2) 
Firm i’s market share will depend on its marginal costs relative to the marginal costs of 
other firm’s in the industry. If firm i’s marginal costs rise relative to those of other firms it will 
lose market share (see Tirole, 1989, Chapter 5 for example).  
Consider the effect of an increase in the minimum wage. If we assume that demand is 
iso-elastic (we will relax this below) then the impact of the minimum wage on the firm’s price-
cost margins will be reflected in its market share. If a firm employs a greater proportion of 
minimum wage workers, it will face a larger increase in marginal costs and therefore a larger 
fall of its price-cost margins.  
This is our key comparative static result: the introduction of a minimum wage will 
reduce the profitability of firms who are more “at risk” because they employ a higher share of 
minimum wage workers. 
If we also relax the assumption the demand elasticity is constant, there will also likely 
be a fall in profitability. To see this clearly assume that firms are symmetric so that they all face 
identical marginal costs. In this case, the equilibrium condition of (A1) simplifies to 

11
NS
=

                                                        (A3) 
It is clear from equation (A3) that the impact of the minimum wage will on profitability 
(
S

) will depend on its impact on the demand elasticity ( ). In particular if demand becomes 
more elastic, profitability will fall. For most commonly used demand curves, a minimum wage 
will make the demand curve more elastic because price has risen. For example, consider the case 
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of linear industry demand (Q) for where Q = A – bp, b > 0, A > 0. In this case, 
Q
p
b= . 
Following the introduction of a minimum wage prices will be higher and quantity sold lower 
unless demand is perfectly elastic. The elasticity of demand is therefore higher and profitability 
will fall. This will reinforce the effects on market share discussed in the more general model 
with asymmetric firms.70 
Under differentiated products Bertrand equation (A3) should be interpreted as a firm-
specific elasticity. This result differs from Aaronson and French (2006) who consider a model of 
monopolistic competition. This generates an equilibrium condition like (A3). The minimum 
wage has no effect on price cost margins in their model because they assume that the elasticity 
of demand is constant. This guarantees no effect of the minimum wage on price-cost margins as 
all costs are passed through completely to the consumer. Additionally, the “large number of 
firms” assumption underlying monopolistic competition rules out strategic interactions that 
generate the market share effects in equation (A3) 
Long-run effects 
After the minimum wage is imposed, absolute profits in the industry will be lower. This 
will mean that there is less of an incentive to enter the industry. Consequently, we might expect 
to see fewer firms in the industry (from exit and/or less entry) in the long run. The short run fall 
in profits for the incumbent firms in the industry will therefore be greater than the long-run 
change as N will fall (e.g. see equation (A3)). 
An important caveat to this is that the number of firms in the industry may not fall due 
to an “integer” effect. Since there will always be an integer number of firms in the industry all 
firms will usually earn some economic profit. Firms will enter and pay the sunk cost up until the 
point that a marginal firm entering the industry would not make a profit net of the sunk cost. For 
                                                          
70  We cannot rule out the possibility that the aggregate demand curve may become more elastic as wages 
rise even if the labor market is perfectly competitive. Micro-economic theory places few restrictions on 
industry demand curve aggregated from consumer preferences (e.g. see Varian, 1984, chapter 3.16). Thus, 
it is still ultimately an empirical issue whether profitability rises or falls after the minimum wage. 
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example, consider a symmetric duopoly in long-run equilibrium. If a third firm entered the 
industry a firm’s profits (net of the sunk cost, K) would be negative i.e. 
KK −− )2*()3*( 0 , where 
)3*(  is equilibrium profits with three firms and )2*(  
equilibrium profits with two firms.  
Now, except in the special case when profits in the market exactly covers the sunk cost 
( 0
)3*( − K  and 0)2*( =− K ) the minimum wage could reduce 
)2*( , but not by so 
much that K− )2*( <0 and one firm was forced to exit the industry. Consequently, for small 
increases in the minimum wage firms could have lower profits without a change in the 
equilibrium number of firms. 
This caveat aside, in a dynamic setting we would expect that a minimum wage would 
increase exit and reduce the entry rate. 
 
3A3. Perfect Competition in the Product Market 
Now consider the case of perfectly competitive product markets. Comparative statics of 
prices and factor demands following a minimum wage increase have been comprehensively 
analyzed by Aaronson and French (2007). Here, we will briefly contrast the usual case of perfect 
competition in the labor market with some alternative models. It worth emphasizing two 
preliminary points. First, as we discussed above that these are in the short-run as in the long run 
firms earn zero profits by assumption. Second, the short-run effect of the introduction of a 
minimum wage will be larger in the competitive model than in the monopsony model.  
Perfect competition in the labor market 
If labor markets are perfectly competitive, the short run effects of the minimum wage on 
profits are composed of two components (see Ashenfelter and Smith, 1979, and the main text). 
First, there is fall in profits due to the increased wage for the current number of workers paid 
below the minimum wage. This fall in profits is offset by a second effect to the degree that firms 
can substitute minimum wage workers for other factors of production (including non minimum 
wage workers).  In the limiting case of perfect substitutability of minimum wage workers there 
will be no effect on profits.  
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Of course these are only short-run effects as there can be no economic profits under 
perfect competition and in equilibrium industry prices will rise and quantity will fall (so there 
will either be fewer firms or the average firm size will shrink). 
Imperfect Competition in the labor market 
There have been a variety of models proposed in recent years where firms have some 
power to set wages because of efficiency wages, monopsony, search or other reasons. In these 
models, over a certain range of values a binding minimum wage can increase employment. 
Considering profits, we would expect the negative short-run effects of a minimum wage 
on profitability to be muted in such models. This is because, unlike the competitive model the 
first order effect on profits is zero as an increase in the wage has a beneficial effect on profits 
through making it easier to recruit, retain and/or motivate workers. There will be a second effect 
because the firm is being shifted away from its optimal level of the wage so overall we would 
still expect a decline in profits. However, this is likely to be much less severe than in the 
competitive model.  
To see this consider a simple representation of the monopsony model. We model the 
firm’s wage setting power in a reduced form way (following Card and Krueger, 1995) and 
assume that the production function, ),( LWF , is increasing in the wage as well as labor, L. The 
firm chooses wages and labor to maximize profits 
WLLWpFLW −= ),(max ,  
which lead to the standard first order condition: 
*),( W
L
LWF
p =


 
where an asterix denotes the optimized value. We also have an additional non-standard 
condition from optimizing wages of: 
*),( L
W
LWF
p =


                                                     (A4) 
If we consider the effect of a small increase in wages on profits in the neighbourhood of the 
optimized level of wages and employment (
*W ,
*L ) this is given by: 
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
 
Note that this is equal to zero by the first order condition with respect to wages, equation (A4).  
Long-run effects 
In this setting, there are no long-run effects on profits.  Considering exit, unlike the 
model with imperfect competition firm size is not tied down. In the competitive model, prices 
will be higher and output lower. In our constant returns set-up a zero profit equilibrium can be 
restored either by all firms becoming smaller or by some firms exiting.  
 
3.A4. Summary 
In models of imperfect product market competition, we would generally expect to 
observe negative effects on the profitability of firms where the minimum wage bites, even after 
firms have adjusted all factors of production. In such models, some of the increase in costs is 
borne by shareholders rather than just consumers and unemployed low-wage workers as in the 
standard competitive model. It is worth emphasizing that employment will still fall in these 
models. So oligopoly could explain only why employment responses could be more muted than 
one would expect from a competitive model. Of course, employment changes can be positive if 
firms with market power in the product market also have market power in the labor market.  
The final section (A4) showed a very simple model that assumes no change in sales or jobs 
following a minimum wage hike. This model does surprisingly well in rationalizing the results.  
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Appendix 3.B:Data 
FAME Data 
The FAME (Financial Analysis Made Easy) dataset contains information on firm 
company accounts of publicly listed and private firms in the UK economy. It is supplied under 
licence as part of the AMADEUS database from BVD (Bureau Van Dijk). Our sample begins 
with data on all firms in the six financial years from April 1st 1996 to March 31st 2002 including 
those who had entered and exited. We select firms who report on the 31st March. We drop firms 
with missing data on our key variables (profits, wages, sales, employment, industry, and region). 
We use information on consolidated accounts at the lowest level that exists (i.e. we use 
subsidiary level information if this exists). We drop information for all observations where the 
profit-sales ratio is greater than 1 in absolute value.   
In the main results, we condition on the cohort of firms who were alive on March 31st 
1999 when the minimum wage introduced and had an average wage between £4000-£20,000. 
We also present results where we examine the impact of including firms who entered after this 
date (and exited before this date) including a dummy variables for entrant and exiting firms (and 
interactions of these dummies with the NMW policy period). 
Profits/Sales: Gross profits (prior to deductions for tax, interest and dividends) over 
turnover (sales). 
Average Wages: Total remuneration divided by total number of employees 
Capital / Sales: Tangible assets over turnover (sales). 
Sales / Employment: Total turnover (sales) over the number of employees. 
 
Labor Force Survey  
The Labor Force Survey (LFS) is a large-scale household interview-based survey of 
individuals in the UK that has been carried out on varying bases since 1975.71 Around 60,000 
                                                          
71 Between 1975 and 1983, the survey was conducted every two years. From 1984 until 1991, it was 
conducted annually. Since 1992, the Labor Force Survey has been conducted every three months in a five-
quarter rolling panel format. 
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households have been interviewed per survey since 1984. Annual proportions calculated relative 
to firm reporting year rather than calendar year (i.e. April 1998 – March 1999).    
Union membership: Defined at the three-digit UKSIC industry level, annual values 
1993-2002. 
Part-Time Work:  Proportion of employed workforce classified as part-time, annual 
values 1993-2002. Defined at the three-digit industry level. 
Female Workforce: Female workers as a proportion of total employed workforce, annual 
values 1993-2002. Defined at the three-digit industry level. 
Graduate Qualifications: Proportion of graduate qualified workers per region and two-
digit industry cell. 
Region: Government Office Region of Workplace (“gorwk”). These include Tyne and 
Wear, Rest of the North East, Greater Manchester, Merseyside, Rest of the North West, South 
Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, Rest of Yorkshire and Humberside, West Midlands and Met 
Country, Rest of West Midlands, Eastern, Inner London, Outer London, South East, South West, 
Wales, Rest of Scotland, Northern Ireland.  
Care Homes Data 
The UK care homes data was collected in surveys conducted in 1992 (prior to the 
general election in that year) and 1993 for homes on the South Coast of England; in 1998 
(before the introduction of the NMW) and in 1999 (after the introduction of the NMW in April) 
for all homes across the country. Finally, there was some more data collected in 2000 and 2001 
for South Coast homes only. The data is in the form of an unbalanced panel so that the same 
homes are followed over time. The sector was chosen because it is characterized by a large 
concentration of non-unionized, low wage employees working in small firms with an average 
employment level of fifteen to twenty. There was also product market regulation in this sector 
insofar that an important fraction of home residents had their care paid for by the government 
through the Department of Social Security (DSS).72 The Department of Social Security paid a 
capped price for beds, which were not increased when the minimum was introduced. As a result, 
                                                          
72 The average percentage of such residents was 52.7% before the minimum wage introduction and 57.6% 
after. We always condition on this variable in the regressions. 
 158 
 
many homes had a limited scope to increase prices in response to the minimum thereby leaving 
more room for employment or profitability effects to manifest themselves. A more 
comprehensive account of features of the data is given in Machin, Manning and Rahman (2003). 
Business Registration and De-registration Database 
The UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) publish data on births and deaths of 
companies at the three-digit level on a consistent basis from 1994 (see 
http://stats.berr.gov.uk/ed/vat/). These are based on Value Added Tax (VAT) Registration 
numbers that every incorporated firm in Britain is legally obliged to have. (This is the same as 
the aggregated FAME date).  
We used this data to calculate for each three-digit sector the proportion of firms who 
entered in a year (entry rate). Entry rates calculated as the number of new VAT (Value-Added 
Tax) registrations as a proportion of the beginning of year stock. Exit rate calculated as the 
number of VAT deregistrations over the beginning-of-year stock. Net entry calculated as entry 
rate minus  exit rate.  We also calculated the net entry rate as the difference between the 
entry and exit rates.  
 
We then matched information form the LFS at the same level of aggregation to calculate 
the proportion of workers in each industry paid below the minimum wage in the pre-policy 
period. 
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TABLE B1:  
CHARACTERISTICS OF TREATMENT AND COMPARISON GROUPS 
 
 
Treatment Group 
T=1 
Comparison Group 
T=0 All 
    
Average Wage (£000s) 10.53 17.38 15.76 
Profit/Sales 0.108 0.064 0.074 
Capital/Sales 0.297 0.237 0.248 
Wagebill/Sales 0.289 0.261 0.268 
Employment (mean) 2,704 1,004 1,407 
Employment (median) 273 170 187 
Productivity (=Sales/Employee) (£000s) 71.4 110.2 101.0 
Exit Rate 0.050 0.053 0.051 
Proportion part-time employees 0.295 0.158 0.190 
Proportion female employees 0.535 0.378 0.415 
Proportion union members 0.186 0.213 0.207 
Proportion Firms in:    
Manufacturing 0.165 0.372 0.323 
Wholesale 0.081 0.172 0.150 
Retail 0.098 0.038 0.052 
Hospitality 0.163 0.015 0.050 
Business Services 0.133 0.083 0.095 
Number of Observations 974 3,138 4,112 
 
NOTES:- T= 0: Comparison group; T = 1: Treatment Group;  Part-time and female employees based on 
Labor Force Survey (LFS) and calculated as proportion of total workers per two-digit industry by 
regional cell. Low Wage Firm - treatment group is defined as firms with an average wage equal to or 
below £12,000 per annum in the pseudo pre-policy financial year up to March 31st 1996; the comparison 
group is defined as firms with average wages between £12,000 and £20,000. Sample for exit represents 
1999 cohort of firms, with total N = 1,066 (N=319 for treatment group and N=747 for comparison 
group). 
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TABLE B2: FIRM ENTRY AND EXIT RATES BY THREE-DIGIT INDUSTRY, 
1996-2001 (DTI VAT REGISTRATIONS AND DEREGISTRATIONS). 
 
 (1) 
All Industries 
 
(2) 
Low Wage industries 
(below median 
Lowpay) 
(3) 
High Wage Industries 
(above median 
Lowpay) 
Entry Rate 0.089 0.087 
  
0.091 
  
Exit Rate 0.082 
 
0.083 0.081 
Net Entry 0.007 
 
0.003 0.011 
Lowpay 0.126 0.051 
 
0.201 
Union  0.287 0.350 0.189 
 
 Female 0.343 0.274 
 
0.411 
 Part-time 0.143 0.076 
 
0.209 
No. of Industries 170 
 
85 85 
No. of 
Observations 
1,020 
 
510 510 
 
NOTES: Entry rates calculated as the number of new VAT (Value-Added Tax) registrations as a 
proportion of the beginning of year stock. Exit rate calculated as the number of VAT 
deregistrations over the beginning-of-year stock. Net entry calculated as entry rate minus the 
exit rate.  The variables lowpay, union, female, part-time are all sourced from the UK Labor 
Force survey (LFS). The “Lowpay” variable is defined as the proportion of workers with hourly 
wage below £3.60 in the pre-minimum wage period (1994-1998).  “Below Median Lowpay” 
indicates all those industries where the proportion of lowpay workers ranges from 0 to 0.092. 
“Above Median Lowpay” indicates all of those industries where the proportion of lowpay 
industries ranges from 0.095 to 0.557. 
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CHAPTER 4: TRADE-INDUCED TECHNICAL CHANGE? THE 
IMPACT OF CHINESE IMPORTS ON INNOVATION, IT AND 
PRODUCTIVITY 
 
Abstract 
We examine the impact of Chinese import competition on broad measures of technical change - 
patenting, IT, R&D, TFP and management practices – using new panel data across twelve 
European countries from 1996-2007. In particular, we establish that the absolute volume of 
innovation increases within the firms most affected by Chinese imports. We correct for 
endogeneity using the removal of product-specific quotas following China’s entry into the 
World Trade Organization. Chinese import competition led to increased technical change within 
firms and reallocated employment between firms towards more technologically advanced firms. 
These within and between effects were about equal in magnitude, and account for about 15% of 
European technology upgrading over 2000-2007 (and even more when allowing for offshoring 
to China). Rising Chinese import competition also led to falls in employment, profits, prices and 
the share of unskilled workers. By contrast, import competition from developed countries had no 
effect on innovation. We develop a simple “trapped factor” model that is consistent with these 
empirical findings.  
 
JEL Code.  O33, F14, L25, L60, 
Keywords: China, technical change, trade, firm survival, employment 
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4.1 Introduction 
A vigorous political debate is in progress over the impact of globalization on the 
economies of the developed world. China looms large in these discussions, as her exports have 
grown by over 15% per year over the last two decades. One major benefit of Chinese trade had 
been lower prices for manufactured goods. We argue in this paper that increased Chinese trade 
has also induced faster technical change from both innovation and the adoption of new 
technologies, contributing to productivity growth. In particular, we find that the absolute volume 
of innovation (not just patents per worker or productivity) increases within the firms more 
affected by exogenous reductions in barriers to Chinese imports. 
Several detailed case studies such as Bartel, Ichinowski and Shaw (2007) on American 
valve-makers, Freeman and Kleiner (2005) on footwear or Bugamelli, Schivardi and Zizza 
(2008) on Italian manufacturers show firms innovating in response to import competition from 
low wage countries. A contribution of our paper is to confirm the importance of low wage 
country trade for technical change using a large sample of over half a million firms and 
exploiting China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) to identify the causal effect 
of trade. 
 The rise of China and other emerging economies such as India, Mexico and 
Brazil has also coincided with an increase in wage inequality and basic trade theory predicts 
such South-North integration could cause this. Despite this, the consensus among most 
economists was that trade was less important than technology in explaining these inequality 
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trends.73 There are three problems with this consensus, however. First, most of this work used 
data only up to the mid 1990s, which largely predates the rise of China (see Figure 4.1).74 Note 
that we end our sample in 2007 prior to the Great Recession to avoid conflating the effect of 
China with that of the financial crisis and subsequent huge fall in trade. Second, Feenstra and 
Hansen (1999) points to an impact of trade through offshoring rather than final goods. Third, an 
emerging line of theory has pointed to mechanisms whereby trade can affect the incentives to 
develop and adopt new technologies. Thus, the finding that measures of technical change are 
highly correlated with skill upgrading does not mean trade has no role. What may be happening 
is that trade is stimulating technical progress, which in turn is increasing the demand for skilled 
labor.  
Our paper addresses these three problems. First, we use data from the last decade to 
examine the recent role of trade in affecting technical change in developed countries. Second, 
we will examine offshoring to China. Third, we analyze the impact of imports on patents, 
information technology (IT), research and development (R&D), total factor productivity (TFP) 
and management practices. We distinguish between the impact of import competition on 
                                                          
73 See, for example, Acemoglu (2002), Autor, Katz and Kruger (1998), Machin and Van Reenen (1998) 
and DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996).  
74 In the 1980s China only accounted for about 1% of total imports to the US and EU and by 1991 the 
figure was still only 2%. However, by 2007 China accounted for almost 11% of all imports and Krugman 
(2008) emphasises this in his re-evaluation of the older literature. Note that Figure 1 may overestimate 
China’s importance as import growth does not necessarily reflect value added growth. For example, 
although IPods are produced in China, the intellectual property is owned by Apple. However, our 
identification relies on differences in Chinese imports over time and industries, and our results are 
stronger when we use quota abolition as an instrumental variable, so using import value (rather than value 
added) does not appear to be driving our results. 
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technology through a within firm effect and a between firm (reallocation) effect and find that 
both matter.  
A major empirical challenge in determining the causal effect of trade on technical 
change is the presence of unobservable technology shocks. To tackle this endogeneity issue we 
implement three alternative identification strategies. Our main approach is to use China’s entry 
into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 and the subsequent elimination of most 
quotas in the ensuing years under the Agreement on Clothing and Textiles (formerly the Multi 
Fiber Agreement). These sectors are relatively low tech, but were still responsible for over 
22,000 European patents in our sample period. Second, we exploit the fact that the exogenous 
liberalization policies in China had differential effects on imports into Europe across industries. 
In particular, Chinese import growth in Europe was much stronger in the sectors where China 
had some comparative advantage. Third, we control for differential industry-specific time trends. 
All three identification strategies support our main finding that Chinese trade stimulates faster 
technical change.  
 We present two core results. First, on the intensive margin, Chinese import 
competition increases innovation, TFP and management quality within surviving firms. Firms 
facing higher levels of Chinese import competition create more patents, spend more on R&D, 
raise their IT intensity, adopt more modern management practices, and increase their overall 
level of TFP. Second, Chinese import competition reduces employment and survival 
probabilities in low-tech firms - e.g. firms with lower levels of patents or TFP shrink and exit 
much more rapidly than high-tech firms in response to Chinese competition. Thus, our paper 
jointly examines the effects of trade on survival/selection and innovation. The combined impact 
of these within firm and between effects is to cause technological upgrading in those industries 
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most affected by Chinese imports. An additional set of results shows that Chinese imports 
significantly reduce prices, profitability and the demand for unskilled workers as basic theory 
would suggest. 
 We focus on China both because it is the largest developing country exporter, 
and because China’s accession to the WTO enables us to plausibly identify the causal effects of 
falling trade barriers. However, we also show results for imports from all other developing 
countries, and find a similar impact on technical change. In contrast, imports from developed 
countries appear to have no impact on technology. 
 We also offer some back of the envelope quantification of Chinese import 
effects on technical change. Over 2000-2007 China appeared to account for almost 15% of the 
increase in patenting, IT and productivity. Furthermore, this effect has grown in recent years and 
is up to twice as large when incorporating offshoring. These results suggest that trade with 
emerging nations such as China may now an important factor for technical change and growth in 
richer countries. 
 To motivate the empirical framework we discuss a model, further developed in 
Bloom, Romer, Terry and Van Reenen (2012), that explains how trade from China drives 
innovation in exposed firms. The intuition relies on “trapped-factors” – that is factors of 
production which are costly to move between firms because of adjustment costs and sunk 
investment (e.g. firm-specific skills and capital). Chinese imports reduce the relative 
profitability of making low-tech products but since firms cannot easily dispose of their “trapped” 
labor and capital, the shadow cost of innovating has fallen. Hence, by reducing the profitability 
of current low-tech products and freeing up inputs to innovate, Chinese trade reduces the 
opportunity cost of innovation. In addition to Chinese import competition stimulating innovation, 
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we find support for two other predictions of the model. First, import competition from low wage 
countries like China has a greater effect on innovation than imports from high wage countries. 
This occurs because Chinese imports have a disproportionate effect on the profitability of low-
tech products, providing greater incentives to innovate new goods. Second, firms with more 
trapped factors (as measured by industry-specific human capital, for example) will respond more 
strongly to import threats.  
 Our paper relates to several literatures. First, for labor economics we find a role 
for trade with low wage countries in increasing skill demand (at least since the mid-1990s) 
through inducing technical change. 75  Second, although many papers have found that trade 
liberalization increases aggregate industry productivity76, the precise mechanism is unclear. This 
evidence tends to be indirect since explicit measures of technical change are generally 
unavailable at the micro-level.77 The literature focuses on the reallocation effects (e.g. Melitz, 
2003) even though within plant productivity growth is typically as large as the between-plant 
reallocation effect. Our paper uses new patenting, IT, R&D, management and productivity data 
                                                          
75 Technological forces also have an effect on trade. For example, better communication technologies 
facilitate offshoring by aiding international coordination. This is another motivation for addressing the 
endogeneity issue. Additionally, there is the direct impact on local employment and welfare (e.g. Autor, 
Dorn and Hansen, 2012). 
76  See, for example, Pavcnik (2002), Trefler (2004), Eslava, Haltiwanger and Kugler (2009), and Dunne, 
Klimek and Schmitz (2008). 
77 For low-wage countries, Bustos (2011) finds positive effects on innovation from lower export barriers 
for Argentinean firms and Teshima (2008) finds positive effects on process R&D from lower output 
tariffs for Mexican firms. The only study of Southern trade on Northern innovation is LeLarge and 
Nefussi (2008), who find that the R&D of French firms reacts positively to low wage country imports, 
although they have no external instrument. 
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to establish that trade drives out low-tech firms (reallocation) and increases the incentives of 
incumbents to speed up technical change. 
 Third, there is a large theoretical literature on trade and technology.78 Our paper 
supports theories arguing for an important role of trade on technical change. In particular, our 
finding that (i) the positive trade effect is on innovation (rather than just compositional effects 
on productivity via offshoring or product switching) and (ii) is much stronger from lowering 
import barriers against low-wage countries rather than high-wage countries is different from the 
mechanisms emphasized in other theories (e.g. market size or learning).  
 Finally, there is a large empirical literature examining the impact of competition 
on innovation, but a major challenge is finding quasi-experiments to identify the causal impact 
of competition on innovation (e.g. Aghion et al, 2005). Our paper extends this work by using 
China’s trade growth, and particularly its entry into the WTO, as an exogenous shift in 
competition. The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 4.2 sketches some theoretical 
models, Section 4.3 describes the data and Section 4.4 details the empirical modeling strategy. 
Section 4.5 describes our results and Section 4.6 discusses their magnitudes. Some extensions 
and robustness tests are contained in Section 4.7 and Section 4.8 concludes. 
4.2 Theory  
There are a large number of theories of how reducing import barriers against low wage 
countries (like China) could affect technical change in high wage countries (like Europe or the 
US). We first outline a simple “trapped factor” model that predicts a positive effect of such 
                                                          
78 Theoretical analysis of trade and innovation is voluminous from the classic work by Grossman and 
Helpman (1991, 1992) and recent important contributions by Yeaple (2005) and Atkeson and Burstein 
(2010). 
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liberalization on innovation, and two ancillary predictions. We contrast this with other 
perspectives on innovation (where trade expands the menu of products in the world economy) 
and composition where trade alters the distribution of products without changing the number of 
quality of products. 
4.21  The “Trapped Factor” model of Trade-induced innovation 
In Bloom, Romer, Terry and Van Reenen (2012) we develop a stylized model of trade-
induced innovation (see Appendix A for a more detailed summary). The basic assumption is that 
firms can allocate a factor of production either to produce old goods or innovate and produce 
new goods. China can produce old goods, but cannot (as easily) innovate and produce new 
goods. At the beginning of the period there are factors of production employed in “Northern” 
firms making old goods (protected by trade barriers). These factors are “trapped” in the sense 
that there is some human or fixed capital that is specific to the old good that is lost for a period if 
the firm chooses to reallocate the factor from producing the old good to innovating a new good. 
The magnitude of the firm-specific capital determines the opportunity cost of innovation and if it 
is sufficiently high the firm optimally chooses not to innovate. 
When import barriers are lowered, Chinese exports increase and the profitability of 
making old goods falls. Therefore, the opportunity cost of using the trapped factors for 
innovating (rather than producing the old good) falls, making innovation more attractive79. Not 
                                                          
79 In the model we make the simplifying assumption that the firms who innovate also produce the good 
while it is on patent. When it comes off patent the good is produced in the home country if protected by 
trade barriers or in the South if not protected. If we extend the model to allow for offshoring, then the 
innovation could still occur in the rich country but production of the new good could occur in the low 
wage country (e.g. the R&D for the I-Pod is in the US, but it is produced in China). In this case, reducing 
trade barriers with China will make the costs of producing the new good cheaper and this could be an 
additional reason why incentives to innovate on new goods increase. 
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only do we expect falling import barriers against China to generate more innovation in rich 
countries, but it should also occur within the same firms due to the firm-specific capital. In terms 
of welfare, this model suggests a benefit of lowering trade barriers against low wage countries is 
that it stimulates innovation, which is likely to be too low in equilibrium.80  
 In addition to predicting a within firm increase in innovation in response to a 
fall in import barriers against China, the trapped factor approach has two other empirical 
implications that we will examine. First, integration with a high wage country will have a much 
less positive impact on innovation. This is because imports from high-wage countries will not 
reduce the price of old goods relative to potential new goods as other rich countries have no 
comparative disadvantage in the production of new goods. In our data imports from other high 
wage countries do not appear to stimulate innovation, consistent with the model. A second 
implication of the model is that all else equal firms who have more trapped factors will respond 
more positively to the China shock. Using different proxies for such trapped factors (e.g. our 
estimates of product-specific human capital, see Appendix 4.A) we also find support for this 
second prediction. There may be other theories that can also rationalize the results so we do not 
want to over-claim for our simple model. Nevertheless, we believe it may capture some features 
of the stylized facts in our data and the prior case studies81. 
                                                          
80 In standard growth models this arises because of both knowledge externalities and the distortions 
induced by R&D being produced by monopolistically competitive firms. Of course, a first best solution 
would be to directly subsidize R&D, but in the absence of such a policy, increased trade may be a second 
best solution. In the model underinvestment occurs because the differentiated good sector is produced 
under monopolistic competition.  
81 The idea of falling opportunity costs stimulating innovation has parallels to some theories of business 
cycles that suggest that “bad times” can generate greater productivity enhancing activities (e.g. Aghion 
and Saint-Paul, 1998, or Barlevy, 2007). 
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4.22  Alternative Innovation models  
There are several alternative models of how reducing trade barriers against low wage 
country goods could induce Northern innovation. First, lowering import barriers in general 
increases competition and competitive intensity can increase innovation. However, the effects of 
competition on innovation are theoretically ambiguous in general. Competition may foster 
innovation because of reduced agency costs (e.g. Schmidt, 1997), “higher stakes” (Raith, 2002) 
or lower cannibalization of existing profits.82 However, there is a fundamental Schumpeterian 
force that competition lowers price-cost margins, thereby reducing the quasi-rents from 
innovation. We will examine competition emanating from high wage countries and show that 
the main effect we identify is through low wage country competition, consistent with the trapped 
factor model. 
 A second class of models stresses the importance of trade in increasing market 
size that will generally foster innovation incentives (e.g. Schmookler, 1966; Krugman, 1980; 
Acemoglu, 2008). Lower trade costs generate a larger market size over which to spread the fixed 
costs of investing in new technologies83. We will investigate these effects by examining whether 
European firms’ exports to China are associated with changes in innovation activity and show 
that this is not driving the imports effect we identify. 
                                                          
82 This is the Arrow (1962) “displacement effect”. It shows up in different guises in Grossman and 
Helpman (1992), Aghion et al (2005)'s “escape competition” effect and the “switchover costs” of Holmes 
et al (2008). 
83 Recent work by Lileeva and Trefler (2010) has shown market size effects on Canadian firms of joining 
NAFTA. 
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Finally, imports could enhance innovation by enabling domestic firms to access better 
overseas’ knowledge (e.g. Coe and Helpman, 1995 or Acharya and Keller, 2008). This may 
occur through the imports of intermediate inputs and supply networks (e.g. Goldberg, 
Khandelwal, Pavcnik and Topalova, 2010a,b)84. These mechanisms do not seem appropriate in 
the Chinese context however, as European firms have (currently) a large technological lead over 
China85.  
4.23 Compositional models  
Perhaps an even simpler approach is to consider a framework where we keep the menu 
of products fixed in the economy. When trade barriers fall between the EU/US and China, the 
high-tech industries will grow relatively faster than low-tech industries in the EU/US. The 
opposite will occur in China. On empirical grounds, this simple framework is unsatisfactory, as 
most of the aggregate changes we observe following trade liberalization have occurred within 
rather than between industries. This could be explained, however, by firms operating in more 
finely disaggregated industries and we will show that there are strong reallocation effects 
whereby low-tech firms tend to shrink and exit because of China. Bernard, Jensen and Schott 
                                                          
84 A related literature typically finds that productivity rises when exporting increases (e.g. Verhoogen, 
2008). 
85  Eaton and Kortum (1999, 2001 and 2002) combine competition, market size and learning in a 
quantifiable general equilibrium trade model. For example, in Eaton and Kortum (2001) a fall in trade 
costs increases effective market size (which encourages innovation) but also increases competition (which 
discourages innovation). In their baseline model, these two forces precisely offset each other so the net 
effect of trade on innovation is zero. Although the Eaton-Kortum framework is powerful, it does not deal 
easily with one of our key results: that there is a strong effect on innovation for incumbent firms in the 
same sector where trade barriers fell. 
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(2006) show a similar result for US plants using indirectly proxies for technologies such as 
capital intensity. 
But we also report that China induces faster technical change within firms and plants, a 
finding that goes beyond the existing results. In principle, firm TFP increases could be 
accounted for by two factors: changes in a firm’s product portfolio or offshoring. First, on 
product switching, Bernard, Redding and Schott (2010) investigate the impact of trade 
liberalization in heterogeneous multi-product firms. In the face of falling trade costs with a low 
wage country like China, Northern firms shift their product mix towards more high-tech 
products (see Bernard, Redding and Schott, 2007). We will investigate this mechanism by 
examining how plants change their product classes, and find some evidence for this. Second, a 
fall in trade costs with China will mean that producers of goods that can use Chinese 
intermediate inputs will benefit. For example, firms may slice up the production process and 
offshore the low-TFP tasks to China (see for example Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). 
This will have a compositional effect if the remaining activities in the home country are more 
technologically advanced. To investigate this mechanism we will look explicitly at offshoring to 
China using a method introduced by Feenstra and Hansen (1999). 
Although we will show evidence that both product switching and offshoring are 
important in our data, neither can fully explain our core findings. In particular, about half of the 
China-induced increase in innovation comes  from expanding the volume of patents within firms. 
This implies that changing composition can only be part of the story.   
4.3  Data 
We combine a number of rich datasets on technical change (see Appendix 4.B). Our 
base dataset is Bureau Van Dijk’s (BVD) Amadeus that contains close to the population of 
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public and private firms in 12 European countries. Firms in Amadeus have a list of primary and 
secondary four-digit industries which we use to match in the industry level trade data (the 
average firm had 2 primary codes, but some had as many as 10 primary and 11 secondary codes). 
In our main results we use a weighted average of Chinese imports across all industries that the 
firm operates in, but we also present robust results where we allocate the entire firm's output to a 
single industry. 
4.31  Patents  
We combined Amadeus with the population of patents from the European Patent Office 
(EPO) through matching by name. Patent counts have heterogeneous values so we also use 
future citations to control for patent quality in some specifications. We consider both a main 
sample of “patenters” – Amadeus  firms filing at least one EPO patent since 1978 – and a wider 
sample where we assume that the firms unmatched to the EPO actually had zero patents.  
4.32  Productivity and Research and Development (R&D) 
Amadeus contains accounting information on employment, capital, materials, wage bills 
and sales. We calculate TFP using firms in France, Italy, Spain and Sweden because of their 
near population firm coverage and inclusion of materials which is needed to estimate “four-
factor” TFP (materials is not a mandatory accounting item in other countries), although the 
results are similar using the data for all 12 countries. We estimate TFP in a number of ways, but 
our core method is to use a version of the Olley Pakes (1996) method applied by de Loecker 
(2011) to allow for trade and imperfect competition. In a first stage, we estimate production 
functions separately by industry across approximately 1.4 million observations to recover the 
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parameters on the factor inputs.86 We then estimate TFP and, in the second stage regression 
relate this to changes in the trade environment. As a robustness test we also allowed the 
production function coefficients to be different by country and industry as well as estimated at a 
finer level of industry aggregation which show similar results. Details of this procedure are 
contained in Appendix 4.C. R&D data comes from BVD’s Osiris database that provides data on 
publicly listed firm in Europe, covering around 4,000 manufacturing firms. Of these, 459 firms 
report performing R&D for 5 years or more so can be used for some of the regressions. 
4.33  Information technology 
Harte Hanks (HH) is a multinational company that collects IT data to sell to large IT 
firms (e.g. IBM, Cisco and Dell). Their data is collected for roughly 160,000 establishments 
across 20 European countries. HH surveys establishments annually on a rolling basis which 
means it provides a “snapshot” of the IT stock. The data contain detailed hardware and software 
information. We focus on using computers per worker (PCs plus laptops) as our main measure 
of IT intensity because this: (i) is a physical quantity measure which is recorded in a consistent 
way across sites, time and countries, and (ii) avoids the use of IT price deflators which are not 
harmonized across countries. In robustness tests we also use alternative measures of IT such as 
Enterprise Resource Planning software, Groupware and Database software.  
 The fact that HH sells this data on to firms who use this for sales and marketing 
exerts a strong discipline on the data quality, as errors would be quickly picked up by clients in 
their sales calls. HH samples all firms with over 100 employees in each country. Thus, we do 
                                                          
86 The number of observations in the second stage is smaller than 1.4 million because we are estimating in 
five-year differences.  
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lose smaller firms, but since we focus on manufacturing the majority of employees are in these 
larger firms, and we find no evidence this sampling rule biases our results.87  
4.34  Management Practices 
The management data was collected in multiple telephone survey waves between 2002 
and 2010 from the London School of Economics using a team of 126 MBA-type student 
interviewers. Firms were interviewed for 45 minutes on average, with this interview targeted at 
the plant manager at the largest establishment within each firm. Management practices were 
scored using the Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) methodology, which scores firms on a 1 to 5 
scale across 18 questions. These 18 questions span three key areas of management: monitoring 
(do firms continuously collect, analyze and use information), targets (do firms have balanced, 
well-understood and binding targets) and incentives (do firms reward high-performers and 
retrain and/or sanction poor performers). This scoring grid was developed by a leading 
international consulting firm based on the practices of Lean Manufacturing, the management 
system developed by Toyota in the 1960s and 1970s which is now becoming widely adopted 
across Europe, the US and Asia. 
Firms were randomly sampled from the population of all manufacturing firms with 100 
to 5000 employees, with a sample response rate of 44% on average (see Bloom and Van Reenen, 
2010). In each wave we also resurveyed all firms from earlier survey waves to help build a 
management panel. In this paper we used all 579 European firms with repeat survey data. 
                                                          
87 We find no systematic differences in results between firms with 100 to 250 employees and those above 
250 employees, suggesting the selection on firms with over 100 employees is unlikely to cause a major 
bias. We also find no differences in our patenting results – where we have the full population of firms – 
between firms with less than and more than 100 employees. It is also worth noting that in the countries we 
study firms with over 100 employees account for over 80% of total employment in manufacturing. 
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4.35  UN Comtrade data 
The trade information we use is sourced from the UN Comtrade data system. This is an 
international database of six-digit product level information on all bilateral imports and exports 
between any given pairs of countries. We aggregate from six-digit product level to four-digit US 
SIC industry level using the Pierce and Schott (2010) concordance. For firms that operate across 
multiple four digit industries we use a weighted average of imports across all sectors a firm 
produces in (see Appendix B)88.  
 We use the value of imports originating from China ( ChinaM ) as a share of total 
world imports (
World
M ) in a country by four-digit industry cell as our key measure of exposure to 
Chinese trade, following the “value share” approach outlined by Bernard, Jensen and Schott 
(2002, 2006); i.e. we use /
WorldCH ChinaIMP M M= . As two alternative measures we also 
construct Chinese import penetration by normalizing Chinese imports either on domestic 
production ( /ChinaM D ) or on apparent consumption (domestic production less exports plus 
imports), /ChinaM C . For domestic production we use Eurostat’s Prodcom database. Compared 
to Comtrade, Prodcom has no data prior to 1996, so this restricts the sample period.  An 
additional problem is that some of the underlying six-digit product data is missing (for 
confidentiality reasons as the industry-country cells are too small), so some missing values for 
domestic production had to be imputed from export data. Although we obtain similar results 
                                                          
88 The results are similar when we allocate firms to a single primary sector (compare Tables 1 and 5B, for 
example). 
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with all measures (see Tables 7 and A7) we prefer the normalization on world imports which 
does not have these data restrictions.  
4.36  Descriptive Statistics 
The rise of China’s share of all imports to the US and the 12 European countries in our 
sample is remarkable. In 2000 only 5.7% of imports originated in China, but by 2007 this had 
more than doubled to 12.4%. This increase also varies widely across sectors, rising most rapidly 
in industries like toys, furniture and footwear (see Table 4.A1). Some basic descriptive statistics 
are shown in Table 4.A2. With the exception of the survival and worst-case bounds analyses, the 
regression samples condition on non-missing values of our key variables over a five year period. 
The exact number of observations (and average firm size) differs between samples. In the 
sample of firms who have patented at least once since 1978 the mean number of patents per year 
is one and median employment is 100. When we use the entire sample of firms with accounting 
data the mean number of patents falls to 0.019 and median employment to 17. R&D reporting 
firms are the largest of all sub-samples with 2,054 employees at the median with an average 
R&D intensive of 15% (recall these are all publicly listed firms whereas the other samples also 
include private firms). For plants with IT data, median employment is 140 and the average IT 
intensity is 0.58 computers per worker.   
4.4  Empirical Modelling Strategy 
Our empirical models analyze both the within firm margin of technological upgrading 
and the between firm margin of upgrading through selection effects. To investigate these we 
examine five broad indicators of “technology” – IT, patents, R&D, TFP and management 
practices.  
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4.41  Technical change within surviving plants and firms 
Consider a basic firm-level equation for the level of technology (TECH) in firm i in 
industry j in country k at time t as: 
ln CHijkt jkt l ijkt ijktTECH IMP x  −= + +                                               (4.1) 
TECH will be interpreted broadly and measured using a number of indicators such as 
patented innovations 89 , R&D spending, IT, TFP and management practices. We measure 
CH
jktIMP  mainly as the proportion of imports (M) in industry j and country k that originate from 
China )/(
World
jk
China
jk MM  and the ijktx  are a set of control variables such as country dummies 
interacted with time dummies to absorb macro-economic shocks. The trade-induced technical 
change hypothesis is that  > 0. Note that we allow for a dynamic response in equation (1) 
depending on the lag length indicator l. Our baseline results will use l = 0 to be consistent with 
the other technology equations, but we show the differences in results to alternative lag lengths 
in sub-section 4.590 
Since there may be many unobservables that are correlated with the firm (and industry’s) 
level of technology and imports that different across firms but broadly constant over time, we 
will control for these by including a fixed effect and estimate: 
                                                          
89 Because of the zeros in patents when taking logarithms we use the transformation PATENTS = 1 + PAT 
where PAT is the count of patents. The addition of unity is arbitrary, but equal to the sample mean of 
patents. We also compare the results with fixed effect Negative Binomial count data models below which 
generated similar results (see Table 6). 
90 For patents, the largest effects appear after three years (see Table A6) which is consistent with the idea 
that most firms take a few years to obtain innovations from their increased R&D spending.  
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ln CHijkt jkt l ijkt ijktTECH IMP x  − =  +  +                                       (4.2) 
We use   to denote the long (usually five year) difference operator. Rapid growth in 
the Chinese import share is therefore used as a proxy for a rapid increase in trade competition 
from low wage countries. The growth of Chinese imports may still be related to unobserved 
shocks, 
ijkt so we consider instrumental variables such as the removal of quotas when China 
joined the WTO to evaluate potential endogeneity biases. We maximize the use of the data by 
using overlapping five-year differences (e.g. 2005-2000 and 2004-1999) but since we cluster at 
the country-industry pair level (or sometimes just industry level) this is innocuous. We report 
some results using non-overlapping five-year differences and specifications in levels (e.g. fixed 
effect Negative Binomial models). 
4.42  Technological upgrading through reallocation between plants and firms 
In addition to examining whether Chinese import competition causes technological 
upgrading within firms we also examine whether trade affects innovation by reallocating 
economic activity between firms by examining employment and survival equations. As 
discussed in the Section III, compositional models would predict that China would cause low-
tech plants to shrink and die, as they are competing most closely with Chinese imports.  
Consequently, we estimate firm employment growth equations of the form:  
5 5ln ( * )
N CH N N N CH N N
ijkt jkt ijkt ijkt jkt ijkt ijktN IMP x TECH IMP TECH    − − =  +  +  + +
      (4.3) 
where the coefficient 
N  reflects the association of jobs growth with the change in 
Chinese imports, which we would expect to be negative (i.e. 
N <0) and TECH is the relevant 
technology variable (e.g. patenting). We are particularly interested in whether Chinese import 
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competition has a larger effect on low-tech firms, so to capture this we include the interaction of 
CH
jktIMP  with the (lagged) technology variables. If Chinese trade has a disproportionately 
negative effect on low-tech firms we would expect 
N  > 0.  
 Equations (4.2) and (4.3) are estimated on surviving firms. However, one of the 
effects of Chinese trade may be to reduce the probability of plant survival. Consequently, we 
also estimate: 
5 5( * )
S CH S S S CH S S
ijkt jkt ijkt ijkt jkt ijkt ijktSURVIVAL IMP x TECH IMP TECH    − −=  +  +  + +
(4.4)
          
which is defined on a cohort of firms (or establishments) who were alive in a base 
period and followed over the next five years. If these establishments (or firms) survived over the 
subsequent five years we define ijktSURVIVAL  = 1 and zero otherwise. If Chinese imports do 
reduce survival probabilities, we expect 
S  < 0 and if high-tech plants are more protected we 
expect 
S > 0.  
 To complete the analysis of between firm effects we would also need an entry 
equation. The fundamental problem is that there is no “initial” technology level for entering 
firms. We cannot use the current observed technology level ( ijktTECH ) as this is clearly 
endogenous (in equations (4.3) and (4.4) we use lagged technology variables under the 
assumption that technology is weakly exogenous). We can address the issue of entry indirectly, 
however, by estimating an industry-level version of equation (2):  
IND CH IND IND
jkt jkt jkt jktTECH IMP x   =  +  +                                                     (4.5) 
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where the coefficient on Chinese imports,  , in equation (4.5) reflects the combination 
of within firm effects from equations (4.1) and (4.2), the reallocation effects from equations (4.3) 
and (4.4), and the unmodelled entry effects. In examining the magnitude of the Chinese trade 
effects, we will simulate the proportion of aggregate technical change that can be accounted for 
by Chinese imports using equations (4.2)-(4.4) and break this down into within and between 
components. We will also compare the micro and industry estimates of equation (4.5) which 
give an alternative estimate of the within and between effects, including entry.  
4.5  Results 
4.51  Within firm and within plant results 
Table 4.1 presents our core results: within firm and within plant measures of technical 
change. All columns control for fixed effects by estimating in long-differences and country-
specific macro shocks by including a full set of country dummies interacted with a full set of 
time dummies. Our key measure of innovation, patents, is the dependent variable in column (1). 
The coefficient suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in Chinese import penetration is 
associated with a 3.2% increase in patenting. Since jobs fell in those industries affected by 
Chinese imports (see Table 4.3) we underestimate the growth in patent intensity (patents per 
worker) by not controlling for (endogenous) employment. If we also include the growth of 
employment in column (1), the coefficient (standard error) on imports is slightly larger at 0.387 
(0.134). 91  Note that our pooling across multiple overlapping years to construct five-year 
                                                          
91 The coefficient (standard error) on employment in the patents equation was 0.015(0.008) implying that 
larger firms have a higher volume of patents. If we include the ln(capital/sales) ratio as well as 
ln(employment) in the regression this barely shifts the results (the coefficient on Chinese imports is 0.370 
with a standard error of 0.125). Thus, the correlation with Chinese trade is not simply an increase in all 
types of capital, but seems related specifically to technical change. The other results in the table are all 
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differences is largely innocuous as we are clustering the standard errors by country-industry pair. 
For example if we use only the last five year difference the qualitative results are similar. In this 
experiment the coefficient (standard error) is 0.591(0.201) for patents; 0.314(0.077) for IT; and 
0.400 (0.079) for TFP.  
A concern with patenting as an innovation indicator is that firms may simply be taking 
out more patents to protect their existing knowledge in the face of greater Chinese competition. 
To test this “lawyer effect” we also look at citations per patent – if firms are now patenting more 
incremental knowledge for fear of being copied by the Chinese, the average quality of their 
patents should fall, so citations per patent should drop. The results on citations per patents in 
Table 4.A3 show, in fact, that Chinese competition does not lead to a fall in citations. The 
coefficient on Chinese imports is actually positive (but insignificant).  
 In column (2) of Table 4.1 we examine IT intensity and find a positive and 
significant coefficient on Chinese imports. We use computers per employee as our main 
measure of IT diffusion as this is a good indicator of a general-purpose technology used widely 
across industries.  However, in Table 4.A4 we investigate other measures of IT – the adoption of 
Enterprise Resource Planning, database software, and groupware tools – and also find positive 
coefficients on Chinese imports. 
 Column (3) of Table 4.1 uses R&D as the outcome and also shows a large and 
significant increase in firm-level R&D expenditure when Chinese imports rise, which is more 
evidence that the increase in innovation observed in column (1) is not due to firms merely taking 
                                                                                                                                                                          
robust to controlling for employment growth – see Table 4.5 below for more analysis controlling for firm 
and industry size. 
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out more intellectual property protection. Column (4) uses a wider measure of technical change 
as the dependent variable, TFP growth, and again establishes a positive and significant 
association with Chinese imports growth. The final column delves uses the latest version of the 
management practices data first described by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007).92  Hence, Chinese 
trade competition also appears to stimulate the rapid adoption of modern (Lean) management 
practices.  
As we discuss in Section 4.6 below the magnitudes are economically significant: a 10 
percentage point increase in Chinese imports is associated with a 3.2% increase in patenting, a 
3.6% increase in IT, a 12% increase in R&D, a 2.6% increase in TFP and a 0.8 (1.38 standard 
deviation) increase in the management index. Note that the latter is an extremely large change 
given that that the average gap between US and Indian management practices is 0.85. 
4.52  Endogeneity: the problem of unobserved technology shocks  
An obvious problem with estimating these equations is the potential endogeneity of 
Chinese imports due to unobserved technology shocks correlated with the growth of Chinese 
imports. To address this we consider three alternative strategies to control for these unobserved 
shocks: (i) using the natural experiment of China joining the WTO, (ii) constructing an IV from 
initial conditions and (iii) controlling for industry time trends. The smaller size of the datasets 
for R&D and management makes it infeasible to implement these identification strategies so we 
focus mainly from this point forwards on the three large-sample technology measures: patents, 
IT and TFP. 
                                                          
92 We have up to three panel data observations per firm between 2010 and 2002 across the European 
countries considered here (see Appendix B) so can only use shorter (three year) differences. 
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 China joining the WTO as a quasi-experiment - One identification strategy is to 
use the accession of China to the WTO in 2001, which led to the abolition of import quotas on 
textiles and apparel. We discuss this in detail in Appendix D, but sketch the idea here. The 
origin of these quotas dates back to the 1950s when Britain and the US introduced quotas in 
response to import competition from India and Japan. Over time, this quota system was 
expanded to take in most developing countries, and was eventually formalized into the Multi-
Fiber Agreement (MFA) in 1974. The MFA was itself integrated into GATT in the 1994 
Uruguay round, and when China joined the WTO in December 2001 these quotas were 
eliminated in two waves in 2002 and 2005 (see Brambilla, Khandelwal and Schott, 2010). Since 
these quotas were built up from the 1950s, and their phased abolition negotiated in the late 
1980s in preparation for the Uruguay Round, it seems plausible to believe their level in 2000 
was exogenous with respect to future technology shocks. The level of quotas also varied quasi-
randomly across four-digit industries 93  – for example, they covered 77% of cotton fabric 
products (SIC 2211) but only 2% of wool fabric products (2231), and covered 100% of women’s 
dresses (2334) but only 5% of men’s trousers (2325). This variation presumably reflected the 
historic bargaining power of the various industries in the richer countries in the 1950s and 1960s 
when these quotas were introduced, but are now uncorrelated to any technology trends in the 
industries as we show below. 
 When these quotas were abolished this generated a 240% increase in Chinese 
imports on average within the affected product groups. In fact, this increase in textile and 
                                                          
93 The quotas were actually imposed at the six-digit level that we aggregated up to the four-digit industry 
level weighting by their share of world imports calculated in the year 2000 (the year before WTO 
accession).   
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apparel imports was so large it led the European Union to re-introduce some limited quotas after 
2005.94 Since this re-introduction was endogenous, we use the initial level of quotas in 2000 as 
our instrument to avoid using the potentially endogenous post-2005 quota levels. Although the 
quota-covered industries are considered low-tech sectors, European firms in these industries 
generated 21,638 patents in our sample. In Appendix 4.D we give several examples of such 
patents taken out by European firms. 
 Panel A of Table 4.2 uses this identification strategy of China’s accession to the 
WTO.95 Since this is only relevant for textiles and clothing, we first present the OLS results for 
these sectors for all the technology indicators in columns (1), (4) and (7). In column (1) there is 
a large positive and significant coefficient on the Chinese trade variable, reflecting the greater 
importance of low wage country trade in this sector. Column (2) presents the first stage using 
the (value-weighted) proportion of products covered by quotas in 2000. Quota removal appears 
to be positively and significantly related to the future growth of Chinese imports. Column (3) 
presents the IV results that show a significant effect of Chinese imports on patents with a higher 
coefficient than OLS (1.86 compared to 1.16).  
                                                          
94 The surge in Chinese imports led to strikes by dock workers in Southern Europe in sympathy with 
unions from the apparel industry. The Southern European countries with their large apparel sectors 
lobbied the European Union to reintroduce these quotas, while the Northern European countries with their 
larger retail industries fought to keep the quota abolition. Eventually temporary limited quotas were 
introduced as a compromise, which illustrates how the abolition of these quotas was ex ante uncertain, 
making it harder to pick up anticipation effects.  
95 In Panels A and B of Table 4.2 we cluster by four-digit industry as the instruments have no country-
specific variation. We also drop years after 2005 so the latest long difference (2005-2000) covers the 
years before and after China joined the WTO.  
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 Columns (4)-(6) repeats the specification but uses IT intensity instead of patents 
as the dependent variable. Column (4) shows that the OLS results for IT are also strong in this 
sector and column (5) reports that the instrument has power in the first stage. The IV results in 
column (6) also indicate that the OLS coefficient appeared downward biased.96 The final three 
columns repeat the specification for TFP showing similar results to patents and IT. So overall 
there is a large OLS coefficient for patents, IT and TFP, but an even larger IV coefficient and 
certainly no evidence of upward bias for OLS.97 
 There are several issues with the specification. First, the regressions all use the 
actual flow of Chinese imports to reflect the threat of import competition. However, an 
advantage of the IV estimates is that by replacing the actual flow of imports by the predicted 
flow based on quota relaxation, this more accurately reflects the threat of Chinese competition.98 
Second, one could argue that firms will be adjusting their innovation efforts earlier in response 
to anticipation of quota relaxation. However, at the time there was considerable uncertainty over 
whether the liberalization would actually take place. A common view was that even if there was 
an abolition of quotas this would be temporary, as to some extent it was with the temporary 
                                                          
96 If we repeat the IV specification of column (6) but also condition on employment growth the coefficient 
on Chinese imports is 0.687 with a standard error of 0.373. Dropping all the four-digit sectors that had a 
zero quota in 2000 uses only the continuous variation in quotas among the affected industries to identify 
the Chinese import effect. Although this regression sample has only 766 observations, this produces a 
coefficient (standard error) under the IV specification of 2.688(1.400) compared to an OLS estimate of 
1.238(0.245). 
97 The Hausman tests fail to reject the null of the exogeneity of Chinese imports for the patents and IT 
equations, but does reject for the TFP equation (p-values of 0.342, 0.155 and 0.001 respectively). 
98 In the reduced forms the coefficient (standard error) on Chinese imports was 0.201(0.091), 0.163(0.038) 
and 0.129(0.018) in the patents, IT and TFP equations. Regressions include country dummies times year 
dummies. 
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reintroduction of some quotas in 2006. We discuss this issue in more detail in Appendix D 
where we show that there is no significant correlation of the quota instrument with technical 
change or Chinese imports prior to the 2001 WTO accession.99 This placebo experiment also 
addresses the concern that quota intensity is proxying some other trend correlated with Chinese 
import growth.  
 To further examine this issue we include lagged Chinese import growth (1995-
2000) as an additional control in Table 4.2. The coefficients are robust to this.100 The most 
rigorous test is to include lags of both technology and Chinese imports in the regression, which 
we do in Table 4.A5. We use the TFP specifications as we have the largest time series of data in 
order to condition on the pre-policy variables. Column (1) of Table 4.A5 repeats the 
specification from the final column of Table 4.2 Panel A. Column (2) conditions on the balanced 
panel where we observe firms for 10 years and shows that the results are robust even though we 
have only two-thirds of the industries. Column (3) includes the two pre-policy variables, the 
lagged growth of imports and the lagged growth of TFP. The coefficient on lagged imports is 
insignificant, but lagged TFP is negative and significant. Importantly, the coefficient on current 
Chinese import growth remains positive and significant, actually rising from 1.49 to 1.61. The 
negative coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is expected due to mean reversion, so we 
                                                          
99 For example, to test for anticipation effects we regressed the level of the imports quota on the growth of 
technology 1996-2000 prior to WTO accession in 2001. All the coefficients on technology were small and 
insignificant suggesting no anticipation effects. The coefficient (standard error) was 0.096(0.177) for 
patents and  0.024(0.031) for TFP. We do not have IT data before 2000 so cannot implement this placebo 
test. 
100 For example in column (6) the coefficient on lagged imports is positive (0.168) but insignificant and 
the coefficient on Chinese import growth remains positive and significant (1.792 with a standard error of 
0.421). 
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also report the results of instrumenting this with the firm’s 1996 level of TFP. This reverses the 
sign of the coefficient on the lag, suggesting a positive relationship between past and present 
TFP. Again the coefficient on Chinese imports is essentially unchanged, suggesting that the 
significant impact of imports instrumented by WTO quota abolition is not proxying for pre-
existing industry trends. 
 Initial conditions as instrumental variables - A disadvantage of the quota-based 
instrument is that we can only construct the instrument for the affected industries (textiles and 
clothing), so we consider a second identification strategy. The overall increase in Chinese 
imports is driven by the exogenous liberalization being pursued by Chinese policy makers. The 
industries where China exports grew more depended on whether the industry is one in which 
China had a comparative advantage. For example, if we consider the growth of Chinese imports 
in Europe between 2000 and 2005, sectors in which China was already exporting strongly in 
1999 are likely to be those where China had a comparative advantage – such as textiles, 
furniture and toys – and are also the sectors which experienced much more rapid increase in 
import penetration in the subsequent years (see Table 4.A1). Consequently, high exposure to 
Chinese imports in 1999 can be used (interacted with the exogenous overall growth of Chinese 
imports,
ChinaM ) as a potential instrument for subsequent Chinese import growth. In other 
words we use (
6 *
CH China
jt tIMP M−  ) as an instrument for 
CH
jktIMP  where 6
CH
jtIMP −  is the Chinese 
import share in industry j in the EU and US. Note that we do not make 
6
CH
jtIMP −  specific to 
country k to mitigate some of the potential endogeneity problems with initial conditions.101 
                                                          
101 This identification strategy is similar to the use of “ethnic enclaves” by papers such as Card (2001) 
who use the proportion of current immigrants in an area as an instrument for future immigrants.  
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 A priori, the instrument has credibility. Amiti and Freund (2010) show that over the 
1997 to 2005 period at least three quarters of the aggregate growth of Chinese imports was from 
the expansion of existing products rather than from adding new products. Similarly, Brambilla et 
al (2010) find this was true when focusing on textiles and clothing after 2001.102 
 Column (1) of Table 4.2 panel B re-presents the basic OLS results for patents. 
Column (2) presents the first stage for the instrumental variable regressions. The instrument is 
strongly correlated with the endogenous variable, the growth of Chinese import intensity. 
Column (3) presents the second stage: the coefficient on Chinese imports is 0.495 and 
significant. 103  Columns (4) through (6) repeat the experiment for IT. In column (6) the 
coefficient on Chinese imports is positive and significant and above the OLS estimate. In the 
final column (9) for TFP, the IV coefficient is again above the OLS estimate.104 Taking Panels A 
and B of Table 4.2 as a whole, there is no evidence that we are under-estimating the effects of 
China on technical change in the OLS estimates in Table 1. If anything, we may be too 
conservative.105  
                                                          
102  This appears to be common in several countries- e.g. Mexico after NAFTA (e.g. Iacovone and 
Javorcik, 2008). 
103 Unsurprisingly the results are more precise if we combined the initial conditions and quota instruments 
together. For example in column (3) the coefficient (standard error) on patents is 2.322 (0.990). 
Furthermore, we cannot reject the null that the instruments are valid using a Hansen over-identification 
test. The p-values for rejection of instrument validity are 0.438 for the patent equation, 0.330 for the IT 
equation and 0.948 for the TFP equation. 
104 If we use the initial conditions estimator for R&D following the column (9) specification we find a 
point estimate (standard error) of 1.179 (0.582). 
105 The downward bias on OLS of trade variables is also found in Auer and Fisher (2010) who examine 
the impact of trade with less developed countries on prices. They use a variant of an initial conditions 
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 Controlling for technology shocks using industry trends. A third way to control 
for unobservable technology shocks is to include industry trends. We do this in Panel C of Table 
4.2 by including a set of three-digit industry dummies in the growth specifications. In column (1) 
we reproduce the baseline specification for patents and column (2) includes the industry trends. 
We repeat this for each of the technology variables. Although the magnitude of the coefficient 
on Chinese imports is smaller in all cases, it remains significant at the 10% level or greater 
across all three specifications. Note that the industry trends are jointly insignificant in all three 
cases. It is unsurprising that the coefficient falls as we are effectively switching off' much of the 
useful variation and exacerbating any attenuation bias. Furthermore, although including these 
industry dummies may deal with omitted trends, they do not deal with reverse causality, which, 
as argued above will cause a downward bias on the coefficient of interest. The WTO instrument 
is superior in this respect as in principle it deals with both reverse causality and omitted 
variables. 
The results are generally robust to even tougher tests. If we include four digit industry 
trends the coefficient (standard errors) in the patent, IT and TFP regressions are 0.185(0.125), 
0.170(0.082) and 0.232(0.064). If we include three digit dummies interacted with country 
dummies the results are: 0.274(0.101); 0.176(0.08) and 0.167(0.052). Hence, the primary source 
of identification is (i) multi-product firms who face differential industry effects in addition to 
their primary sector and (ii) the acceleration of import growth and technology. The continued 
importance of the trade variable even after this tough test is remarkable. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
estimator based on the industry's labor intensity. Like them, we also find important import effects on 
prices (see sub-section 4.6).  
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 Summary on endogeneity - The main concern in interpreting the technology-
trade correlation in Table 1 as causal is that there are unobserved technology shocks. The 
evidence from Table 4.2 is that controlling for such potential endogeneity concerns in a variety 
of ways does not undermine a causal interpretation of the impact of Chinese imports on 
technical change in the North. 
4.53  Reallocation effects: jobs and survival 
Table 4.3 examines reallocation effects by analyzing employment growth in Panel A 
and survival in Panel B.  We first examine the basic associations in column (1) of Panel A, 
which suggests a strong negative effect of Chinese imports - a 10 percentage point increase in 
imports is associated with a 3.5% fall in employment. In addition, high-tech firms (as indicated 
by a high level of lagged patents per worker) were more likely to grow. Most importantly, the 
interaction of Chinese trade and lagged patent stock enters with a positive and significant 
coefficient in column (2). This suggests that more high-tech firms are somewhat shielded from 
the effects of Chinese imports. In columns (3) and (4) we repeat the estimates but for the 
“patenters” sample rather than all firms (i.e. those firms who had at least one patent since 1978) 
and find a similar result: firms with a high lagged patent stock had less job falls following a 
Chinese import shock.106 In columns (5) and (6) we run similar employment estimations using 
the initial level of IT and TFP and again find similar positive interaction terms, suggesting high-
tech firms are somewhat protected from the effects of Chinese import competition. 
                                                          
106 Furthermore, this result is not driven by the inclusion of employment in our patent stock measure. To 
test this we estimated both a model where employment was removed from the denominator (that is, a 
simple patent stock measure) and a model that include lagged employment and its interaction with 
Chinese imports. The estimate of our technology-imports interaction terms for these models were 
0.192(0.086) and 0.160(0.083) respectively.  
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 We also examined the dynamic effects of Chinese imports on employment and 
compared this to the impact on technology. Table 4.A6 explores the timing for patents by 
moving from a lag-length of 5 years in column (1) to a lag-length of zero years in column (6) as 
in our baseline model. Chinese imports appear to have the largest impact on patents after about 
three years. Panel B of Table 4.A6 shows the same results for employment, where we see the 
largest impact for Chinese imports is contemporaneously. This is consistent with the idea that 
firms respond to Chinese imports by cutting employment while also initiating innovative 
projects. These innovation projects appear to take around three years on average to produce 
innovations that are sufficiently developed to be patented. 
 Panel B of Table 4.3 examines survival. We consider a cohort of firms and 
plants alive in 2000 and model the subsequent probability that they survived until 2005 as a 
function of the growth of industry-wide Chinese imports and the initial technology levels. 
Column (1) shows firms facing higher rates of Chinese import growth are less likely to survive - 
a ten percentage point increase in Chinese imports decreases the survival probability by 1.2 
percentage points. Since the mean exit rate in our sample period is 7-percentage point this 
represents a 17% increase in exit rates. Column (2) analyzes the interaction term between 
Chinese import growth and lagged patents and finds again a positive “shielding” effect – firms 
with a low initial patent stock have a significantly higher change of exiting when faced by an 
influx of Chinese imports. In columns (3) and (4) we re-estimate these specifications using only 
patenting firms and again find a significant positive interaction between lagged patent stocks 
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and Chinese imports107. Columns (5) and (6) shows that there are also positive interaction effects 
when we use IT or TFP as alternative measures of technology, although these are not significant 
at the 5% level. Further investigation reveals that the main effect is coming from firms in the 
bottom quintile of the technology distribution who were significantly more likely to exit because 
of Chinese import competition.108 These findings on the impact of low wage country imports on 
reallocation is consistent with those found in US manufacturing establishments in Bernard, 
Jensen and Schott (2006) using indirect measures of technology (capital intensity and skills) for 
the pre-1997 period in the US. 
4.6 Magnitudes: Industry-Level results, Selection and General 
Equilibrium Effects  
Taking all these results together we have a clear empirical picture of the role of Chinese 
imports in increasing technological intensity both within firms (Tables 1 and 2) and between 
firms by reallocating output to more technologically advanced firms (Table 4.3). We now turn to 
the economic magnitude of these effects. 
4.61  Magnitudes  
We can use the regression coefficients to perform some partial equilibrium calculations 
to quantify how much of the aggregate change in technology China could account for and to 
gauge the relative importance of within and between firm effects (details in Appendix E). In 
summary, for patents per employee we apply the coefficients from all our regressions with the 
                                                          
107 We have re-estimated all these results with the IV strategies discussed in the previous section and, as 
with the technology equations, all results are robust. 
108 For example, estimating column (5) but using the lowest quintile of the IT intensity distribution rather 
than the linear IT intensity gave a coefficient (standard error) of 0.214 (0.102) on the interaction. 
 195 
 
empirical growth of Chinese imports to predict growth in patent intensity and then divide this by 
the actual growth in aggregate patent intensity in our sample. For IT and TFP we follow a 
similar exercise, again applying our regression coefficients to get a predicted increase from 
China and dividing by the total increase in aggregate data. 
 In Table 4.4 we see that over the 2000-2007 period Chinese imports appear to 
have accounted for about 14.7% of the increase in aggregate patenting per worker, 14.1% of the 
increase in IT intensity and 11.8% of TFP growth in European manufacturing. The predicted 
impact of Chinese imports appears to increase over this period. For example, we estimate that 
Chinese imports accounted for 13.9% of the increase in patents per employee over the 2000-04 
period but 18.7% over the 2004-2007 period. The reason for this acceleration is clear in Figure 
4.1, where Chinese import growth has rapidly increased over this period. Table 4.4 also shows 
for patents the contributions of the within and between components are roughly equal which is 
consistent with the literature on trade liberalization (e.g. Pavcnik, 2002). For IT and productivity, 
the within component is larger which may be because the adjustment costs are lower in response 
to the more gradual growth of Chinese imports over the 2000’s compared to the “shock” trade 
liberalizations examined in places like Chile and Columbia. 
4.62  Industry level results  
In Table 4.5 we re-estimate our technology regressions at the industry level in Panel A 
and at the firm level in Panel B.109 This provides another approach to comparing the within firm 
                                                          
109 The firm-level results are identical to those in Table 1 for IT and R&D. The patents and TFP results 
differ somewhat from Table 1 because we exploited the multi-industry information at the firm level to 
construct a weighted average of Chinese imports in the main results. By contrast, in Table 5 we allocate a 
firm to its primary four-digit industry (Panel B) for comparability to the industry level results (Panel A). 
See Appendix B for details.  
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and between firm magnitudes of the impact of trade with China, since the industry level 
magnitudes capture both effects while the firm level magnitudes capture only the within effects. 
In addition to being a cross check on the magnitudes as estimated from the full set of equations, 
the industry-level estimates include any effect of China on entry.110 For example, if Chinese 
competition discourages entry of innovative firms within an industry, then the calculations in 
Table 4.4 will over-estimate the impact of trade on technical change. By contrast, the industry 
level aggregates are the stock of firms so include all growth from entrants as well as survivors. 
 Table 4.5 starts by examining outcomes where we expect Chinese trade to have 
a negative impact: prices, employment and profitability. We use producer prices as a dependent 
variable in column (1) of Panel A (there is no firm-level price data) and observe that Chinese 
imports are associated with large falls in prices in the most affected industries, consistent with 
Broda and Romalis (2009). Column (2) uses employment as the dependent variable and shows a 
larger negative effect at the industry level (Panel A) than the firm level (Panel B) consistent with 
the evidence from Table 4.3 that there is a trade effect on exit probabilities. 111 Column (3) 
contains the results for profitability (profits before tax, interest and dividends divided by revenue) 
and shows that industry and firm profits have fallen significantly (the smaller firm-level 
coefficient is the usual selection effect due to the least profitable firms being the first to exit). 
This negative profitability effect is important, as it is consistent with the idea that Chinese 
                                                          
110 Atkeson and Burstein (2010) stress this as one of the main problems with firm-level analysis of trade. 
See also Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2010). 
111 Interestingly, Autor, Dorn and Hansen (2012) looking at US labor markets find Chinese import 
competition not only reduces employment and wages, but also increases transfer payments for disability 
and unemployment. 
 197 
 
imports are causing an increase in competitive pressure in the industry (as assumed in the 
“trapped factor” model). If Chinese import share was instead only proxying some greater ability 
to offshore (which if properly measured it should not as these are Chinese imports in the firm's 
output market not its input market), then we would expect the coefficient to be positive as this 
should enhance rather than inhibit profitability. We discuss offshoring in more detail in sub-
section VII.D below. 
 In columns (4) to (10) of Table 4.5 we show results for our technology 
measures - patents, IT, R&D and TFP. At the industry level (Panel A) we find that Chinese 
import competition is significantly associated with increases in all of these measures of 
technology. Note that these industry-level results are based on data that includes all firms and 
plants at a given point in time, rather than just survivors. In Panel B columns (4) to (10) confirm 
that the firm level results show similar strong associations between Chinese import growth and 
technology, but with magnitudes between one-half to two-thirds of those at the industry level, 
broadly consistent with the share of the within firm component shown in the Table 4.4 
magnitude calculations. This suggests that any entry effects omitted from the firm-level results, 
but included in the industry level results, must be relatively small given the similarity of the 
magnitudes112. 
4.63 Dynamic Selection Bias  
A concern with our finding of positive effects of Chinese imports competition on within 
firm technical change is that it reflects dynamic selection bias. For example, it may be that firms 
                                                          
112 For example, the magnitude of the within industry level effects 2000-2007 for patents, IT and TFP are 
12.5%, 10.8% and 16.1%, very similar to the equivalent firm-level values of 14.7%, 14.1% and 11.8% as 
shown in Table 4.  
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who know that they are technologically improving are less likely to exit in the face of the 
Chinese import shock. This could generate our positive coefficients in Table 1. Note that our 
industry-level results in Table 4.5A are robust to this problem as it examines aggregate 
innovation. Dynamic selection bias would mean, however, that we allocate too much of this 
aggregate industry effect to the within firm component and too little to the reallocation 
component in the calculations of Table 4.4.  
 Appendix F gives a formal statement of the dynamic selection problem and 
suggests two ways of tackling it by (i) bounding the selection bias and (ii) a control function 
approach. First, we can place an upper bound on the magnitude of the dynamic selection effects 
by exploiting the fact that the number of patents can never fall below zero. We create pseudo 
observations for firms who exit and give them a value of zero patents for all post exit periods 
until the end of the sample in 2005. This is a “worst case bounds” bounds approach (see Manski 
and Pepper, 2000 or Blundell et al, 2007) as the effect of trade could never be less than this 
lower bound.  
 Table 4.6 implements this method. We first report the baseline results of Table 
1 column (1) and then report the results for the worst-case lower bounds in column (2). Note that 
as well as additional observations on our existing 8,480 firms we also obtain additional firms as 
we now can construct a five-year difference even for firms with less than five years of actual 
patenting data by given them zeros for the years after they exit. Dropping firms with less than 
five years of data is another possible source of selection bias that is addressed by this method.113. 
                                                          
113 A total of 658 firms some history of patenting exited to bankruptcy in our sample. 406 of these were 
already in the main sample of 8,480 firms and 30,277 observations (Table 1, column (1)). The additional 
252 of the 658 exiting firms were outside the main sample because they reported less than five 
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Our results appear to be robust to these potential selection bias problems as the coefficient on 
Chinese imports in column (2) remains positive and significant and has fallen only by less than 
one-sixth, from 0.321 to 0.271. 
Since patents are counts we also consider a Negative Binomial model. It is less 
straightforward to deal with fixed effects in such models than in our baseline long-differences 
models, especially with weakly exogenous variables like Chinese imports (e.g. the Hausman, 
Hall and Griliches, 1984, fixed effect Negative Binomial model requires strict exogeneity). We 
use the Blundell et al (1999) method of controlling for fixed effects through pre-sample mean 
scaling for the baseline model. This estimator has proven attractive in the context of patent 
models and exploits the long pre-sample history of patents to control for the fixed effect (we 
have up to 23 years of pre-sample patent data). More details of the estimation technique are in 
Blundell et al (2002) and the textbook by Cameron and Trevidi (2005).  
Column (3) implements the Negative Binomial model and shows that the coefficient on 
imports is similar to the baseline results with a positive and significant coefficient that is if 
anything slightly higher than the long differenced results. Column (4) shows that the worst-case 
lower bounds are again not much lower than the baseline, with the effect falling from 0.397 to 
0.389.  
We conclude from Table 4.6 that the dynamic selection problem is not causing us to 
substantially overestimate the impact of Chinese competition causing a within firm increase in 
the volume of innovative activity. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
consecutive observations so that a five-year difference in patenting could not be defined. The increase in 
observations from 30,277 in column (1) to 31,272 in column (2) are the additional observations on these 
658 exiting firms. 
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 This worse case bounds approach will not work for TFP as it does not have a 
lower bound of zero. However, the approach that we have taken to calculate TFP already 
includes a control function approach to remove the bias associated with selection in production 
functions following Olley and Pakes (1996). Details of this are in Appendix C. Thus, our TFP 
estimates should be robust to this selection problem.  
4.64 General Equilibrium and Welfare 
We cannot prematurely jump to aggregate welfare conclusions from the results in the 
paper. Atkeson and Burstein (2010) argue that lowering trade costs may lead to the exit of low 
productivity domestic firms, but it will deter product innovation through new entry. In Ossa and 
Hsieh (2010) the reduction of barriers to Chinese imports raises average European firm 
productivity (as we find), but lowers the average quality of Chinese exporters to the EU. While 
Arkolakis et al (2008, 2010) argue that the standard gains to trade summarized in the ratio of 
exports to GDP are not fundamentally altered in a wide class of models that allow for 
heterogeneous firms. More subtly, the innovation response in rich countries in sectors where 
China has comparative advantage (like textiles), might reduce the standard Ricardian gains from 
trade (Levchenko and Zhang, 2010).114 
                                                          
114  Another argument is that increased innovation from Chinese trade drives up the wages of R&D 
scientists leading to no net increase in innovation, We believe this fully offsetting increase in R&D prices 
is unlikely. First, much of the improvements we identify do not require large increases in R&D scientists 
– the incremental changes in IT, TFP, management practices and patenting may require more skilled 
workers, but not more scientists. Second, it is unlikely the supply curve of R&D scientists is completely 
vertical – workers for innovation-related tasks can be imported from overseas and redeployed from other 
activities. Bloom, Griffith and Van Reenen (2002), for example, showed that the number of R&D 
employees rose in countries that introduced fiscal incentives for R&D even in the short-run.  
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Our empirical models are partial equilibrium and do not capture all of the complex 
welfare effects of trade with China. Therefore, what they directly estimate is the impact of 
increasing trade on innovation on an industry-by-industry basis. This is directly relevant for 
typical trade policy question, such as the costs of putting quotas on imports in any particular 
industry.  
 Nevertheless, we think that our results are also suggestive of a positive aggregate effect 
of Chinese trade on innovation as implied by standard endogenous growth models (such as the 
trapped factor model of Bloom et al, 2012, building on Romer and Riviera-Batiz, 1992)115. First, 
the within firm effects of Chinese imports on innovation is at least as large as the between firm-
reallocation effects (see Table 4.4). Second, any possible falls in innovation through lower entry 
within the same industry cannot offset our main results. For example, the net effect of China 
(including all entry effects) is on average positive in the industry-level analysis of Table 4.5 
Panel B. 
4.7 Extensions and Robustness 
In Section II we discussed several models of trade induced technical change. The 
trapped factor model, amongst others, suggested that innovation should rise when faced by 
greater import competition and should occur for firms facing the largest trade shock. The 
trapped factor model also implies that the innovation response (i) should be weaker for import 
competition from high wage countries, (ii) larger for firms more subject to the trapped factor 
problem. We investigate these further implications in the next two sub-sections, examine skills 
                                                          
115 It may be that there is “too much” innovation of course, so slowing down innovation has positive 
welfare effects. However, most empirical estimates have found that there is a socially sub-optimal level of 
R&D and innovation (e.g. Jones and Williams, 1998). 
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as another outcome in sub-section C and finally examine three alternative theories of Section II 
relating to offshoring, product switching and export-led innovation in sub-sections VII.D to 
VII.F. 
4.71  Low wage vs. high wage country trade 
Our key measure of Chinese import competition is the share of total imports originating 
in China. An alternative approach is to normalize Chinese imports by a measure of domestic 
activity such as production or apparent consumption. These alternative normalizations are 
presented in Table 4.A7. Although the magnitude of the coefficients changes as the mean of the 
imports variable is different, the qualitative and quantitative results are remarkably similar.116  
Using these alternative definitions of Chinese imports also allows us to separately 
distinguish the impact of Chinese imports from all other low wage country imports and high 
wage country imports. We define low wage countries as those countries with GDP per capita 
less than 5% of that in the US between 1972 and 2001. On this definition, the increase in non-
Chinese low wage imports (as a proportion of all imports) 1996-2007 was close to zero (0.005), 
whereas China’s growth was substantial (see Figure 4.1).  
 Table 4.7 presents some analysis of using measures of Chinese imports 
normalized by domestic production. The dependent variable is the change in patents in Panel A, 
the change in IT in Panel B and the change in TFP in Panel C. Column (1) simply shows what 
we have already seen – Chinese import penetration is associated with significantly greater 
technical change. Column (2) includes the non-Chinese low wage country import penetration 
                                                          
116 For example, a one standard deviation increase in the import share in Table 1 column (1) is associated 
with a 10% increase in patenting. By contrast, a one standard deviation increase in the import share in 
column (1) of Panel B in Table A7 is associated with a 14% increase in patenting.  
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measure. The coefficient is insignificantly different from the Chinese imports coefficient in all 
panels. When we include all low wage country import penetration instead of just China in 
column (3) we obtain similar coefficients to those in column (1), with a positive and significant 
coefficient for all three technology measures. We conclude that China is qualitatively no 
different from other low wage countries - it is just the largest trade shock from low wage 
countries in recent decades. 
 Column (4) of Table 4.7 includes the growth of imports from high wage 
countries. The coefficient is positive in all panels, but insignificant. High wage imports are also 
easily dominated by Chinese imports when both are included in column (5). Column (6) uses 
total import penetration that is positive but again dominated by China in column (7). One 
concern is that the endogeneity bias may be greater for high wage country imports than Chinese 
imports. We followed Bertrand (2004) and used trade-weighted exchange rates as an instrument 
that, although generally significant in the first stages, did not qualitatively change any of our 
results.117  
 Taken as whole Table 4.7 strongly suggests that China is a good example of a 
low wage country trade shock. Import competition from low wage countries appears to stimulate 
faster technical change, whereas import competition from richer countries does not. According 
to our model, this is because imports from the South make the production of low-tech goods less 
                                                          
117 For example in column (6) of Table 7 the coefficient (standard error) on trade weighted exchange rates 
was 0.391(0.178)  in the first stage for IT and the coefficient on imports in the second stage remained 
insignificant (actually falling to -0.095 with a standard error of 0.172). For TFP the first stage coefficient 
(standard error) was 0.819(0.220) and the imports variable remained significant and positive in the second 
stage with a coefficient (standard error) of 0.210(0.081). For patents the first stage was very weak due to 
much fewer degrees of freedom with a coefficient (standard error) on the instrument of 0.082. The second 
stage coefficient on imports was negative but very imprecisely determined: -2.310(4.392). 
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profitable and increases incentives to move up the quality ladder. Rich country imports are more 
likely to be higher tech goods that for Schumpeterian reasons shrink profit margins and offset 
any pro-innovation effects of competition. 
4.72  Heterogeneity: The effect of Chinese imports on innovation is stronger when 
there are more “trapped factors”  
In Section II we suggested that firms with “trapped factors” (e.g. due to firm-specific 
human capital) may be less likely to innovate until a shock such as the reduction of trade 
barriers against Chinese goods lowers the opportunity cost of innovating. To test this idea we 
allow the effect of Chinese imports to be heterogeneous with respect to environments where we 
might think that trapped factors are more important.  
Our first simple test is to construct a measure of the industry-specific wage premia that 
our model suggests is the product-specific human capital following an innovation (see Appendix 
A). We estimate these three digit inter-industry wage differentials in the standard way (e.g. 
Krueger and Summers, 1988) from a Mincerian wage equation using individual-level data. We 
do this for the UK as (i) there is abundant publicly available micro-data and (ii) we want to 
avoid conflating institutional constraints (like unions and minimum wages) with the underlying 
technology of the industry and the UK has the least regulated labor market of our European 
countries118.  
                                                          
118 For example, the OECD (2009) index of “strictness of employment protection in 2008” gives the UK 
the lowest score (i.e. highest flexibility) of 1.1 (on a scale of zero to 6) of all 30 developed countries with 
the exception of the US. By contrast, Portugal had the greatest degree of job protection with a score of 
4.2. 
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In column (1) of Table 4.8 we repeat our basic patents equation. In column (2) we 
include our proxy for trapped factors, the measure of the industry-specific wage premium. This 
has a negative and significant correlation with innovation as the model would suggest as the 
opportunity cost of innovating is higher for firms with more trapped factors. Column (3) 
includes the key term: an interaction of the growth of Chinese imports and the industry wage 
premium. The coefficient on this term is positive and significant implying that the effect of 
Chinese competition is greater when there is more industry-specific human capital as the model 
predicts. 
Using industry wage premium interprets the theory quite literally and it may be that 
trapped factors are a more general phenomenon. An alternative measure of trapped factors is to 
use measured TFP (“MFP”) as a higher value of this term will reflect the fact that some firms 
have higher TFP than others (see Appendix A).  The advantage of this measure is that it is firm 
specific, but a disadvantage is that we can only construct TFP for a sub-sample of the data. 
Column (4) of Table 4.8 presents the patent equations for this sub-sample. Even though the 
sample is smaller, the effect of Chinese import competition on patents is similar to that in the 
overall sample in Table 1 (0.284 vs. 0.321). We then include the firm’s initial TFP in column (5) 
which, in line with the trapped factor model, is negatively correlated with subsequent patent 
growth. Column (6) includes the key interaction term between import growth and initial TFP. 
There is a significant and positive interaction suggesting that high TFP firms are more likely to 
respond by innovating when faced by a Chinese import shock than low productivity firms. This 
result has the same flavor as Aghion et al (2005) that the innovation in firms nearer the 
technology frontier responds more positively to competition, than low TFP firms. Unlike 
Aghion et al, however, we find no evidence of an inverted “U” which may be because we focus 
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on competition from less developed countries who are near the bottom of the quality ladder, 
rather than an increase in general competition.119  
 We could not find any evidence that larger firms responded more to Chinese 
imports. But Holmes and Stevens (2010) argue that size is not an adequate proxy for 
productivity, finding that small plants actually do relatively better than larger plants following 
an increase in Chinese import competition. In their model, small firms survive by operating in 
product niches rather than the standardized products competing with China. Like Holmes and 
Stevens (2010) we find that size per se is an inadequate proxy for productivity, but document a 
new result that firms endogenously create niche products through innovation when faced by 
Chinese competition. 
 In summary, Table 4.8 as a whole suggests some heterogeneity of the effect of 
trade on innovation in a direction consistent with our simple trapped factor model. 
4.73  Skill demand  
To examine skill demand we use the UK Labor Force Survey, as none of our micro 
datasets has plant or firm level skills measures. We create a three-digit panel on the share of the 
college-educated workers in the total wage-bill. Since the impact of China is relatively common 
across Europe, we think the UK results should be broadly representative. 
 In column (1) of Table 4.9, we see that Chinese imports are associated with an 
increase in the wage-bill share of college-educated workers, suggesting Chinese trade raises the 
                                                          
119 In a similar vein, Amiti and Khandelwal (2010) find stronger effects of trade on quality upgrading for 
firms closer to the quality frontier. Following Khandelwal (2010) we tried interacting imports with his 
average length of a quality ladder in the industry. The interactions typically went in the expected 
direction, but were insignificant. 
 207 
 
demand for skills. In column (2) we see the standard result that IT is also associated with an 
increase in the share of wages for college workers. Including both variables into the regression 
in column (3) shows that both IT and Chinese imports are significant, although both have lower 
coefficients, suggesting part of the association of IT with skilled workers may be a proxy for the 
impact of developing country trade120. In column (4) we re-estimate this specification by OLS 
using the textile and apparel sample, and in column (5) report the IV results that support a causal 
impact of Chinese import competition on the demand for skilled workers. This is consistent with 
the model that Chinese trade leads firms to switch from producing older low-tech goods to the 
design and manufacture of new goods, which is likely to increase the demand for skilled 
workers. 
4.74  Offshoring 
We have focused on China’s effect through competition in the final goods market, but 
an alternative way in which China could affect technical progress is through allowing Western 
firms to buy cheaper intermediate inputs and offshore low value added parts of the production 
chain.121 We investigate this by adapting the offshoring measure of Feenstra and Hansen (1999) 
for China, which uses the input-output tables to measure for each industry the share of Chinese 
                                                          
120 When disaggregating the wage bill share in relative wages and relative employment we find a positive 
association of Chinese imports with both components, but the strongest impact is on relative employment 
rather than relative wages. 
121 Intermediate inputs are stressed (in a developing country context) by Amiti and Konings (2006) and 
Goldberg et al, 2010b).  
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inputs in total imported inputs122. Column (1) of Table 4.10 includes this China offshoring 
measure in the patent equation. It enters with a positive but insignificant coefficient. 
Interestingly, in columns (2) and (3) we look at IT and TFP and do find a significant positive 
impact of offshoring. Throughout Table 4.10, the share of Chinese imports in the final goods 
market (our baseline measure) remains positive and significant with only slightly lower 
coefficients.123 
We also investigated using the WTO quasi-experiment of Table 4.2 to construct “input 
quotas” using the input-output tables to calculate predicted falls in the barriers to using Chinese 
inputs. Looking at the reduced forms for the technology equations (i.e. simply regressing the 
five year growth of each technology measure on input quotas and country dummies interacted 
with time dummies), removal of input quotas had no significant impact on patents, but 
significantly increased IT intensity and TFP (see Table 4.10). When output quotas were also 
included in this specification, input quotas remained significant at the 5% level for the TFP 
equation, but were only significant at the 10% level for the IT equation. 124  Output quotas 
remained positive and significant in all three specifications. 
                                                          
122 See Appendix B for details. We also considered the share of total imported inputs in all inputs (or all 
costs) like Feenstra-Hansen, but as with our analysis of total imports in the final goods market, it is the 
Chinese share (reflecting low wage country inputs) that is the dominant explanatory factor. 
123 This is compared to the baseline results in columns (1), (2) and (4) in Table 1 for patents, IT and TFP. 
The coefficient estimates in Table 10 imply a one standard deviation increase in offshoring has a similar 
marginal effect on IT and TFP  (0.014 and 0.008 respectively) to a one standard deviation increase in 
Chinese imports (0.014 and 0.007 respectively). 
124 The coefficients (standard errors) on input quotas were 0.727(0.523), 0.696(0.365) and 0.290(0.136) in 
the patents, IT and TFP equations. We estimate these equations on industries where at least 0.5% of 
imported inputs are from China. 
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 Together these results suggest that while offshoring does not increase overall 
innovation (as measured by patents) it does increase IT intensity and productivity, presumably 
since offshoring moves the less IT intensive and lower productivity parts of the production 
process overseas to China.  
 We re-estimated all the technology, employment and survival equations 
including extra terms in Chinese offshoring (see Table 4.A8). As with Table 4.10, these terms 
made little difference to the main patents equation but did have some effect on the IT and TFP 
equations, suggesting more of a role for offshoring in increasing the reallocation effects of 
China, broadly in line with the compositional models of sub-section IIC. We re-calculated the 
aggregate magnitudes of the effects of China on technical change including the offshoring terms 
(see Table 4.A9, the analog of Table 4.5). Although the overall effects on patents are not much 
changed (China still accounted for just under 15% of the increase in patenting), the implied 
effects of China on aggregate IT and TFP more than doubled suggesting that offshoring 
magnifies the product market competition effects of Chinese trade we have focused on. This 
implies that if anything, we are underestimating the effect of China by focusing on the final 
goods markets effects. 
4.75  Product and industry switching 
A leading compositional theory we discussed in the theory section was that in the face 
of Chinese import competition European firms change their product mix. To investigate this we 
examine whether a plant changes its primary four-digit industrial sector in the HH data, which 
has accurate four-digit industry data going back to 1999 (the other datasets have less reliable 
information on the changes in industry affiliation). On average 11% of plants switch industries 
 210 
 
over a five-year period, a substantial number that is consistent with evidence from recent 
papers.125 
 Table 4.11 begins by regressing a dummy for switching on Chinese imports and 
the usual controls, finding plants in industries exposed to China were more likely to switch 
industries. Column (2) includes a control for lagged IT intensity that reduces the probability of 
switching, but only slightly reduces the coefficient on Chinese imports. Column (3) includes 
employment growth, which has little impact. The second half of Table 4.11 uses IT intensity 
growth as the dependent variable. Column (4) shows that switching is indeed associated with 
greater use of IT, but the magnitude of the effect is small: plants who switched industries had a 
2.5% faster growth in IT intensity than those who did not. Column (5) displays the standard 
regression for this sample, showing the positive relationship between IT intensity and Chinese 
imports for the sub-sample where we have switching data. Most importantly, column (6) 
includes the switching dummy; this reduces the coefficient on Chinese imports, but only by a 
small amount. A similar story is evident when we include employment growth in the final 
column. So industry switching is statistically significant but cannot account for much of Chinese 
import effects. 
 One limitation of this analysis is that our data does not allow us to observe 
product switching at a more disaggregate level. Bernard et al (2010, Table 4.5) show, however, 
that in US manufacturing firms three quarters of the firms who switched (five-digit) products did 
so across a four-digit industry. If we run column (5) on those plants who did not switch 
                                                          
125 For example, Bernard, Redding and Schott (2010) on the US, Goldberg et al (2010a, b). Bernard et al 
(2006) found that 8% of their sample of US manufacturing plants switched four-digit industries over a 
five-year period.  
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industries, the Chinese imports effect remains strong (0.474 with a standard error of 0.082). This 
could still conceivably be driven by the small percentage of plants who switched five-digit 
sector within a four sector, but it seems unlikely given the small effect of controlling for four-
digit switching on the Chinese imports coefficient.  
4.76 Exports to China 
We have focused on imports from China as driving changes in technology but as 
discussed in Section 6.2, exports may also have an impact through market size effects. Comtrade 
allows us to construct variable reflecting exports to China (as a proportion of total exports in the 
industry-country pair) in an analogous way to imports. Table 4.A10 presents the results, and 
shows that in every column of results exports are not significant. This is unsurprising as most of 
the theories of export-led productivity growth focus on exporting to developed countries rather 
than emerging economies, like China. It is unclear what benefit there is to learning, for example, 
from China that is usually thought of as being behind the European technology frontier. And in 
terms of market size, China’s share of the total world exports produced by European 
manufacturers is still relatively small at around 1.3%, so is not likely to drive technology change 
in the North. 
4.8 Conclusions 
In this paper we have examined the impact of trade on technical change in twelve 
European countries. Our motivation is that the rise of China which constitutes perhaps the most 
important exogenous trade shock from low wage countries to hit the “Northern” economies. 
This helps identify the trade-induced technical change hypothesis. We use novel firm and plant 
level panel data on innovation (patents and R&D), information technology, TFP and 
management practices combined with four-digit industry-level data on trade.  
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 The results are easy to summarize. Our primary result is that the absolute 
volume of innovation as measured by patenting (and R&D) rose within firms who were more 
exposed to increases in Chinese imports. A similar large within firm effect is observe for other 
indicators of technical change such as TFP, IT intensity and management quality. Second, in 
sectors more exposed to Chinese imports, jobs and survival rate fell in low-tech firms (e.g. lower 
patenting intensity), but high-tech firms were are relatively sheltered (the between firm effect). 
Both within and between firm effects generate aggregate technological upgrading.  
 These results appear to be robust to many tests, including treating imports as 
endogenous using China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001. In terms of 
magnitudes, China could account for around 15% of the overall technical change in Europe 
between 2000 and 2007. This effect appears to be increasing over time and may even be an 
underestimate as we also identify a similar sized role for offshoring to China in increasing TFP 
and IT adoption (although not for innovation). This suggests that increased import competition 
with China has caused a significant technological upgrading in European firms in the affected 
industries through both faster diffusion and innovation. In terms of policy, our results imply that 
reducing import barriers against low wage countries like China may bring important welfare 
gains through technical change, subject to the caveats over general equilibrium effects discussed 
in sub-section 6.4.  
 There are several directions this work could be taken. First, we would like to 
investigate more deeply the impact of low wage countries on the labor market, using worker 
level data on the non-employment spells and subsequent wages of individuals most affected by 
Chinese trade. Much of the distributional impact depends on the speed at which the reallocation 
process takes place. Second, we want to complement our European analysis with a similar 
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exercise in the US and other countries. Thirdly, we would like to further develop our trapped 
factor model, to see how important it is in explaining trade effects compared to the more 
conventional market size and competition effects. Finally, it would be helpful to more 
structurally extend the analysis to properly take into account general equilibrium effects. These 
areas are all being actively pursued. 
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4.9 Tables for Chapter 4. 
 
TABLE 4.1: TECHNICAL CHANGE WITHIN INCUMBENT FIRMS AND PLANTS 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: Δln(PATENTS) Δln(IT/N) Δln(R&D) ΔTFP ΔMANAGEMENT 
Estimation method 5 year diffs 5 year diffs 5 year diffs 5 year diffs 3 year diffs 
      
Change in Chinese Imports 0.321*** 0.361** 1.213**  0.257*** 0.814*** 
CH
jkIMP  (0.102) (0.076) (0.549) (0.072) (0.314) 
Sample period 2005-1996 2007-2000 2007-1996 
2005-1996 
2010-2002 
Number of Units 8,480 22,957 459 
89,369 
1,576 
Number of country by industry clusters 1,578 2,816 196 
1,210 
579 
Observations 30,277 37,500 1,626 
292,167 
3,607 
 
Notes:  *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance. Estimation is by OLS with standard errors clustered by country by four-digit industry pair in parentheses (except 
columns (3) and (5) which are three-digit industry by country). All changes are in five-year differences, e.g. CH
jkIMP represents the 5-year difference in Chinese imports as a fraction of total imports in a four-
digit industry by country pair (except column (5) which is in three-year long differences). All columns include a full set of country by year dummies. Δln(PATENTS) is the change in ln(1+PAT), PAT = count 
of patents. IT/N is the number of computers per worker. R&D is expenditure on research and development. TFP is estimated using the de Loecker (2011) version of the Olley-Pakes (1996) method separately 
for each industry based on 1.4m underlying observations (see Appendix C) and Management is the average score on the 18 Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) management questions around monitoring, targets 
and incentives. The 12 countries include Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK for all columns except (4) which only includes France, 
Italy, Spain and Sweden (the countries where we have good data on intermediate inputs) and column (5) which covers France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Sweden and the UK. Dummies for establishment type 
(Divisional HQ, Divisional Branch, Enterprise HQ or a Standalone Branch) are included in column (2).  Standard survey noise controls such as interviewer dummies and interview/interviewee controls (e.g. 
tenure in firm) are included in column (5) as in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). Units are firms in all columns except (2) where it refers to plants. 
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TABLE 4.2: CONTROLING FOR UNOBSERVED TECHNOLOGY SHOCKS  
PANEL A: USING CHANGES IN QUOTAS AS AN IV (TEXTILE AND APPAREL INDUSTRIES ONLY) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
     PATENTING ACTIVITY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY   TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY 
Dependent Variable: Δln(PATENTS) ΔIMPCH   Δln(PATENTS)   Δln(IT/N)     ΔIMPCH Δln(IT/N)    ΔTFP ΔIMPCH ΔTFP   
 Method: OLS First Stage IV OLS First Stage IV OLS First Stage IV 
Change Chinese Imports  1.160***       1.864* 1.284***  1.851***     0.620***   1.897** 
 (0.377)  (1.001) (0.172)  (0.400) (0.100)  (0.806) 
Quotas removal  0.108***   0.088***       0.068***  
  (0.022)   (0.019)   (0.026)  
Sample period 2005-1999 2005-1999 2005-1999 2005-2000 2005-2000 2005-2000 2005-1999 2005-1999 2005-1999 
Number of units 1,866 1,866 1,866 2,891 2,891 2,891 55,791 55,791 55,791 
Number industry clusters 149 149 149 83 83 83 187 187 187 
Observations 3,443 3,443 3,443 2,891 2,891 2,891 55,791 55,791 55,791 
PANEL B: USING “INITIAL CONDITIONS” AS AN INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE (ALL INDUSTRIES) 
 
(CONTINUED OVER) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable Δln(PATENTS) ΔIMPCH Δln(PATENTS) Δln(IT/N)   ΔIMPCH Δln(IT/N)   ΔTFP ΔIMPCH ΔTFP 
  Method: OLS First Stage IV OLS First Stage IV OLS First Stage IV 
Change in Chinese Imports 0.321***  0.495** 0.361***  0.593*** 0.257***  0.507* 
 (0.117)  (0.224) (0.106)  (0.252) (0.087)  (0.283) 
Chinese imports in SIC4*US  0.167***   0.124***       0.078***  
&EU Chinese import growth  (0.017)     (0.002)   (0.021)  
Sample period 2005-1996 2005-1996 2005-1996 2007-2000 2007-2000 2007-2000 2005-1996 2005-1996 2005-1996 
Number of Units 8,480 8,480 8,480 22,957 22,957 22,957 89,369 89,369 89,369 
Number of industry clusters 304 304 304 371 371 371 354 354 354 
Observations  30,277  30,277  30,277 37,500 37,500 37,500 292,167 292,167 292,167 
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(TABLE 4.2, CONTINUED) 
PANEL C: INCLUDE INDUSTRY TRENDS (OLS, ALL INDUSTRIES) 
Notes:  *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance. In all panels we use the same specifications as Table 1 columns (1), (2) and (4) but estimate 
by instrumental variables (IV). In Panel A the IV is “Quota removal” is based on EU SIGL data and defined as the (value weighted) proportion of HS6 products in the four-digit industry 
that were covered by a quota restriction on China in 2000 (prior to China’s WTO accession) that were planned to be removed by 2005 (see the Appendix D for details). Sample only 
includes textiles and apparel industries. In Panel B the IV is the share of Chinese imports in all imports in an industry across the whole of the Europe and the US (6 years earlier) 
interacted with the aggregate growth in Chinese imports in Europe. The base year is (t-6). Panel C reproduces the baseline OLS regressions in columns (1), (3) and (5) and then includes a 
full set of three-digit dummies in columns (2), (4) and (6). Since these specifications are in long differences this is equivalent to including three digit trends in the levels specification. The 
number of units is the number of firms in all columns except the IT specification where it is the number of plants. All columns include country by year effects. Standard errors for all 
regressions are clustered by four-digit industry in parentheses in panels A and B and by four-digit industry by country pairs in Panel C. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable Δln(PATENTS) Δln(PATENTS) Δln(IT/N)   Δln(IT/N)   ΔTFP ΔTFP 
Change in Chinese Imports 
0.321*** 0.191* 0.361*** 0.170** 0.257*** 0.128** 
 
(0.102) (0.102) (0.076) (0.082) (0.072) (0.053) 
Three Digit Industry trends? No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Sample period 2005-1996 2005-1996 2007-2000 2007-2000 2005-1996 2005-1996 
Number of Units 8,480 8,480 22,957 22,957 89,369 89,369 
Number of clusters 1,578 1,578 2,816 2,816 1,210 1,210 
Observations 30,277 30,277 37,500 37,500 292,167 292,167 
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TABLE 4.3: EMPLOYMENT AND EXIT 
PANEL A: EMPLOYMENT 
Dependent Variable: Employment Growth, Nln  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Technology variable (TECH)  Patent stock Patent stock Patent stock IT TFP 
Sample  All Firms All Firms Patenting firms Patenting firms IT sample TFP sample 
Change in Chinese Imports -0.349*** -0.352*** -0.361*** -0.434*** -0.379*** -0.382*** 
CH
jkIMP  (0.067) (0.067) (0.134) (0.136) (0.105) (0.093) 
Change in Chinese imports*technology at t-5  1.546**  1.434** 0.385** 0.956** 
CH
jkIMP  *TECHt-5  (0.757)  (0.649) (0.157) (0.424) 
Technology at t-5 0.513*** 0.469*** 0.389*** 0.348*** 0.230*** 0.256*** 
TECHt-5 (0.050) (0.058) (0.043) (0.049) (0.010) (0.016) 
Number of Units 189,563 189,563 6,335 6,335 22,957 89,369 
Number of country by industry clusters 3,123 3,123 1,375 1,375 2,816 1,210 
Observations 581,474 581,474 19,844 19,844 37,500 292,167 
 
PANEL B: EXIT 
Dependent Variable: SURVIVAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Technology variable  Patent stock Patent stock Patent stock IT TFP 
Sample  All Firms All Firms Patenting firms Patenting firms IT sample TFP sample 
Change in Chinese Imports -0.122***  -0.122*** -0.065 -0.089 -0.182** -0.189*** 
CH
jkIMP  (0.036) (0.036)       (0.047) (0.050) (0.072) (0.056) 
Change in Chinese imports*technology at t-5  0.391**  0.261** 0.137 0.097 
CH
jkIMP  *TECHt-5  (0.018)  (0.114) (0.112) (0.076) 
Technology at t-5 0.052*** 0.040*** -0.006 -0.014 -0.002 -0.003 
TECHt-5 (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) 
Survival Rate for Sample (mean) 0.929 0.929  0.977 0.977 0.886 0.931 
Number of country by industry clusters 3,369 3,369 1,647 1,647 2,863 1,294 
Observations (and number of units) 490,095 490,095 7,985 7,985 28,624 268,335 
 
Notes: *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance. Estimation by OLS with standard errors (clustered by country by four-digit industry pair) in 
parentheses.  CHIMP   represents the 5-year difference in Chinese imports as a fraction of total imports in a four-digit industry by country pair. In columns (1) to (4) TECH is ln[(1+ the 
firm’s patent stock)/employment]. In column (5) TECH is computers per employee (IT/N) and in column (6) TECH is TFP. 12 Countries in all columns except column (6) which is for four 
countries. In columns (3) and (4) only “patenting firms” (defined as a firm that had at least one European patent between 1978 and 2007) included. Sample period is 2005-1996 for all except 
column (5) which is 2007-2000. Number of units is the number of firms in all columns except (5) where it is the number of plants. All columns include country by year effects. In Panel A the 
dependent variable is the five year difference of ln(employment). In Panel B the dependent variable (SURVIVAL) refers to whether an establishment that was alive in 2000 was still alive in 
2005 for the HH sample in column (5).  In the other columns it is based on Amadeus company status (Appendix B) and is defined on the basis of whether a firm alive in 2000 was dead by 
2005.  
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TABLE 4.4: APPROXIMATE MAGNITUDES  
PANEL A: Increase in Patents per employee attributable to Chinese imports (as 
a % of the total increase over the period) 
 
Period Within Between Exit Total 
2000-07 5.8 6.3 2.5 14.7 
     
PANEL B: Increase in IT per employee attributable to Chinese imports 
(as a % of the total increase over the period) 
 
Period Within Between Exit Total 
2000-07 9.8 3.1 1.2 14.1 
     
PANEL C: Increase in Total Factor Productivity attributable to Chinese 
imports (as a % of the total increase over the period) 
 
Period Within Between Exit Total 
2000-07 8.1 3.4 0.3 11.8 
     
 
Notes:  Panel A reports the share of aggregate IT intensity accounted for by China, Panel B the increase in 
patents; and the Panel C the increase in total factor productivity. This is calculated by multiplying the 
regression coefficients and the observed Chinese import share growth to generate a predicted change in 
IT/Employee, Patents/Employee and TFP 2000 to 2007 inclusive. This aggregate predicted growth in 
IT/Employee is then divided by the average annual change in IT/employee between 1999 to 2007 (2.5%). 
The aggregate predicted change in Patents/Employee is then divided by 3.5% (the aggregate annual growth 
rate of patents from 1986 to 2006 in the USPTO) and the aggregate predicted growth in TFP is divided by 2% 
(the average TFP growth in manufacturing).      
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TABLE 4.5: COMPARING INDUSTRY LEVEL REGRESSIONS TO FIRM LEVEL REGRESSIONS 
PANEL A. INDUSTRY-COUNTRY LEVEL 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Variable: Δln(Prices) Δln(Employment) 
Δln(Profits 
/Sales) 
Δln(PATENTS) Δln(PATENTS) Δln(IT/N) Δln(IT/N) Δln(R&D) Δln(R&D) Δln(TFP) 
Change in Chinese Imports -0.447** -0.422*** -0.112**    0.368 * 0.368* 0.399*** 0.354*** 2.145* 1.791** 0.326*** 
CH
jkIMP  (0.216) (0.148) (0.052) (0.200) (0.200) (0.120) (0.120) (1.186) (0.829) (0.072) 
Change in employment     0.005  -0.088***    
     (0.012)  (0.013)    
Change in ln(Production)         -0.297  
         (0.403)  
Sample period 2006-2000 2005-1996 2007-2000 2005-1996 2005-1996 2007-2000 2007-2000 2007-2000 2007-2000 2005-1996 
Country by industry clusters 131 2,990 2,295 1,646 1,646 2,902 2,902 151 151 1,140 
Observations 262 11,800 5,372 6,888 6,888 7,409 7,409 322 322 5,660 
PANEL B. FIRM LEVEL EQUIVALENT (ALLOCATING FIRM TO A SINGLE FOUR-DIGIT INDUSTRY) 
Dependent Variable: Δln(Prices) Δln(Employment) 
Δln(Profits 
/Sales) 
Δln(PATENTS) Δln(PATENTS) Δln(IT/N) Δln(IT/N) Δln(R&D) Δln(R&D) Δln(TFP) 
Change in Chinese Imports No firm-
level price 
data 
available 
 -0.280**** -0.043***    0.171** 0.215** 0.361** 0.195*** 1.213** 1.545*** 0.164*** 
CH
jkIMP  (0.066) (0.008) (0.082) (0.098) (0.076) (0.067) (0.549) (0.330) (0.051) 
Change in employment    0.015*  -0.617***    
    (0.009)  (0.010)    
Change in ln(Production)        0.558***  
         (0.043)  
Years  2005-1996 2007-2000 2005-1996 2005-1996 2007-2000 
2007-
2000 
2007-2000 2007-2000 2005-1996 
Country by industry clusters   2,814 2,259 1,578 1,464 2,816 2,816 196 196 1,018 
Observations  556,448 214,342  30,277 22,938 37,500 37,500 1,626 1,626 241,810 
 
Notes: *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance. Panel A uses data aggregated to the industry by country level and panel B is the firm level equivalent specification 
with firms allocated to a single industry (except columns (6) and (7) which are plant level). Coefficients estimated by OLS in five-year differences with standard errors (clustered by industry-country pair) in 
parentheses below coefficients. Chinese imports are measured by the value share of Chinese imports in total imports. There are 12 countries in all columns except (10) which only includes France, Italy, Spain 
and Sweden (where we have good data on intermediate inputs) and (3) which is based on Germany, France, Finland, France, Spain and Sweden (where gross profit information is available). All columns include 
country-year effects. The dependent variable in column (1) is producer prices and is measured at the two-digit level. In column (3) the dependent variable is (pre-tax and interest) profits rates. Columns (8) and 
(9) in Panel A use industry R&D data from the OECD STAN database and includes Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, the UK, Italy, Norway and Sweden, and is run at the two-digit level. In column 
(10) productivity is estimated using the de Loecker (2011) version of the Olley-Pakes method separately for each two-digit industry (see text). All firms are allocated to a single four-digit industry unless 
otherwise stated (i.e. we do not use the multiple-industry information exploited in the other tables) in order to make the two Panels comparable. 
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TABLE 4.6: ASSESSING DYNAMIC SELECTION BIAS IN THE PATENTS EQUATION 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  
Estimator 
5 year 
 long differences 
5 year 
 long differences 
Fixed effects 
Negative Binomial 
Fixed effects 
Negative Binomial 
 
Method 
 
Baseline 
 
Worst case Lower Bound 
 
Baseline 
 
Worst case Lower Bound 
 
 
 Change in Chinese Imports 0.321*** 0.271*** 
  
 
( )/China Worldjk jkM M  (0.102) (0.098)    
 Level of Chinese Imports 
  
0.397*** 0.389***  
( )/China Worldjk jkM M  (0.168) (0.165)  
     
 
Number of Clusters 1,578 1,662 1,578 1,662  
Number of Firms 8,480 8,732 8,480 8,732  
Number of Observations 30,277 31,272 74,038 75,463  
 
Notes: *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance. Sample period is 1996-2005 for all columns. Estimation in columns (1) and (2) by OLS in 
long-differences and by Negative Binomial count data model with fixed effects using the Blundell et al (1999) technique in columns (3) and (4). Standard errors (clustered by country by 
four-digit industry pair) in parentheses. “Worst case lower bounds” impute a value of zero to all observations through 2005 where a firm dies (death is defined as in Table 3B). There are 
more observations for the Negative Binomial than five year long differences as we are using observations with less than five continuous years. All columns include a full set of country by 
year dummies. 12 countries included in all samples. 
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TABLE 4.7: LOW WAGE COUNTRY AND HIGH WAGE COUNTRY IMPORTS 
PANEL A: DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS CHANGE IN LN(PATENTS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Change in Chinese Imports   0.182** 0.063   0.182**  0.178** 
( )jkChinajk DM /  (0.074) (0.125)   (0.073)  (0.077) 
Change in Non-China Low Wage Imports  0.152      
( )jkLowjk DM /   (0.128)      
Change in All Low Wage Imports    0.106***     
( )jkLowjk DM /    (0.040)     
Change in High Wage Imports    0.004 0.003   
( )
jk
High
jk
DM /     (0.019) (0.019)   
Change in World Imports      0.017 0.004 
( )
jkjk
DM /       (0.018) (0.018) 
Number of Firms 8,364 8,364 8,364 8,364 8,364 8,364 8,364 
Number of industry-country clusters 1,527 1,527 1,527 1,527 1,527 1,527 1,527 
Number of Observations 29,062 29,062 29,062 29,062 29,062 29,062 29,062 
PANEL B: DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS CHANGE IN IT INTENSITY 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Change in Chinese Imports     0.129*** 0.126***   0.128***  0.120*** 
( )jkChinajk DM /  (0.028) (0.029)   (0.028)  (0.029) 
Change in Non-China Low Wage Imports  0.018      
( )jkLowjk DM /   (0.051)      
Change in All Low Wage Imports    0.127***     
( )jkLowjk DM /    (0.025)     
Change in High Wage Imports    0.014 0.002   
( )jkHighjk DM /      (0.009) (0.009)   
Change in World Imports      0.024*** 0.007 
( )
jkjk
DM /       (0.009) (0.009) 
Number of  Units 20,106 20,106 20,106 20,106 20,106 20,106 20,106 
Number of industry-country clusters 2,480 2,480 2,480 2,480 2,480 2,480 2,480 
Number of Observations 31,820 31,820 31,820 31,820 31,820 31,820 31,820 
PANEL C: DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS CHANGE IN TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Change in Chinese Imports  0.065*** 0.092**   0.071***  0.062** 
( )jkChinajk DM /  (0.020) (0.048)   (0.021)  (0.022) 
Change in Non-China Low Wage Imports  -0.026      
( )jkLowjk DM /   (0.041)      
Change in All Low Wage Imports    0.050***     
( )jkLowjk DM /    (0.014)     
Change in High Wage Imports    0.007 -0.006   
( )jkHighjk DM /     (0.006) (0.007)   
Change in World Imports      0.014** 0.002 
( )
jkjk
DM /       (0.006) (0.007) 
Number of Firms 89,369 89,369 89,369 89,369 89,369 89,369 89,369 
Number of industry-country clusters 1,210 1,210 1,210 1,210 1,210 1,210 1,210 
Number of Observations 293,167 293,167 293,167 293,167 293,167 293,167 293,167 
Notes: *** denotes 1% significance, ** denotes 5% significance, * denotes 10% significance. Estimation is by OLS with standard 
errors clustered by four-digit industry pair. ( )jkChinajk DM /  represents the 5-year difference in Chinese imports normalized by domestic 
production (D). is the 5-year difference in All Low Wage Country imports normalized by domestic production (D) ( )jkHighjk DM /  is the 
5-year difference in total World Imports normalized by domestic production (D). Production data is from Eurostat’s Prodcom database 
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(no Swiss data). All specifications include country-year dummies. In Panel B we include site-type dummies and employment growth as 
additional controls. Sample period is 2000-2007 for Panel B and 1996-2005 for Panels A and C. 12 countries. 
 
 
TABLE 4.8: HETEROGENEITY - THE CHINA EFFECT ON INNOVATION IS GREATER FOR 
FIRMS WITH MORE “TRAPPED FACTORS”  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable: Δln(PATENTS) 
 
Change Chinese Imports  0.321***  0.192*** 0.202*** 0.284* 0.343** -2.466*** 
CH
jkIMP  (0.102) (0.090) (0.092) (0.157) (0.153) (0.848) 
Industry wage premia     -0.343***    -0.411***    
  (0.065) (0.069)    
Change Chinese Imports      2.467***    
* Industry Wage premia   (1.171)    
Total Factor Productivity     -0.232*** -0.287*** 
TFPt-5     (0.046) (0.050) 
Change Chinese Imports       1.464*** 
*TFPt-5      (0.462) 
CH
jkIMP *TFPt-5       
Number of units 8,480 8,480 8,480 5,014 5,014 5,014 
Number of  clusters 1,578 1,578 1,578 1,148 1,148 1,148 
Number of Observations 30,277 30,277 30,277 14,500 14,500 14,500 
 
Notes:  *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance. Estimation is by OLS with standard errors clustered by 
country and four-digit industry cell in parentheses. 12 countries.  Industry wage premia defined as coefficients on three digit industry dummies in a 
wage regression implemented using the UK LFS pooled cross-sections from 1996-2008 (see Appendix A). The ln(hourly wage) regression includes 
controls for a quadratic in experience, schooling, region and gender. TFP is calculated in the same way as rest of paper using the de Loecker (201) 
method (see Appendix C) 
 
 
 
TABLE 4.9: RELATIVE DEMAND FOR COLLEGE EDUCATED WORKERS INCREASES WITH 
CHINESE IMPORTS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: 
Δ(Wage bill 
Share of college 
educated) 
Δ(Wage bill 
Share of college 
educated) 
Δ(Wage bill 
Share of college 
educated) 
Δ(Wage bill 
Share of college 
educated) 
Δ(Wage bill Share 
of college educated) 
 
Sample All All All 
Textiles & 
Clothing 
Textile & 
Clothing 
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS IV 
Change in Chinese  0.144***  0.099** 0.166*** 0.227*** 
Imports, CH
jkIMP  (0.035)  (0.043) (0.030) (0.053) 
Change in IT intensity  0.081** 0.050*   
)/ln( NIT   (0.024) (0.026)   
F-test of excluded IV      9.21 
Industry Clusters  72 72 74 17 17 
Observations 204 204 204 48 48 
 
Notes: *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance. The sample period is 1999-2006. The dependent variable is 
the five-year difference in the wage bill share of college-educated workers. Estimation is by OLS with standard errors clustered by three-digit industry pair 
in parentheses. This data is a three-digit industry panel for the UK between 2000 and 2007 (based on aggregating up different years of the UK Labor Force 
Survey). All manufacturing industries in columns (1) - (3) and textiles and clothing industries sub-sample in columns (4)-(5). IV regressions use Quota 
removal (the height of the quota in the three-digit industry in 2000 prior to China joining the WTO). All regressions weighted by number of observations in 
the Labor Force Survey in the industry cell. All regressions control for year dummies. 
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TABLE 4.10: OFFSHORING 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable: Δln(PATENTS) Δln(IT/N) Δln(TFP) 
Change in Chinese Imports  0.313*** 0.279*** 0.189*** 
CH
jkIMP  (0.100) (0.080) (0.082) 
Change in Chinese Imports  in source industries 0.173   1.685*** 1.396*** 
OFFSHORE   (0.822) (0.517) (0.504) 
Number of units 8,480 22,957 89,369 
Number of industry-country clusters 1,578 2,816 1,210 
Observations 30,277 37,500 292,167 
 
Notes:  *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance. Estimation is by OLS with standard errors clustered by 
country and four-digit industry cell in parentheses. 12 countries except column (3) where there are four countries. “Number of units” represents the 
number of firms in all columns except (2) where it is plants. Offshoring is defined as in Feenstra and Hansen (1999) except it is for Chinese imports 
only, not all low wage country imports (see Appendix B). 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4.11:  INDUSTRY/PRODUCT SWITCHING AND TECHNICAL CHANGE 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
Variable: 
SWITCHED 
INDUSTRY 
SWITCHED 
INDUSTRY 
SWITCHED 
INDUSTRY 
Δln(IT/N) Δln(IT/N) Δln(IT/N) 
        
Change in Chinese 
imports 0.138*** 0.132*** 0.131***  0.469*** 0.466*** 
CH
jkIMP  
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050)  (0.083) (0.083) 
IT intensity (t-5)  -0.018** -0.018**  
  
(IT/ N) t-5  (0.007) (0.008)    
Industry Switching    0.025***  0.023* 
    (0.012)  (0.012) 
Employment growth   -0.002    
Δ ln(Employment)   (0.006)    
     
  
Observations 32,917 32,917 32,917 32,917 32,917 32,917 
 
Notes:  *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance. The plant-level Harte-Hanks data is used for all 
regressions reported in the table.“Switched Industry” is a dummy variable equal to unity if a plant switched four-digit industry classification over the 
5-year period. Estimation is by OLS standard errors clustered by four-digit industry and country. 12 Countries. All regressions include country-year 
effects and site-type controls. Sample period is 2000 to 2007.  
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4.10 Figures for Chapter 4 
 
FIGURE 4.1:  Share of all imports in the EU and US from China and all low wage countries 
 
Notes:  Calculated using UN Comtrade data. Low wage countries list taken from Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) and are defined 
as countries with less than 5% GDP/capita relative to the US 1972-2001.  
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4.11 Appendix for Chapter 4 
APPENDIX 4.A: TRAPPED FACTOR MODELS: THEORY AND MEASUREMENT 
A Theory of Trapped Factors and Innovation 
We formulate a simple model to examine the impact in the North of a removal of trade barriers against the South (see 
Bloom, Terry, Romer and Van Reenen, 2012 for details). We assume that factors of production can be used to produce 
current goods or be used to innovate (losing a period of production). The basic idea is that there are some factors of 
production that are partially “trapped” due to sunk costs. With a low wage country trade shock, the opportunity cost of 
using these factors in innovating new goods falls as demand for the old product has been reduced, so the factors may be 
redeployed in innovating rather than continuing to produce the old good. As a simple example, if skilled workers are no 
longer used to make a low-tech product but are partly trapped within firms (for example due to firm specific human capital) 
they will be cheaper to deploy in designing and building a new high-tech product. 
To fix ideas, consider a high wage home economy endowed with unskilled workers (U) who can only produce old goods 
and earn wage w, and skilled workers (S, who have a productivity level   higher than unskilled workers, U) who can spend 
their time either producing or innovating. In period 0 all workers produce a competitive generic good. In period 1, skilled 
workers can form partnerships of size   if they choose to innovate. When innovating skilled workers lose a period of 
production but (i) they earn some  profits while the product is on patent and (ii) after a period their firm-specific 
productivity increases through learning by doing to 
 
  > .  If the present discounted value of innovating is П, skilled 
workers will innovate in period 1 if w  < П before they have acquired their specific skills. After innovating and learning 
by doing, the opportunity cost of innovating rises to w  , so they will cease to innovate if П< w  . This is because the 
profits from innovating are less than the opportunity cost of ceasing to produce the old good. It follows that the condition to 
be in a stationary equilibrium is: 
w  < П< w                   
We consider an economy in a stationary equilibrium that has a “China shock”: a trade liberalization with a low wage 
country on a measure of old goods that makes them unprofitable to produce but does not change the value of innovating (as 
by assumption China is not able to innovate in the new goods). The “China shock” thus lowers the opportunity cost (from   
w  to w  ) of the workers with firm-specific skills engaging in innovation. Thus, so long as the equilibrium condition 
holds, the China shock will induce more innovation. 
  
The model has two further predictions we can take to the data. First, integration with another high wage country will not 
have the same innovation effect, as workers in these countries are paid a similar wage and old products can still be 
profitably produced. This is consistent with our results as we do not find any effect of imports from high wage countries on 
innovation. In terms of welfare, this model suggests a new benefit in addition to the usual consumer benefits of lower prices 
when integrating with China if there is underinvestment in R&D. 126 A second prediction is that the magnitude of the 
impact of innovation is increasing in the size of the trapped factor (indexed by 
 
  > ). If we allow this to be heterogeneous 
across industries or products, then it follows that there will be a larger impact of the trade liberalization for those 
                                                          
126 In the model, underinvestment occurs even in the absence of knowledge externalities because the differentiated good sector is 
produced under monopolistic competition. The monopoly distortion implies that rents from innovation are lower than the total surplus as 
consumer surplus is ignored in the private innovation decision. An R&D subsidy would be the first-best policy, but in the absence of 
sufficiently high subsidies trade is a second best policy that could help close the gap between private and social rates of return to 
innovation.  
  234 
sectors/firms with a higher level of trapped factors. We test this by interacting the Chinese import effect with proxies for the 
trapped factor. We turn next to how do we may measure these. 
Measured inter-industry wage premia as an indicator of Trapped Factors 
The model directly implies that a measure of trapped factors is the degree of product-specific skills which should be 
reflected in higher wages. So in principle this could be measured by the firm-specific component of a wage equation after 
all other general human capital and labour market shocks are controlled for. Unfortunately, such matched worker-firm data 
with human capital characteristics is available for only a tiny sub-sample of our firms. Consequently we turn to the more 
standard route of estimating a Mincerian wage equation with a full set of three digit industry dummy variables (e.g. Krueger 
and Summers, 1988, who use more aggregated industry dummies). The coefficients on the industry dummies are the inter-
industry wage premia which, in our context will be a measure of the product-specific human capital. To do this we use 
pooled cross sections from the UK Labor Force Survey (LFS), the European equivalent of the US CPS (although unlike the 
CPS there is luckily no top-coding of the wage data). We chose the UK because it is the least regulated labor market in 
Europe – we did not want the results to be strongly affected by unions, minimum wages and other country-specific labor 
market institutions. The UK also has good publicly available quality hourly wage data on representative cross sections 
1996-2008 covering our sample period. 
To be precise we estimate OLS ln(hourly wage) equations of the form: 
 
ln 'lt lt j j ltjw x IND  = + +  
 
Where ltw is the hourly wage of worker l in year t (1996,….,2007), IND is a dummy for each of the j = 1,…,J  three digit 
industries, and ltx  is a vector of wage equation controls that includes education level (dummies for four levels), a quadratic 
in age (for labour market experience), gender, year effects and regional dummies. We also checked the results were robust 
to conditioning on a sample of male workers only and to dropping all years prior to 2001 (when China joined the WTO). 
For example, when using the pre-2001 LFS sample, the results for Table 8, column(3) were 2.807(0.960) for the interaction 
term and 0.394 (0.068) for the linear industry wage premia term.     
 
In the LFS the wage information is asked in the first (of five) quarters a respondent is interviewed and in the last quarter. 
We use both quarters and all years between 1996 and 2007 giving us a total of 107,622 observations for manufacturing 
industries (which is the sample we use). 
 
Measured TFP as an indicator of Trapped Factors 
In the trapped factor model, some firms have firm-specific inputs that generate higher productivity (e.g. workers with firm 
specific skills). Normalize  =1 so that the labor services, L, are ii iU S+ . Assume that we can write the production 
function as Cobb-Douglas so  
 
i l i k i m iy a l k m  = + + +  
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Where Y=value added, L = labor services, K = capital services and lower case letters denote logarithms so y = lnY, etc. 
“True” TFP is therefore: 
ln ln( ) ln lnii i l i k i m i i l i i k i m iTFP y l k m Y U S K M      = − − − = − + − −  
Denote measured TFP as MFP where  
ln ln ln ln ln ln( ) ln lni i l i k i m i i l i i k i m iMFP Y L K M Y U S K M     = − − − = − + − −  
Consequently measured TFP will be equal to true TFP plus a term that depends on the importance of the trapped factors: 
ln
ii i
i i l
i i
U S
MFP TFP
U S


 +
= +  
+   
If there are no trapped factors then 1i = and measured and true TFP are the same. Firms which have more trapped factors, 
1i  , however, will have a higher level of MFP. Thus the level of MFP for a firm is correlated with the magnitude of the 
trapped factors. This can be generalised to any factor which is trapped. If TFP is calculated based on the shares of the 
untrapped factor, then MFP will be correlated with the size of the trapped factor.  
 
The advantage of using MFP instead of industry wage premia as a measure of trapped factors is that (i) this is firm specific 
time varying measure rather than an industry specific non-time varying measure and (ii) it is more general than simply 
being related to trapped factors in labor. The disadvantage of this measure is that it is more indirect. For example, if there is 
heterogeneity in the effect of trade by true TFP, then the coefficient on the interaction effect of trade and MFP in the patent 
equation reflects this effect as well.  
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APPENDIX B: DATA 
Datasources 
The basic data sources are described in the text, but we give some more details here.  
Amadeus Accounting Data - The Amadeus data is provided by the private sector company Bureau Van Dijk, BVD. It has 
panel data on all European countries' company accounts. It includes private and publicly listed incorporated firms (i.e. not 
sole proprietors or partnerships). The accounting data includes variables such as employment, sales, capital, profits, 
materials and wage bills. The data goes back to the late 1970s for some countries, but is only comprehensive across a range 
of countries since the mid-1990s. We use successive cohorts of the Amadeus DVDs because although all firms are meant to 
be kept for at least 10 years after exiting, this rule is sometimes violated. Although Amadeus is a reasonably comprehensive 
list of names (and locations, industries and owners) for the 12 countries we study, the accounting items listed are limited by 
national regulations. For example, profits are generally required to be disclosed by all firms, but employment is sometimes 
a voluntary item for smaller firms; some countries (e.g. France) insist on wider disclosure of data than others (e.g. Germany) 
and disclosure is greater for public firms than private firms. In the regressions (such as the patents regressions), we consider 
results without and with these accounting items to check against selection bias. In terms of cleaning the accounts variables 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The profit/sales variable winsorized between -1 and +1. Amadeus tracks the 
number of four digit “primary” and “secondary” four digit sectors that a firm operates in. We give primary sectors a two-
third weight and secondary sectors a one third weight (results are robust to alternative weighting schemes) and weight 
equally within these groups (Amadeus does not report the split of sales across the four digit sectors). Using these firm-
specific imports measures gives similar results to allocating all firms to their primary four-digit sector (compare Tables 1 
and 5B). 
EPO Patents Counts - Patents data is obtained from the electronic files of the European Patent Office (EPO) that began in 
1978. We take all the patents that were granted to firms and examine the assignee names (see Belenzon and Berkovitz, 
2010). We match these to the population of European firms using Amadeus (i.e. we do not insist that we have any 
accounting data in Amadeus when doing the matching to obtain the maximum match). The matching procedure was based 
on names and location. Patents are dated by application year.   
In principle, a firm in Amadeus that was not matched to the EPO has taken out no patents. Nevertheless, there is a concern 
that we may have missed out some of the patenting activity by some firms due to the matching procedure as we were quite 
conservative (we only made a match if we were quite sure that the patent did belong to the Amadeus firm). We consider a 
narrow sample where we only keep firms if they have made at least one patent since 1978 (“patenters sample”) and a wider 
sample where we assume that firms who we could not match really did zero patents. The analysis of patenting equations 
(e.g. Table 1) just uses the patenters' sample (there is no variation in the non-patenters sample) whereas the employment 
and survival equations (Table 3) consider both samples (see Table A2 for descriptive statistics across different samples). 
When constructing PATSTOCK, the patent stock, (e.g. Table 3) we follow Blundell et al (1999) and estimate these by 
perpetual inventory methods using a depreciation ( P ) rate of 15%. 1(1 )
P
it it itPATSTOCK PAT PATSTOCK −= + −  
where itPAT  is the count of patents of firm i in period t and 
P =0.15. 
 
EPO Patent Citations- The EPO also provides all the citations to these patents from later EPO patents, so we use this to 
gauge how important a patent was (all else equal, a more highly cited patent is deemed to be more important). This is used 
in Table A3. 
R&D - Research and Development expenditure are taken from BVD’s Osiris database. These are publicly listed firms (so a 
sub-set of Amadeus) but Osiris contains a wider range of accounting items that Amadeus does not include, such as R&D. 
R&D is not a mandatory item to disclose for all publicly listed firms in Europe. Typically only the larger firms are required 
to disclose this item, although rules are stricter in some countries than others (e.g. in the UK under the SSAP(13) Revised 
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accounting standard disclosure of R&D is mandatory for medium sized and larger firms). For the industry level values used 
in Table 5B we use the OECD’s ANBERD database which is more comprehensive than Osiris as it covers all firms in a 
country-industry pair. We use BERD, the research and development expenditure conducted by all businesses within an 
industry. The ANBER data is available on a consistent basis since 1987 at a broadly two-digit industry level. 
Information Technology (IT) - The IT data is drawn from an entirely different database as companies do not report IT 
spending except rarely as a voluntary item. Harte Hanks (HH) is a private sector company that surveys establishments in 
order to obtain indicators of their use of hardware, software and IT personnel. The unit of observation is a "site" which in 
manufacturing is a plant, so it is more disaggregated than the Amadeus data that is firm level. HH surveys plants in firms 
with 100 employees or more. This covers about 80% of European manufacturing employees, but obviously misses 
employees in smaller firms (unlike Amadeus). Each plant has an in-depth report including numbers of PCs and laptops, 
which we use to construct our basic computers measure. There is also information on a number of items of software such as 
ERP, Databases and Groupware that we use in Table A4. We have data from Harte Hanks between 2000 and 2007. 
Survival - For the HH data we have a plant level measure of survival which is based on exit from the economy (i.e. 
SURVIVAL = 0 only if the plant shuts down). For the Amadeus firm-based measure we have a firm-based measure that 
includes both exit to bankruptcy and exit to takeover and merger (the data cannot distinguish between these types of exit). 
Management data - Our management data was collected in 5 waves between 2002 and 2010. We interviewed plant 
managers in medium sized manufacturing firms across twenty countries (see Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007, 2010). We 
used a “double blind” survey tool to assess management quality across 18 questions in the areas of shopfloor operations, 
monitoring, targets and incentives. Each individual question is scored on a scale of 1 (worst score) to 5 (best practice) and 
we average across all 18 questions by firm-year observation for an overall management quality score. Each wave has a 
cross sectional and a panel element, with the panel element growing larger over time. There were 778 interviews in the first 
major cross-sectional wave in 2004 and  2,311 interviews in the last wave in 2010. Hence, we have a larger sample of data 
towards the end of the period with a relatively short time-span per firm. To merge the management data into the yearly 
trade data we linearly interpolated scores between survey waves for the same firm. So, for example, a firm which received a 
management score of 3.0 in 2008 and 3.2 in 2010 would have an interpolated score of 3.1 in 2009. Since we cluster by 
industry-country in all regressions, the t-statistics are not inflated through this interpolation procedure. The reason for this 
interpolation is that it increases the size of the data sample we can use in long differences – for example a firm surveyed in 
2006, 2008 and 2010 could not be used in a three-year long-difference estimation without interpolating. Because the 
industry definitions in the management panel are not available at the four-digit level for all countries, we match industry 
trade data in at the three digit by country level. 
UN Comtrade - Our study uses data at the HS6 product level taken from the UN Comtrade online database. We use 
standard concordances of HS6-SIC4 (e.g. Pierce and Schott (2010)) to aggregate to the four-digit industry level. We 
calculate a “value share” measure of import penetration as per Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) where the value of 
Chinese imports for a given country-SIC4 cell is normalized by the value of total world imports flowing into the same cell.   
 
Eurostat Prodcom Production database - In Table A7 we use measures of four-digit industry-level production to normalize 
our imports variable. This measure of domestic production is constructed from the Eurostat Prodcom dataset. Prodcom is an 
eight-digit product level database of production across EU members. The first four digits of the Prodcom product code 
correspond to the four-digit NACE classification system. We construct a concordance between the NACE codes and US 
SIC, after which we aggregate the production figures to the SIC4 level. In the final step of constructing the data we 
compare the estimated value of production by industry-country cell to the value of exports reported in Comtrade for the 
same industry-country cell. In cases where the value of exports exceeds the estimated value of production from Prodcom 
we use the exports number as our lower bound estimate of production. This problem occurs in a limited number of cases 
and is due to confidentiality restrictions on the reporting of data for small industry-country cells in Prodcom.    
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Eurostat Producer Prices - We take two-digit industry producer prices from the online Eurostat Structural Business 
Statistics (SBS) database. The year 2005 is set as the base year for the price index. In some cases the data extends back to 
1990 with good coverage after 1996.  The SBS database reports prices in NACE codes and we concord these to the US 
SIC2 level to facilitate the merging in of other variables. We assemble this information for the 12 countries we focus on 
across our study.  
Offshoring measure - This is calculated by using the US BEA input-output matrix, matched up to the Comtrade at the four-
digit industry level. The offshoring variable for each industry-year is the estimated share of Chinese imported inputs in total 
imported inputs estimated on a similar basis to Feenstra and Hanson (1999). For each industry j we consider the input-
output weights, 'jjw , between j and every other j’ industry (note 'jjw  is from the US so the weights do not vary by 
country and time period). We define offshoring to China as 
' '
'
CH CH
jkt jj j kt
j
OFFSHORE w IMP=  . We also considered the 
share of total imported inputs (from China and all other countries) in all inputs (or all costs) like the original Feenstra and 
Hansen paper (this replaces 
'
CH
j ktIMP  with 'j ktIMP  in the offshoring definition). However, as with our analysis of total 
imports in the final goods market in Table 6, it is the Chinese share (reflecting low wage country imported inputs) that is 
the dominant explanatory factor. 
Trade weighted exchange rate IV - Following Bertrand (2004) we define each four-digit industries’ exchange rate as the 
country-weighted exchange rate based on the source of imports in the industry. For example, an industry in Switzerland, 
which imported 50% from France and 50% from the UK, would have an industry-weighted exchange rate of 50% from the 
Euro and 50% from Sterling. This weight is held fixed by industry in the base year, but the country-specific exchange rates 
fluctuate every year. 
Constructing industry codes  
The HH plant level data (used for IT) only has a single four-digit SIC code, but this does change between years so can be 
used to look at product switching. Note that in Table 11 the sample conditions on firms staying within the manufacturing 
sector if a switch occurs i.e. plants that switch to the service sector are dropped from the sample (approximately 11% of 
plants switch industry according to this criterion). The Osiris data (used for R&D) only has a primary three-digit code. The 
Amadeus data (used for the patents, TFP and employment equations) has multiple four-digit industry codes which we can 
exploit to construct a weighted average of industry level imports variable to compare to the single industry code. 
Unfortunately, the industry data is not updated regularly so it is not reliable as a time series measure of industry switching. 
 
The analysis of patents and TFP in the baseline specifications is based on these multiple four-digit industries. The 
underlying data is based on successive cross-sections of “primary” and “secondary” industry codes taken from Amadeus. 
We extract four cross-sections for each available year between 2003-2006. Our set of cross-sections begins in 2003 because 
Amadeus only began reporting primary and secondary codes separately at this point in time.  
 
For the multiple industry import measure we use the 2003 cross-section to define a baseline set of primary and secondary 
four-digit industry codes for each firm. We assign a two-thirds weight to the primary codes and one-third to the secondary 
codes to calculate a multiple four-digit measure of import penetration (the results are not sensitive to the exact weights 
used). We take the arithmetic mean within sets of primary and secondary codes, that is, we weight industries equally. We 
follow the same procedure for calculating import penetration for the alternative normalizations presented in Tables 7 and 
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A7. In our data the median firm had one primary industry, the average firm 1.93 and the maximum was 10, only 19% of 
firms reported any secondary industry code with a mean of 2.68 and maximum of 11).  
When calculating a single industry code we use the most commonly occurring four-digit code pooling across all years in 
the dataset. We take the lowest four-digit industry value in cases where codes occur an equal number of times.  Results 
using this method are shown in Table 5. 
APPENDIX 4.C: PRODUCTION FUNCTION ESTIMATION 
The Basic Olley-Pakes Approach 
Consider the basic value-added production function as: 
 
  ititjtitkitlit Xkly  ++++=                        (C1) 
The efficiency term, it , is the unobserved productivity state that will be correlated with both output and the variable input 
decision, and it  is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) error term. jtX  are the other exogenous variables in 
the model which are common to all firms in the industry, such as the level of quotas against Chinese goods. Assume that 
the capital stock is predetermined and current investment (which will react to productivity shocks) takes one period before 
it becomes productive, that is: 
1 1(1 )it t itK I K− −= + −  
It can be shown that the investment policy functions are monotonic in capital and the unobserved productivity state.  
   ),,( jtititit Xkii =                                                                              (C2) 
The investment policy rule, therefore, can be inverted to express it  as a function of investment and capital, 
),,( itititt Xki . The first stage of the OP algorithm uses this invertibility result to re-express the production function as: 
itjtitititl
itjtitittitititlit
Xkil
XkiXkly k


++=
++++=
),,(
),,(
                           (C3) 
where jtitkjtititttjtitit XkXkiXki  ++== ),,(),,( . We approximate this function with a series estimator and 
use this first stage to get estimates of the coefficients on the variable inputs. The second stage of the OP algorithm is: 
  ititjtitkitlit Xkly  +++=−                                                (C4) 
Note that the expectation of productivity, conditional on the previous period’s information set (denoted Ωt-1) is: 
  ititititititit SES  +=== −− ]1,|[)1,(| 11                                    (C5) 
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where 1=itS  indicates that the firm has chosen not to shut down. We model the selection stage by assuming that the firm 
will continue to operate so long as its productivity is greater than a threshold productivity, it .   So the exit rule is 1=itS
if itit   , otherwise 0=itS . Taking expectations: 
1 1 1 1 1[ | ( , 1)] [ | , 1] [ | , ( , )] ( , ( , ))it it it it it it it it it it it it it itE S E S E k X g k X        − − − − − = = = =  =  
We do not know it  , but we can try to control for it using information on observed exit. 
1 1 1 1Pr( 1| ) Pr( ( , ) | ) Pr( , ( , ))it it it it it it it it itS k X k X   − − − −=  =   =  
We can write the last equality as a non-parametric function of lagged observables: 
1 1 1 1Pr( 1| ) ( , , )it it it t it itS P s i k X− − − −=  = =  
So returning to the second stage coefficient of interest: 
),(),()|( 111 ititjtitkititjtitktitlit PhXkgXklyE −−− ++=++=−   
Including the shocks we have: 
1 1 1 1( , ) ( , )it l it k it jt it it it it k it jt it k it jt it it ity l k X g k X h k X P             − − − −− = + + + + = + + − − + +   (C6)
 
Where itit  +  are now uncorrelated with itk . Since we already have estimates of the 1−t  function and the itP  this 
amounts to estimating by Non-Linear Least Squares. We now have all the relevant parameters of the production function. 
Our Implementation of Olley and Pakes 
We used panel data from AMADEUS to estimate production functions between 1996 and 2006. Only four European 
countries had good coverage of all the factor inputs needed to estimate production function – France, Italy, Spain and 
Sweden. The main problem is that most countries do not insist on disclosure of both materials and capital for all unlisted 
private firms. 
Following de Loecker (2011) we use a modified version of the Olley and Pakes (1996) approach. We allow endogeneity of 
the variable factor inputs (labor, capital and materials) using a control function approach and for selection through a non-
parametric correction (in practice we use a second order series estimator). In addition we allow the trade variables to enter 
directly into the non-parametric controls for endogeneity and selectivity. As de Loecker (201) emphasizes, it is important to 
allow for this in order for the estimator to be consistent when the trade environment changes. We allow for imperfect 
competition by assuming that there is monopolistic competition which implies that the coefficients on the production 
function are a mix between the technological parameters and a mark-up term. The latter is identified from the coefficient on 
an additional control for industry output in the production function. Since some firms produce in multiple industries the 
relevant output term is firm-specific depending on the firm’s distribution across industries. We exploit the fact that 
Amadeus reports the number of primary and secondary four-digit industries a firm operates in to construct this.  
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We do not have information on skill groups at the firm level so we also estimated TFP using the wage bill (rather than 
employment) as a measure of labor services, L. The idea is that wages reflect the different skill levels of workers in the firm, 
so multiplying the quantity of labor by its wage reflects the full value of labor services.  
We use this method to obtain an estimate of the pure technological parameters and construct an estimate of TFP which is 
the variable used in the main part of the paper. We checked that the results were robust to many alternative assumptions 
such as estimating each parameter separately for each two-digit and country pair and by three-digit industry; allowing for 
higher order terms in the series approximation. Results were robust to these changes. 
APPENDIX 4.D: THE TEXTILE AND CLOTHING QUOTA RELAXATION AS A QUASI-EXPERIMENT 
History of trade barriers in textiles and quotas and the WTO 
In 2005 restrictions on the fourth (and final) set of products regulated by the Agreement on Tariffs and Clothing (ATC) 
were removed. The ATC was the successor to the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA). The removal of quotas under the ATC 
came in four stages (1995, 1998, 2002 and 2005) but because China only joined the WTO in December 2001, it did not 
benefit initially from the first two stages. China enjoyed a substantial fall in these quotas between the end of 2001 (when it 
joined the WTO) and 2005 (when the ATC quotas were essentially all removed). Brambilla et al (2010) describe how there 
was a huge jump in Chinese exports into textiles and clothing to the US during this period (e.g. 7 percentage points increase 
in China’s share of all US imports in 2005-2006 alone). China’s increase was substantially larger than other countries not 
just because it joined the WTO but also because the existing quotas seemed to bite more heavily on China as indicated by 
the higher “fill rates” of Chinese quotas. This seemed to be because under the ATC/MFA Chinese quotas were increased 
more slowly over time than those in other countries. 
Although formally quotas fell to zero in 2005, for 22 product groups domestic industries successfully lobbied for some 
“safeguards” which were re-introduced after 2005. Nevertheless, these were much lower than the pre-existing quotas. As 
noted in the test we only use beginning of period quotas (in 2000) to avoid the problem that post 2005 quotas are 
endogenous to the growth of Chinese imports. The quota policy is EU wide. It is reported in the form of the SIGL (System 
for the Management of Licenses for Textile Imports) database that is available online at  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/sigl/choice.html. This database is classified according to 172 grouped quota categories defined by 
the EU. However, these categories are closely based on HS6 products so we are able to map them into the US four-digit 
industry classification.  In addition, we added in quotas on footwear and tableware products as described in the WTO’s 
articles of accession articles of accession for China, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm. These included a selection of footwear products in the 
6401-6404 HS4 categories as well as tableware products in the HS 6911-6912 range.   
Construction of the Instrument 
For each four-digit industry we calculated the proportion of product categories that were covered by a quota in each year 
(data on the amount produced in each industry is not available so we use a simple mean proportion of products). For the 
five-year change in imports 2005 to 2000 in the technology equations we use the quota variable in 2000 immediately prior 
to China’s WTO entry. Specifically, this proportion represents the share of all quota-affected HS6 products in the four-digit 
industry (we weight each HS6 in an industry by its 2000 import value). The idea is that the market expected at this point all 
the quotas to be lifted. Using the actual change renders similar results, but there is a concern that the quotas remaining in 
2006 are endogenous as they were the result of lobbying by the effected sectors. The “fill rates” (the proportion of actual 
imports divided by the quota) for most quotas were close to 100% for China in the late 1990s implying that these 
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constraints were binding127. This also limits anticipation effects, although to the extent that they exist this will make it 
harder for us to identify a first stage. The products upon which the quotas were set were determined in the 1950s to 1970s 
(Spinanger, 1999) which makes them likely to be exogenous to any post 2000 actual (or anticipated) shocks. To be specific, 
in the regression sample of Table 2 Panel A we use all four digit US sectors in SIC4 two-digit industries 22, 23, 28, 30 and 
three-digit industries 314 and 326. We show that the results are robust to dropping all four-digit industries within this group 
with zero quotas against China in 2000 and dropping the tableware and footwear quotas.  
Anticipation of China's Accession to WTO? Problems and solutions 
Even if there was an unanticipated component of the China shock, since firms knew China was going to join the WTO in 
2001 does this invalidate the instrument? In a stylized way one can imagine two points at which firms will react. There is 
an "announcement" effect on the day China's accession is determined (Costantini and Melitz, 2008, emphasis this) and an 
"accession" effect when China joins. For the instrument to have power in the first stage (which it does empirically), all we 
need is that there was some uncertainty over the effects of the accession or that firms do not fully adjust between 
announcement date and accession. The instrument could still be invalid, however, because the increase in technological 
investments (or imports) prior to accession as a result of announcement may be correlated with post-accession investments 
(or imports).  
Formally, say the true model has the dynamic form (say because of adjustment costs) 
5 1 2 5ln ln
CH CH
it it it it itTECH TECH IMP IMP u  − − =  +  +  +                      (D1) 
where TECH is one of our technological indicators (we use a lag of five years to be consistent with the five year 
differences). However, say we estimate our basic empirical model as:  
ln CHit it itTECH IMP  =  +                                                             (D2) 
Even under the assumption that our quota instrument, Zit-5,  satisfies the exclusion restriction 5( ) 0it itE Z u− =  
an IV 
estimation of equation (D2) using the quota instrument will be inconsistent if quotas are correlated with 5ln itTECH −  or 
5
CH
itIMP −  due to anticipation effects. Under this assumption 5( ) 0it itE Z −  because it  includes the omitted lagged 
technology and imports variables ( 5ln itTECH −  and 5
CH
itIMP − ). Of course, since we are estimating in long differences, 
it may be that 2 0 = = in equation (D1) so IV estimation of equation (D2) will consistently estimate  even in the 
presence of partial anticipation effects. 
 
There are several ways to tackle the potential problem of anticipation effects. A direct method is to explicitly estimate the 
dynamic model of equation (D1). This is demanding in data terms, because we need to use firms where we observe ten full 
years of technology data. There are too few firms to accomplish this task for IT and patents. However, it is possible to do 
this for TFP and we reported the results in Table A5. We found that our results were completely robust to using the 
alternative dynamic specification of equation (D2). 
                                                          
127 We attempted to use the fill rates in order to get a more refined measure of the instrument, but it had no additional power due to 
the uniformly high fill rates. Similarly, dropping all industries whose fill rates were less than 80% made no difference to the results for 
the same reason. 
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A second approach is to examine directly whether quotas are correlated with pre-WTO Accession trends in technology or 
Chinese imports. In our data there is a positive but small and statistically insignificant correlation between pre-WTO 
growth of technology (and Chinese imports) and quotas. Turning first to technical change if we regress the growth of TFP 
1996-2000 (we do not have data pre-1996) on the quota instrument the coefficient (standard error) on quotas is 
0.024(0.031). After China joined the WTO the five year difference 2000-2005 is 0.190(0.021) and the four year difference 
is 0.122(0.018). Similarly the standard reduced form for patent growth 2000-2005 has a coefficient on quotas of 
0.264(0.088) whereas the regression of the pre-WTO growth of patents 1996-2000 on the quota IV has a coefficient 
(standard error) of 0.096(0.177). 
We turn to pre-policy import trends in Table A11. We use the country by four-digit industry level information over the 
1990-2007 period (we do not need technical change measures for this experiment so can use a longer period) and show 
regressions where the five year growth in Chinese imports is the dependent variable. Column (1) includes simply the quota 
(in 2000), and the positive coefficient on this variable indicates that industries where quotas were high had faster growth in 
Chinese imports throughout the period. Column (2) then interacts the quota variable with a policy dummy equal to one after 
China joined the WTO in 2001. The coefficient on this interaction is large and statistically significant, whereas the linear 
term on quota is small and statistically insignificant. The coefficients suggest that prior to China’s joining the WTO in 2001 
industries with high quotas (i.e. where all products where subject to some form of quota restriction) had 0.002 percentage 
point growth a year in Chinese imports (this is consistent with increases in the “fill rates” of quotas over this period as 
China grew). After China joined the WTO and quotas were relaxed this rose by 0.84 (= 4.2/5) percentage points per annum, 
a substantial amount. Column (3) includes an even more rigorous specification where we include industry dummies, 
allowing for industry trends over time. The coefficient on the policy-based instrumental variable remains significant with a 
similar magnitude of 0.04, implying that there was an increase in the Chinese growth trend post 2001.  
 
Examples of patents taken out in the textiles and apparel industry 
While the textiles and apparel sectors are relatively low tech, they were still responsible for 21,638 European patents in our 
sample period. These cover innovations such as new materials (for example the water resistant fabric described below), new 
designs (for example the more flexible ski-boat fastener described below) and new products (for example the design of an 
orthotic sock designed to aid ankle movement described below). Many more examples can be obtained simply by searching 
on the EPO web-site128  for an appropriate textile or fabric term such as “shirt”, “handbag” or “cotton”. 
 
Patent EP1335063, taken out by a German firm for a “Water vapor permeable, water-resistant composite material” 
This is for a waterproof fabric used in, for example, protective clothing. The fabric prevents liquid water from penetrating 
through while at the same time permitting moisture vapor such as 
perspiration to pass out through the article, similar to Gore-Tex. The article 
has two main layers: a microporous hydrophobic outer layer which permits 
the passage of moisture vapor but resists penetration by liquid water; and a 
hyrophilic inner layer permitting the transfer of moisture vapor but 
preventing surface tension lowering agents such as those contained in 
perspiration and/or body oils from reaching the hydrophobic layer. 
                                                          
128 http://worldwide.espacenet.com/quickSearch?locale=en_EP 
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Patent: EP2082659, taken out by an Italian firm for a “Fastening device for sports footwear” 
This patent is for a more flexible in-line skate or ski boot fastener. This allows adjustment of the angle of forward 
inclination of the skater's leg, the circular direction of the boots and also 
the overall tightness of the fastening. The fastener can also include a 
forward inclination pressure adjusting mechanism to adjust the pressure 
applied to the skater's leg by the boot when the skater moves forwardly. 
This boot fastener can be used for a variety of purposes, with the key one 
being in-line skating (roller-blading), ski and snowboarding boots, but also 
other semi-hard sports boots and work boots. 
Patent: EP1626686, taken out by a UK firm for an “Orthotic sock” 
This product provides an ankle-foot orthosis (a product to support the ankle) that comprises: an elastic structure formed of 
contiguous first and second tubular members, with the second tubular member set at an angle to the first tubular member to 
define, at least in use, a generally L-shaped cavity configured 
to accept and fit closely about the foot and ankle of a patient; 
and a rib which is permanently bonded to a region of the 
structure which overlies the dorsum of the patient's foot in 
use, with this being formed of a flexible material that has a 
resilience appropriate for resisting the particular degree of 
plantarflexion experienced by the patient. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  245 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX E: CALCULATING MAGNITUDES 
 
The magnitudes in Table 4 attempt to quantify the potential contribution of Chinese imports to the overall increase in 
patents per worker, IT per worker and TFP among European manufacturing firms. Our basic approach to these calculations 
stems from the literature on productivity decompositions, for example, Bailey, Hulten and Campbell (1992). To explain this 
approach start by denoting Pt as a generic index of technology, for example aggregate patents, computers per person, or 
TFP. We can summarize the change in this aggregate technology index between time t and time 0 as:   
 
0 0
1 1
N N
t it ijt i ij
i i
P s p s p
= =
 = −                                                                          (E1) 
where Pt, the aggregate level of the technology index, is given as a function of individual firms’ technology levels (pijt) 
weighted by their employment shares (sit), where sit = firm employment divided by total employment in manufacturing. We 
will use patents per employee as our example, but the calculation is the same for IT per worker or TFP. This aggregate 
change can be decomposed into a variety of within and reallocation terms as follows: 
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                (E2) 
where jtp  is the average technology level of all firms in industry j year t, 0
exit
ijp  is the technology level of an exiter, 
entrant
ijtp is the technology level of an entrant and the summations are over the N firms in the economy. In this breakdown in 
equation (E2) the first term is the within effect (the increase in technology holding firm size constant), the second term is 
the between component (the increase in technology from shifting employment from low-tech to high-tech firms), the third 
term is the cross effect (the correlation of the increase in technology within firms and their change in employment share)129. 
The fourth term is the exit component (the impact of the relative technology level of exiting firms versus incumbent firms) 
and the final term the entry component (the impact of technology level of entering firms versus incumbent firms). As noted 
in the text, we cannot directly model entrants because we do not observe their lagged technology levels. In the paper we can 
indirectly examine the effect of entry by comparing the industry level estimates to the four components we can identify. 
 
                                                          
129 Following the convention, we will aggregate the cross effect with the between effect when presenting results, but in practice this 
makes little difference as the cross-term is always small. 
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We have explicitly modeled the main components of these terms in our econometric models of equations (1) - (4) in the 
main text. Given our estimates of these in Tables 1, 2 and 3 we can create predicted values for these observable components 
arising from the increase in Chinese imports (
China
tP ) as follows: 
0 00 0
1 1 1
0
( ) ( )
( )
N N N
China PAT between between PAT
i it i j it ij it j
i i i
exit exit
it ij jo
i exit
P s IMP s s p s s IMP
s p p
 
= = =

 =  + − + − 
− −
  

          (E3)
 
where 
PAT is the coefficient on Chinese imports in equation (1) in the main text. In Table 1 column (1) this is 0.321. 
between
its is the predicted share of employment for incumbent firms and 
entry
its  is the predicted share of employment in 
exiting firms (defined below), 
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Where 
N  is the coefficient on Chinese imports in the employment growth equation (equation (3) in the main text) and 
NP  the coefficient on Chinese imports interacted with the technology variable. The values of these are -0.352 and 1.546 
respectively from column (2) in Table 3 Panel A.  0iN is employment in the firm
130. 
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Where 
S  is the coefficient on Chinese imports in the survival equation (equation (4) in the main text) and SP  is the 
coefficient on Chinese imports interacted with the technology variable. In column (2) of Table 3 Panel B these are -0.122 
and 0.391.  Note that in equation (E5) there is a negative sign before the coefficients because we estimate survival 
equations econometrically whereas the decomposition uses exit. 
 
Given these equations we can then quantify the share of technical change predicted to arise from Chinese imports as the 
ratio 
China
tP / tP .  Similarly, we can identify the contribution of each component. To calculate tP  
for IT intensity we 
calculate the total increase in technology in our sample firms, that is, the change in the weighted mean we observe in our 
sample. For patents we cannot use our sample because of: (i) delays in the provision of firms accounts (we match to firm 
accounts and some of these are not available yet for 2005/06 due to reporting delays)  and (ii) processing delays at the 
European Patent Office since we only use granted patents (dated by their year of application). As a result we use instead the 
aggregate growth of the US Patent Office (which provides long-run total patent numbers) over the proceeding 10 years 
                                                          
130 Note that we re-weight employment throughout the calculations so that the regression sample is representative of the entire 
population of Amadeus firms. This avoids any differences in data sampling or matching rates affecting the aggregate calculations. 
  247 
(1996-2005), which is 2.2%. This growth rate of total patents is stable over long-run periods, for example being 2.4% over 
the proceeding 20 years period of 1986 to 2005.131 Similarly, for TFP we use 2% as our measure of the growth rate of TFP 
growth in manufacturing in recent years.132 
 
 
 
APPENDIX F: DYNAMIC SELECTION BIAS 
The dynamic selection problem 
Consider the representation of our baseline equations (we ignore other variables for notational simplicity) as: 
 
it it it i ity z u  = + + +                                                            (F1) 
 
it it it its w u = + +                                                                 (F2) 
 
where ity  is the technology outcome (e.g. IT/N) of interest for firm i at time t (we suppress the industry-country jk- 
subscripts), itz  is Chinese imports and its = 1 if the firm is operating at time t and zero otherwise. We assume itz  is 
exogenous, but endogeneity can easily be allowed for by using the quota instrument, for example. Assume that the 
idiosyncratic error terms, it  and it  are i.i.d. and the vector itw  includes itz . 
 
The selection problem arises from the fact that itu  can affect survival as well as being correlated with itz .To see this 
consider the differenced form of equation (F1) and take expectations conditional on surviving: 
( | , 1) ( | , 1)it it it it it itE y z s E u z s  = = +   =                                             (F3) 
The potential bias arises from the ( | , 1)it it itE u z s  =  term. Under the assumption that we have instruments for Chinese 
imports (or they are exogenous) this simplifies to ( | 1)it itE u s = . If the selection was solely in terms of the fixed effect,
i  or captured by the observables itw , then this expectation would be zero and our estimate of the effect of trade would be 
unbiased, so “static selection” is not a problem. The concern is that there is “dynamic selection” on technology shocks,
itu , so ( | 1) 0it itE u s =  .  
 
To see the dynamic selection problem in our context consider two industries A and B, one (industry A) has an increase in 
Chinese imports (e.g. from a relaxation of quotas) and the other (B) has not. Now consider the reaction to this shock of two 
identical firms who both have had the same negative productivity shock unrelated to China. If the firm in industry A is 
more likely to exit (as life will get harder in the future) then it will appear that within firm productivity growth improves in 
                                                          
131 The data goes back to 1986 on aggregate USPTO patents and comes from http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/cbcby.htm. The EPO does 
not have this long-run of time series aggregate patents data since it was only founded in 1977 and was not widely accepted (over 
European national patent offices) until the late 1980s making the time series unreliable prior to the 1990s. 
132 The growth rate of European multifactor productivity growth 1995-2008 was 1.9% per annum according to Conference Board 
(http://www.conference-board.org/economics/downloads/Summary_Statistics_2010.pdf, taken from Table 12 for the EU-12). 
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industry A, even if nothing else changes. Although there is a genuine increase in productivity in industry A as more of the 
low productivity firms are “cleansed” by Chinese competition, we attribute too much of this to the within firm component. 
 
One strategy for dealing with this problem is to consider “instruments” for survival i.e. variables that effect the probability 
of survival that do not affect the technology shock. This is the standard Heckman (1979) selection equation where we 
would include selection correction terms generated from equation (F2) augmented to equation (F3). It is difficult to think of 
such exclusion restrictions in our context, however, that could enter itw  but be excluded from itz
133. Instead we take two 
alternative approaches: (i) placing a lower bound on the selection bias and (ii) adopting a non-parametric control function 
approach to control for the bias. 
 
Bounding the Selection Bias 
A recent literature in econometrics emphasises that even when point identification is not feasible, it may be possible to 
achieve set identification. In our context, this means that we may be able to place a lower bound on the effect of Chinese 
imports on technology. Following Manski (1994), Manski and Pepper (2000) and Blundell et al (2007) we consider the 
“worst case bounds”, i.e. what could be the lowest effect of imports if selection effects were severe. What helps out in our 
application is that there is a finite lower support at zero for the distribution of patents and IT. If the firm had survived it 
could never have less than zero patents or zero computers. In this case we can impute that all the exiting firms would have 
performed zero patents and lost all their computers had they survived. Any positive effect remaining from   will be the 
“worst case” bounds.  
 
Control function approach for selection 
The worst-case bounds approach is infeasible for TFP as it is a continuous variable without finite support. One approach 
would be to use less conservative bounds (e.g. assume that the exiters were all from the lowest decile of the TFP 
distribution). These approaches need some rather arbitrary cut-off rule so instead we the same control function approach 
suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) to add a non-parametric term in the propensity score based on observed exiters when 
estimating the production function. This is described above in Appendix C (e.g. see equation C6) 
 
 
 
                                                          
133 Some possibilities based on alternative (usually strong) dynamic assumptions include Kyriazidou (1997), Honore and 
Kyriazidou (2000) or Wooldridge (1995). 
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TABLE A1: CHINA’S SHARE OF GLOBAL IMPORTS – TOP TEN INDUSTRIES, 1999-2007 
 
Notes: Calculated using product-level UN Comtrade data aggregated to four-digit US SIC codes.  There are 430 four-digit industries in our dataset. China’s share of all imports 
1999
CHIMP  total 
world imports. Countries include Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. the  Manufacturing industries (not 
elsewhere classified) includes many miscellaneous goods such as hairdressing equipment, tobacco pipes, cigarette holders, artificial flower arrangements, and amusement or arcade machines. 
  
Top Ten Industries in 1999 (by China’s import share) 
  
 
China’s Share of all Imports  
CHIMP  
Industry Description Industry Code 
1999 
 
2007 
 
Change 
2007-1999 
Dolls and Stuffed Toys 3942 0.817 0.859 +0.042 
Drapery, Hardware and Window Blinds 2591 0.527 0.574 0.047 
Rubber and Plastics Footwear 3021 0.532 0.618 0.086 
Leather Gloves and Mittens 3151 0.517 0.574 0.057 
Women's Handbags and Purses 3171 0.470 0.517 0.047 
Manufacturing NEC 3999 0.458 0.521 0.064 
Games, Toys and Children's Vehicles 3944 0.434 0.765 0.331 
Luggage 3161 0.432 0.680 0.248 
Personal Leather Goods 3172 0.416 0.432 0.016 
Apparel and other Finished Fabric Products 2386 0.415 0.418 0.003 
     
     
All Industries 
(standard-deviation)  
0.057 
(0.102) 
0.124 
(0.152) 
0.068 
(0.089) 
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TABLE A2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variable Mean Stan. Dev. Median Minimum  Maximum 
Patenters sample - Firms with at least one EPO patent since 1978      
Number of Patents (per firm-year) 1.022 10.40 0 0 882 
Employment 739.5 6,526.7 100 1 463,561 
Number of Observations 30,277     
IT sample (Harte-Hanks)      
Number of Employees 248.3 566.1 140 1 50,000 
IT Intensity (computers per worker) 0.580 0.385 0.398 0.05 2.00 
Industry switchers (% plants switching four-digit sector in five year period) 0.112 0.316    
Number of Observations 37,500     
R&D sample (Osiris)      
R&D/Sales ratio 0.152 0.888 0.034 0.001 17.3 
Employment 17,230 46,422 2054 4 464,841 
Number of Observations 1,626     
TFP sample (Amadeus) 
Employment 79.4 
 
333.9 30 10 84,252 
Number of Firms (in TFP sample) 89,369     
Number of Observations  292,167      
Management sample      
Management score 3.11 0.58 3.14 1.11 4.89 
Employment 716 902 350 100 5,000 
Number of firms 1576     
Number of observations 3,607     
Employment sample (Amadeus)      
Number of Patents (per firm-year) 0.019 5.741 0 0 882 
Employment 99.95 1,504.9 17 1 372,056 
Number of Observations 581,474     
Survival sample (Amadeus)      
Number of Patents 0.049 2.80 0 0 830 
Employment 97.8 2,751.7 14 2 1,469,840 
Number of Observations 490,095     
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Samples are based on those used to run regressions, so we condition on having non-missing values over a five-year period 
for the relevant variable. “Patenters sample” are those firms who have at least one patent in the European Patent Office (EPO) since 1978. Employment sample is based 
on Amadeus (again firms have to have reported employment over a five-year period as this is the dependent variable in the regressions. IT sample is HH. IT intensity is 
computers per worker. R&D sample is from Osiris (publicly listed firms). TFP sample is Amadeus firms in France, Italy, Spain and Sweden. Management sample 
covers all firms in France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Sweden and the UK with multiple management interviews. 
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TABLE A3:  NO FALLS IN CITATIONS PER PATENTS BECAUSE OF CHINESE IMPORTS 
Dependent Variable:  Δln(CITES) Δ ln(CITES/PATENTS) 
Change in Chinese Imports   0.118 0.009 
CH
jkIMP   (0.081) (0.029) 
Number of industry-country clusters  1,578 1,578 
Number of Firms  8,480 8,480 
Observations    30,277  30,277 
Notes:  *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance. Estimation is by OLS with standard errors clustered by country by four-digit industry pair in 
parentheses. Estimation by five-year differences. CHIMP   represents the 5-year difference in Chinese imports as a fraction of  total imports in a four-digit industry by country pair.  All 
specifications include country-year fixed effects. 12 Countries. Sample period is 1996 to 2006. Δ(CITES) is defined as the change in ln(1+CITES) where CITES = count of citations and  
Δ(CITES/PATENT) is defined as the change in ln[(1+CITES)/(1+PAT) where PAT = count of patents. 
 
TABLE A4: ALTERNATIVE IT ADOPTION MEASURES  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 ΔERP (ENTERPRISE RESOURCE 
PLANNING) 
ΔDATABASE ΔGROUPWARE 
Change in Chinese Imports  0.040   0.002      0.249***   
CH
jkIMP  (0.034)   (0.070)   (0.083)   
Highest Quintile for CH
jkIMP      0.013***     0.020**     0.034**  
  (0.005)   (0.010)   (0.014)  
2nd  Highest Quintile of CH
jkIMP   0.006      0.030***   0.021  
  (0.005)   (0.010)   (0.013)  
3rd  Highest Quintile for CH
jkIMP      0.014***      0.043***   -0.008  
  (0.005)   (0.010)   (0.013)  
4th Highest Quintile for CH
jkIMP      0.010**      0.024***   -0.018  
  (0.005)   (0.011)   (0.013)  
Lowest Quintile for CH
jkIMP      -0.011***     -0.028**   -0.000 
   (0.004)   (0.009)   (0.001) 
Number of Observations 
 
24,741 
 
24,741 
 
24,741 
 
24,741 
 
24,741 
 
24,741 
 
24,741 
 
24,741 
 
24,741 
 
 Notes: *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance. Estimation by OLS with standard errors (clustered by country by four-digit industry pair) in 
parentheses. There are 2,728 distinct country by industry pairs. . Quintiles represent bands of establishments ordered from highest (5) to the lowest (1) in terms of their change in Chinese 
Imports, that is, quintiles of CHIMP . 12 Countries. All regressions have site-type controls, employment growth and country by year dummies 
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TABLE A5: CHECKING PRE-POLICY TFP TRENDS 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: ΔTFP ΔTFP ΔTFP ΔTFP 
Estimating Method: IV IV IV IV 
Δ Chinese Importst    1.897** 1.491*** 1.608*** 1.635*** 
 (0.806) (0.264) (0.410) (0.313) 
ΔTFPt-5   -0.211*** 0.378*** 
   (0.024) (0.063) 
ΔChinese Importst-5   -0.531 -0.450 
   (0.602) (0.423) 
Endogenous  right-hand side variables  Chinese Imports Chinese Imports Chinese Imports 
Chinese Imports,  
ΔTFP(t-5) 
Number of units 55,791 3,107 3,107 3,107 
Number of clusters 187 126 126 126 
Observations 55,791  3,107  3,107  3,107 
 
Notes: *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance. Estimation is by OLS with standard errors 
clustered by four-digit industry in parentheses. These are estimates from the textile and apparel industries following Table 2 Panel A. Five-
year differences covering the period 1999-2005. Estimation by five-year differences. Quota removal is based on EU SIGL data and defined 
as the (value weighted) proportion of HS6 products in the four-digit industry that were covered by a quota restriction on China in 1999 (prior 
to China’s WTO accession) that were planned to be removed by 2005 (see the Appendix D for details). In columns (1)-(3) we use quota 
removal to instrument Chinese imports. In column (4) we also use 
10tTFP− as an instrument for 5tTFP− . 4 Countries. 
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TABLE A6: DYNAMICS OF THE EFFECT OF CHINA ON PATENTS AND EMPLOYMENT 
 
PANEL A: PATENTS, Δln(PATENTS)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
5-year lag of Change in Chinese Imports  0.328***      
5
CH
tIMP−   (0.110)      
4-year lag of Change in Chinese Imports   0.394***     
4
CH
tIMP−    (0.110)     
3-year lag of Change in Chinese Imports    0.402***    
3
CH
tIMP−     (0.120)    
2-year lag of Change in Chinese Imports     0.333***   
2
CH
tIMP−      (0.113)   
1-year lag of Change in Chinese Imports      0.314***  
1
CH
tIMP−       (0.102)  
Contemporaneous change in Chinese Imports       0.321*** 
CH
tIMP        (0.102) 
Number of country-industry pairs  1,578 1,578 1,578 1,578 1,578 1,578 
Number of Firms  8,480 8,480 8,480 8,480 8,480 8,480 
Observations    30,277  30,277  30,277  30,277  30,277  30,277 
PANEL B: EMPLOYMENT, Δln(N)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
5-year lag of Change in Chinese Imports  -0.188      
5
CH
tIMP−   (0.140)      
4-year lag of Change in Chinese Imports   -0.241*     
4
CH
tIMP−    (0.139)     
3-year lag of Change in Chinese Imports    -0.306**    
3
CH
tIMP−     (0.155)    
2-year lag of Change in Chinese Imports     -0.275*   
2
CH
tIMP−      (0.160)   
1-year lag of Change in Chinese Imports      -0.285**  
1
CH
tIMP−       (0.143)  
Contemporaneous change in Chinese Imports       -0.309** 
CH
tIMP        (0.138) 
Number of country-industry pairs  1,464 1,464 1,464 1,464 1,464 1,464 
Number of Firms  7,030 7,030 7,030 7,030 7,030 7,030 
Observations   22,938 22,938 22,938 22,938 22,938 22,938 
 
Notes:  *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance. Estimation is by OLS with standard errors 
clustered by country by four-digit industry pair in parentheses. All columns estimated as 5-year differences CH
t lIMP− represents the 5-year 
change in Chinese imports (where l = lag length). 12 Countries. Sample period is 1996 to 2005.  
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TABLE A7: ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF THE CHANGE IN CHINESE IMPORTS 
 
PANEL A:  CHINESE IMPORTS NORMALIZED BY DOMESTIC PRODUCTION  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable:  Δln(PATENTS) Δln(IT/N) Δln(TFP) Δln(N) SURVIVAL 
Change in Chinese Imports (over production)       0.142*** 0.053** 0.065*** -0.232***   -0.103*** 
( )jkChinajk DM /   (0.048) (0.024) (0.020) (0.033) (0.017) 
Change in Chinese imports*ln(Patent stock per worker at t-5)     0.507   0.456*** 
( )/Chinajk jkM D  *(PATSTOCK/N)t-5     (0.431) (0.111) 
ln(Patent stock per worker at t-5)     0.503*** 0.041*** 
(PATSTOCK/N)t-5     (0.054) (0.009) 
Number of Units  8,474 20,106 89,369 189,309  488,270 
Number of industry-country clusters  1,575 2,480 1,210 3,115 3,335 
Observations   30,221 31,820 293,167 579,818 488,270 
 
PANEL B:  CHINESE IMPORTS NORMALIZED BY APPARENT CONSUMPTION 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable:  Δln(PATENTS) Δln(IT/N) Δln(TFP) Δln(N) SURVIVAL 
Change Chinese Imports (over apparent consumption)  0.349*** 0.169* 0.045** -0.477*** -0.203*** 
( )/Chinajk jkM C    (0.122) (0.089) (0.019) (0.078) (0.034) 
Change in Chinese imports*ln(Patent stock per worker at t-5)     1.385 0.476*** 
( )/Chinajk jkM C  *(PATSTOCK/N)t-5     (1.238) (0.187) 
ln(Patent stock per worker at t-5)       0.490***  0.041*** 
(PATSTOCK/N)t-5     (0.078) (0.009) 
Number of Units  8,474 19,793 89,369 189,309 488,270  
Number of industry-country clusters  1,575 2,406 1,210 3,115 3,335 
Observations   30,221 31,225 293,167 579,818 488,270 
 
Notes:  *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance. Estimation is by OLS with standard errors clustered by 
country by four-digit industry pair in parentheses. ( )jkChinajk DM /  represents the 5-year difference Chinese Imports normalized by domestic production 
(D).  ( )jkChinajk CM /  is the 5-year difference in Chinese imports normalized by apparent consumption (C). Apparent consumption defined as Production 
- Exports + Imports (C=D-X+M). Variables D and C is from Eurostat’s Prodcom database with full details given in the Data Appendix. Quintile 1 is a 
dummy variable for firms in the lowest quintile of IT intensity in the baseline year.  Note that Switzerland is not included because it does not report 
production data to Eurostat's Prodcom database.  Sample period is 2000 to 2007 for the IT equation and 1996-2005 for patents equations. Column (2) 
controls for the growth in employment. 
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TABLE A8: OFFSHORING TO CHINA – FULL RESULTS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent 
 Variable: 
Δln(PAT
ENTS) 
Δln(IT/N) Δln(TFP) Δln(N) Δln(N) Δln(N) SURVIVAL SURVIVAL SURVIVAL 
Measure of Lagged 
TECH: 
   
Patent 
stock 
IT TFP 
Patent 
Stock 
IT TFP 
CH
jkIMP  
0.313*** 0.279*** 0.189*** -0.392*** -0.269*** -0.374*** -0.090 -0.110 -0.172** 
 (0.100) (0.080) (0.082) (0.145) (0.105) (0.103) (0.060) (0.079) (0.074) 
5*
CH
jk tIMP TECH −       0.142* 
 
-0.362** 0.679 0.339** 0.071 0.053 
    (0.086) (0.168) (0.477) (0.167) (0.138) (0.075) 
 CH
jkOFFSHORE  0.173 1.685*** 1.396*** -1.643 -2.802*** -0.227 -0.500 -1.546*** -0.533** 
 (0.822) (0.517) (0.504) (1.202) (0.682) (0.544) (0.316) (0.550) (0.223) 
5*
CH
jk tOFFSHORE TECH −     1.064 1.406 4.874** 1.950 1.315** 0.568 
     (0.70) (1.111) (2.181) (2.030) (0.710) (0.411) 
 
5tTECH −
    -0.012 0.219*** 0.231*** 0.016 -0.125 -0.007 
    (0.008) (0.013) (0.019) (0.018) (0.008) (0.005) 
Number of units 8,480 22,957 89,369 6,335 22,957 89,369 1,647 2,863 1,294 
Number of industry-
country clusters 
1,578 2,816 1,210 1,375 2,816 1,210 7,985 28,624 268,335 
Observations 30,277 37,500 292,167 19,844 37,500 292,167 7,985 28,624 268,335 
 
Notes: *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance. Estimation by OLS with standard errors (clustered by country by four-digit 
industry pair) in parentheses.  CHIMP   represents the 5-year difference in Chinese imports as a fraction of total imports in a four-digit industry by country pair. The variable 
OFFSHORE  is the 5-yerar change in Chinese imports in source industries, defined following Feenstra and Hansen (1999) – see Appendix B. Countries in all columns except 
for TFP models which is for four countries. Columns(1)-(3) repeat the results reported in Table 10. Columns (4)-(6) repeat the analysis of employment changes in Table 3 
Panel A but also include the control for offshoring (and its interaction with lagged technology). Columns (7)-(9) repeat the analysis of survival (conducted in Table 3, Panel B) 
with a control for offshoring (and its interaction with lagged technology).  All columns include country by year effects. 12 countries (except in column (3), (6) and (9) which 
are four countries). 
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TABLE A9: MAGNITUDES ALLOWING FOR OFFSHORING  
All Figures are as a % of the total increase over the period 2000-2007 
PANEL A: Increase in Patents per employee attributable to Chinese imports  
Period Within Between Exit Total 
Product Market  4.6 7.6 2.0 14.2 
Product market + 
Offshoring 
5.1 8.0 1.4 14.5 
 
PANEL B: Increase in IT per employee attributable to Chinese imports 
Period Within Between Exit Total 
Product Market  9.8 3.1 1.2 14.1 
Product market + 
Offshoring 20.9 5.3 3.3 29.5 
 
PANEL C: Increase in Total Factor Productivity attributable to Chinese imports 
Period Within Between Exit Total 
Product Market  10.1 4.4 0.3 14.7 
Product market + 
Offshoring 24.6 7.6 0.8 33.0 
 
Notes: Panel A reports the share of aggregate patents per worker accounted for by China, Panel B the increase in IT 
per worker and Panel C the increase in total factor productivity. In each panel the first row (“Product Market”) simply 
reports the same results following methodology in Appendix E implemented in Table 4 (the results differ slightly from 
Table 4 because we only use the single industry version of Chinese imports as in Table 5 Panel B as the multiple 
industry version is not available for offshoring). We then extend the methodology to allow for offshoring to China. All 
underlying regression specifications are extended to allow for offshoring to China. The full specifications of the within 
firm (same as Table 10), between and exit specifications are those in Table A8. We multiply the relevant coefficients 
by the observed Chinese import share growth to generate a predicted change in IT/Employee, Patents/Employee and 
TFP between 2000 to 2007 inclusive. The lower row in each panel (“Product Market + Offshoring”) decomposes the 
total change (final column) into within, between and exit effects for the combined product market and “offshoring 
elements. 
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TABLE A10: EXPORTS TO CHINA  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable: Δln(PATENTS) Δln(IT/N) ΔTFP 
Change in Chinese Imports   0.322***   0.361*** 
    
0.254*** 
CH
jkIMP  (0.102) (0.076) (0.072) 
Change in Exports to China -0.243 0.028 -0.125 
( )WorldjkChinajk XX /  (0.200) (0.118) (0.126) 
Number of Units 8,480 22,957 89,369 
Number of Industry-country clusters 1,578 2,816 1,210 
Number of Observations 30,277 37,500 292,167 
 
Notes: *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance. Estimation is by OLS with 
standard errors clustered by country by four-digit industry in parentheses.12 Countries except column (3) where there are 
four countries. “Number of units” represents the number of firms in all columns except (2) where it is plants. 12 countries 
except in column (3) where it is four countries. 
 
  
TABLE A11: THE QUOTA INSTRUMENT IS UNCORRELATED WITH THE 
GROWTH IN CHINESE IMPORTS PRIOR TO THE ACCESSION TO THE WTO 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable    ΔIMPCH   ΔIMPCH   ΔIMPCH 
Quota Removal*Post WTO   0.042*** 0.039*** 
   (0.010) (0.010) 
Quota Removal  0.036*** 0.009  
  (0.008) (0.008)  
      
Country by Year Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Country by industry trends  No No Yes 
Number of clusters  84 84 84 
Observations   11,138 11,138 11,138 
 
Notes: *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance. Estimation is by OLS with 
standard errors clustered by four-digit industry pair in parentheses. This data is a four-digit industry by country panel 
between 1990 and 2007. Sample is the textiles and clothing industries only. The dependent variable is the five-year 
difference in Chinese import share. Quota removal is the height of the quota in the four-digit industry in 2000 prior to 
China joining the WTO. “Post WTO” is a dummy equal to unity after 2001 (and zero before). 12 countries. 
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CHAPTER 5: REAGAN’S INNOVATION DIVIDEND? 
TECHNOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF THE 1980S US DEFENSE 
BUILD-UP. 
. 
 
Abstract 
 
US government spending since World War II has been characterized by large investments in 
defense related goods, services and R&D. In turn, this means that the Department of Defense 
(DoD) has had a large role in funding corporate innovation in the US. This paper looks at the 
impact of military procurement spending on corporate innovation among publicly traded firms 
for the period 1966-2003. The study utilizes a major database of detailed, historical procurement 
contracts for all Department of Defense (DoD) prime contracts since 1966. Product-level 
spending shifts – chiefly centered around the Reagan defense build-up of the 1980s – are used as 
a source of exogenous variation in firm-level procurement receipts. Estimates indicate that 
defense procurement has a positive absolute impact on patenting and R&D investment,  with an 
elasticity of approximately 0.07 across both measures of innovation. In terms of magnitudes, the 
contribution of defense procurement to innovation peaked during the early Reagan build-up, 
accounting for 11.4% of the total change in patenting intensity and 6.5% for R&D. This 
compares to a defense sector share in output of around 4%. The later defense cutbacks under 
Bush Senior and Clinton then curbed the growth in technological intensity by around 2%.                          
 
JEL Codes: 030, 031, 038, 043. 
Keywords: Induced Innovation, Patenting, R&D, Defense Spending.  
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5.1 Introduction 
Technological development is central to many debates on economic policy. At the 
macroeconomic level it underpins economy-wide productivity, so governments invest 
considerable resources to influence the development of new technologies. Surprisingly, academic 
research on the determinants of the rate and direction of technical change makes up only a small 
sub-field of economics. Schmookler’s (1966) contribution outlined an agenda for studying 
technical change that has been followed up heavily in empirical research that has appeared over 
the last 10-15 years.  This work has included research on areas such as medical innovation 
(Acemoglu and Linn 2004; Finkelstein 2004); the energy sector (Newell, Jaffe and Stavins 1999; 
Popp 2002); and the impact of low-wage import competition (Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen 
2011; Le Large 2010).        
However, it is government intervention itself that became a major driver of technical 
change in the mid-20th century. World War II introduced an era of ‘organized innovation’ 
centered on the defense sector (Mowery and Rosenberg 1991). The massive spending in R&D 
made during WII provided a model for ongoing investment following Vannevar Bush’s (1945) 
policy report, Science: The Endless Frontier. As Figure 1 shows,  real defense spending has 
hovered around an average level of around $300 billion per year since WWII with peaks during 
‘hot war’ episodes (Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf Wars) as well as some ‘cold war’ phases (notably 
the Reagan-led build-up of the 1980s).  
The scale of this spending is significant along a number of dimensions that make it 
important for the study of innovation. Firstly, defense spending represents a large fraction of 
government outlays – approximately 15-20% over this period, which is comparable to the budgets 
for health and social security (OMB 2008). Secondly, this spending has a large role in 
determining the level of total R&D expenditures. The NSF(2006) estimates that Department of 
Defense (DoD) funding accounts for around 20% of R&D expenditures in the post-war period, 
with a peak of around 30% in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Thirdly, the amount of money 
flowing into high-tech, defense-focused production dwarfs the amount spent on other  prominent 
innovation policy tools. For example, the Federal R&D tax credit costs around $6.5 billion per 
year while support for basic science through the National Science Foundation figures at $7 billion 
(NSF 2006). By contrast, around $16 billion per year is spent on military R&D procurement alone 
along with another $40-50 billion in spending on high-tech products. This makes defense 
spending – and military procurement in particular – one of the most significant topics for the 
study of induced innovation in the US economy.          
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In this paper I assess the impact of military procurement on corporate innovation among 
listed US firms, who have historically been the main recipients of DoD spending.  Specifically, I 
focus on the impacts of DoD funding on patenting and R&D investment and address two main 
questions. Firstly, what are the absolute and relative impacts of government defense procurement 
purchases on corporate patenting and R&D investment? The absolute impact is defined in terms 
of the elasticity between procurement and the two innovation measures while the relative impact 
is measured using the benchmark of an equivalent civilian-sector sales shocks. Secondly, given 
these impacts, what has been the historical magnitude of the defense sector’s contribution to 
corporate innovation through the procurement channel? These questions are important not only 
because of the size of the procurement budget but also because of debate about the innovative 
qualities of military spending.                 
This debate has stressed the special characteristics military spending on a number of 
counts.  On the negative side, it is argued that the effectiveness of defense-oriented production in 
fostering innovation is likely to be lower than comparable effort directed at the civilian economy. 
This argument is based on the specialized, mission-focus of defense production. For example, 
spending on defense R&D has emphasized the “D” component of development rather than “R” 
element of basic science134. Furthermore, defense production is thought to prioritize technical, 
battlefield performance as a main goal thereby sacrificing efficiency, cost-effectiveness and 
potential dual-use in the civilian sector. There is also a line of argument regarding the potential 
‘crowding out’ and displacement effects of federally-funded R&D on private R&D135. Finally, 
defense production  is also notorious for its general inefficiency and high costs which have 
inevitable consequences for productivity. 
On the other side of the argument, it is possible that military procurement spending could 
have a positive impact on innovation. In particular, the high-tech nature of defense procurement 
sales could push out the ‘innovation possibilities frontier’ as firms commit their resources to more 
                                                          
134  Figures from the NSF(2006) indicate that between 1956-2005 work classified as ‘Development’ 
accounted for approximately 80% of DoD sponsored R&D while ‘Applied’ work had a 10-15% share and 
‘Basic’ R&D claimed less than 5%.    
135 The main crowding out channel here is the input market – federal spending could drive up the price of 
R&D inputs and lower the real value of spending (Goolsbee 1999). Investment displacement could also 
occur in cases where (for political or other reasons) the government has funded projects with high rate of 
private return.  Hence the government could be subsidizing projects that private companies would have 
pursued with their own funds (David, Hall and Toole 2000) 
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technically ambitious projects than those demanded by the civilian sector. Cozzi and Impullitti 
(2010) present a growth model along these lines where the technological composition of 
government spending matters for innovation. Specifically, they outline a ‘demand-pull’ channel 
where  a shift towards spending on high-tech goods increases the rewards for innovation and 
ultimately has an effect on the relative demand for skilled workers136. Ruttan (2006) also presents 
a detailed historical account that tracks the role of military funding in the development of crucial 
general purpose technologies such as jet passenger aviation, computing, nuclear energy and, most 
recently, the global positioning system (GPS) network. This historical literature suggests that the 
contribution of military spending to innovation could be significant but there is limited 
microeconomic evidence to support this at the level of individual firms.       
In this paper I fill this gap and assemble a new firm-level dataset on corporate innovation 
and defense procurement. This involves the matching of a major historical database of all DoD 
prime procurement contracts between 1966-2003 to firm-level information on publicly traded 
firms (from COMPUSTAT) and the NBER US Patent Database. The prime contracts database 
reports very detailed information including characteristics such as contractor identity, type of 
product sold, extent of competition, location of work, and dates of action among other features. 
This level of detail greatly facilitates the analysis in terms of both the heterogeneity of spending 
and the scope for identifying exogenous shifts in firm procurement receipts.  
Empirically, the potentially endogenous allocation of funding makes it important to 
identify such exogenous shifts in the amount of procurement contracts received by companies. 
The fact that changes in defense spending have historically been driven by strategic 
considerations assists in tracing out these spending shocks. In general, the procurement receipts of 
individual firms have been at the mercy of major turning points in defense spending such as the 
Korean war, Vietnam, the ‘Reagan build-up’ after the invasion of Afghanistan, the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, and latterly 9/11137. Historically, this means that some firms have been exposed to 
very sharp increases and decreases in DoD spending. In this paper, I identify exogenous shocks to 
                                                          
136 Their calibrated model posits that this government policy channel has an impact on innovation which 
then explains between 12-15% of observed changes in wage inequality between 1976-2001. This is 
consistent with earlier evidence by Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994) which found that changes in 
defense shipments accounted for just over 15% of the increase in non-production worker employment 
shares in the 1979-87 period. 
137 Changes in military strategy have also shifted the composition of spending. Markusen et al (1990) 
document how the rise of the ‘air power’ doctrine shifted the structure of spending circa WWII. This was 
followed by further changes as ballistic missile technology became strategically important in the 1950s.  
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firm procurement receipts by using the lagged product specialization of firms interacted with the 
current level of DoD spending in the firm’s hypothesized defense ‘product market’.  
Practically, this approach measures how the DoD’s aggregate and product-level spending 
decisions affect the procurement receipts of individual firms. The central assumption here is that 
no individual firm can influence the level of DoD demand for goods and services at the product 
(or indeed aggregate) level. Since my sample covers the period 1966-2003138 the major ‘turning 
point’ in aggregate spending is the 1980s Reagan build-up and subsequent cutbacks in the 1988-
2000 period under Bush and Clinton. My analysis therefore pays special attention to the structure 
of the build-up and the impact of this overall spending policy.     
The main results analyze the impact of defense-based sales relative all other non-defense 
or ‘civilian’ sales.  The OLS estimates indicate the elasticity between defense procurement and 
both measures of innovation is around 0.07. This implies that a 10% increase in procurement 
contracts is associated with a 0.7% increase in patenting and company-sponsored R&D. 
Benchmarking this elasticity against non-defense or ‘civilian’ sales I find that the estimated effect 
for patents is  twice as high as its civilian benchmark, supporting the idea that defense 
procurement is a  source of demand for high-tech production. Furthermore, this effect also holds 
for cite-weighted patents indicating that the additional patents are not secured through a quality 
trade-off. The effects for company-sponsored R&D are broadly in line with the civilian sales 
benchmark but are much higher when total R&D (including external, defense-funded R&D) is 
considered. The proposed IV (firm-specific product market shocks)  strongly predicts defense 
procurement and suggests elasticities higher than the OLS estimates for both patents and R&D. 
The effectiveness of the IV strategy is supported by an analysis of the DoD’s product level 
spending patterns. Specifically, following the main identification assumption outlined above, 
there is no evidence that firms in concentrated industries are able to tilt DoD spending in their 
own favor.    
Finally, in terms of historical magnitudes, the contribution of defense procurement to 
innovation peaked during the early Reagan build-up when the defense sector accounted for 11.4% 
of the total increasing in patenting and 6.5% of the change in R&D. This is a large effect given 
that the defense share of sales is around 4% for the full corporate sample. These magnitudes are 
calculated using an industry-level decomposition and it is notable that the majority of the 
patenting effect is due to within industry changes. This is consistent with the firm-level estimates 
                                                          
138 Changes in the procurement reporting system after 2003 make it difficult to link up the data from 2004 
onwards. See the data section for further notes. 
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which indicate that defense procurement spending strongly stimulates patenting.  The later 
cutbacks under Bush Senior and Clinton then served to moderate the growth in technological 
intensity with the between industry shifts in defense output curbing the total trend increase by 2%.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section offers more background and a 
discussion of data. The modeling approach is then outlined, followed by the discussion of results 
and conclusions.              
5.2 Background   
5.21 Defense Procurement Policy in the US 
In this section I discuss three main features of US defense procurement policy relevant to 
this study. The first important feature is the scale of procurement spending in this area. Figure 2a 
plots the total amount of procurement spending by fiscal year from 1966 (expressed in 2003 
prices). This data is derived from the historical files used for the empirical work in this paper. 
Spending peaks at over $220 billion in 1985 and records its lowest levels after Vietnam and in the 
mid-1990s prior to end of the Clinton administration. This total includes goods and services 
purchased from all types of contractors, including listed firms, non-listed firms and universities or 
other research institutes. Based on the calculations from my matched dataset the COMPUSTAT-
listed firms are the biggest group of contractors in weighted dollar terms, accounting for 60-70% 
of all spending per fiscal year. 
The second important feature of procurement policy relates to the structure of spending. 
Contracts in the DoD procurement database are classified according to a 4-digit product code. 
While there are over 1500 4-digit products across 155 2-digit groups, spending is still heavily 
concentrated amongst a subset of products. Figure 2b shows the procurement spending shares of 
the ‘Top 10’ products at the 2-digit level. The DoD’s purchases are massively capital and 
research intensive with R&D, electronics, ships, and missiles making up a large fraction of 
spending alongside regular armed forces supplies such as subsistence and fuel. This large share 
for the Top 10 products is a consistent feature and in later analysis I explore how product shares 
changed over time.           
The final important background feature to DoD policy is the way that procurement 
spending decisions are taken. Specifically, the DoD purchases its major goods and services on 
both a competitive and non-competitive basis following a ‘life-cycle’ model. For example, when 
the DoD commissions a new weapons system it establishes a ‘technical design competition’ and 
solicits detailed, scientific proposals from potential contractors. Firms contest this stage 
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vigorously because winning a design contest assures them of receiving non-competitive follow-on 
contracts. These follow-on contracts relate to supply and maintenance – since the firm designed 
the weapon system it has monopoly power over its ongoing provision. The DoD’s power in this 
situation depends on its ability to substitute across weapons system which according to a study by 
Lichtenberg (1990) is limited139. The uncertainty inherent in high-tech defense projects (Peck and 
Scherer 1962) also means that costs for the DoD often increase after the competitive stage, 
enhancing the financial position of the locked-in contractor.  
Practically, the DoD supports the design competition process by providing on ongoing 
R&D subsidy for firms so that they are primed to submit detailed technical bids.  The effects of 
the DoD’s overall policies are therefore felt by firms both on the demand-side (through 
procurement policy) and the supply-side (via the R&D subsidy).   
5.22 Analytical Framework 
The demand and supply-side effects of DoD policy on firm-level innovation can be 
understood using the general framework established by Hall, David and Toole (2000) who in turn 
built on the work of Howe and McFetridge (1976). This framework is illustrated in Figure 3 and 
contains some obvious components. Over each planning period, firms rank potential innovation 
projects according to their anticipated yield thereby forming a marginal rate of return (MRR) 
schedule. The volume of innovation investment here is denoted as R&D. The marginal cost of 
capital for funding these potential innovation projects is then traced out by the upward sloping 
MCC schedule. The upward slope of the MCC reflects the increasing cost of funds as the volume 
of R&D increases. The use of internal firm funds is represented by the flatter area of the MCC 
with external financing accounting for the upward slope. This very simple framework can be set 
up as: 
1( , )MRR f R Z=     (5.1) 
2( , )MCC g R Z=   (5.2) 
with R standing for R&D expenditures  while the 1Z  and 2Z  vectors capture ‘shift variables’ 
that respectively affect the range of project rates of return and the marginal costs of capital. Of 
course, the optimal R&D occurs where the MRR and MCC are equalized, such that 
* ( , )R h X Z= .  
                                                          
139 Lichtenberg (1990) studies data on cost and quantity revisions at the weapon systems level and finds an 
elasticity of demand of 0.55.  
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The impact of federal procurement funds can then be nested according to potential shift 
factors. Hall et al (2000) summarize the 1Z  vector for the MRR according to three types of 
variables: those that affect technological opportunities; those influencing the state of demand for a 
firm over its lines of business; and finally, institutional factors that affect the appropriation of 
innovation outputs. By analogy the MCC shifters can be categorized as: firstly technology policy 
measures that directly target the cost of capital; then macroeconomic conditions that affect 
internal funds; bond market conditions underpinning the cost of external finance; and finally 
institutions affecting the availability of finance (i.e. venture capital).  
Procurement contracts such as those offered by the DoD are therefore best framed as 
demand shifters affecting the MRR. As discussed, contracts for R&D services are frequently 
coupled with valuable, non-competitive follow-on contracts for the final goods designed as part 
of the research process. The large demand component therefore has the effect of moving the firm 
MRR schedule outwards. Furthermore, this is not a secular increase in demand but rather one that 
applies for military-related innovation investments. Following the introductory discussion,  the 
increased emphasis on military-related investments could then have a positive or negative effect 
on the subsequent innovation outputs of firms (chiefly measured in this paper by patents).     
This type of shift in the MRR contrasts with the effects of a direct R&D grant or subsidy. 
Such policies increase the effective level of internal funds and shift the MCC schedule to the right. 
It should be noted that there is a clear distinction in DoD policy between procurement and 
subsidy-based R&D funds. The DoD administers a subsidy policy known as the Independent 
Research and Development (IR&D) program. This program reimburses firms for the overhead 
costs incurred as part of non-contract work that is related to military R&D priorities broadly 
defined.  The work is independent in the sense that the research projects involved are selected and 
initiated by the private company itself. The main objective of the program is to underwrite the 
efforts of firms in participating in technical design competitions for new projects as outlined in 
the previous section.  The role of the IR&D program was studied in detail by Lichtenberg (1989, 
1990).  
Given this overall background, this paper mainly treats procurement spending as working 
through the demand–side of the firm innovation investment decision. While some shifts in the 
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MCC could still be induced by changes in procurement spending policy 140  the majority of 
procurement effects are likely to fall on the demand-side. However, the presence of the IR&D 
program complicates the analysis. This program operates in parallel to procurement spending and 
will have the effect of pushing the MCC outwards.   
Systematic data on the IR&D subsidy is not as readily available as the information on 
procurement but  some conclusions about its influence can be drawn. Firstly, the level of the 
IR&D subsidy is determined by a formula  that depends in part on lagged level of procurement 
spending. As such, the IR&D subsidy will be correlated with firm procurement receipts, albeit 
with a delay141. Secondly, while the IR&D subsidy is valuable to firms it is still small compared 
to the total value of procurement. For example, Lichtenberg (1990) calculates that allowable costs 
under the IR&D policy were worth $3.5billion in 1986 for all contractors which represents only 
2.5% of the total procurement budget. The ultimate implication of this correlation between the 
two policies (that is, the IR&D subsidy and procurement spending) is that the reduced form 
estimates I present below will be picking up some degree of shift in the MCC along with the 
bigger effects of procurement on the MRR.   
5.3 Data 
Three main datasets are used to build the long-run firm panel used in this paper: historical 
military procurement data from the  National Archives and Records Administration (NARA); US 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) information on patents (as compiled by Hall, Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg (2002) as part of their NBER project); and company accounts information from 
COMPUSTAT. The details of each dataset are discussed in turn.  
5.31 DoD Procurement Contracts  
The NARA historical files on military procurement contain all prime military contracts 
awarded by the Department of Defense (DoD) since the 1966 Fiscal Year (FY) and until FY 2003. 
After 2003, the DoD changed its procurement reporting format. It began to report its procurement 
                                                          
140 For example, this could occur in cases where the signal of demand from the DoD makes firms more 
attractive to external sources of finance and in situations where procurement has a ‘pump priming’ effect 
that lowers the fixed costs of research.    
141 Lichtenberg (1989,1990) explains that the IR&D subsidy is calculated as the firm’s defense sales-to-
total sales ratio multiplied by a ceiling amount for allowable R&D costs. This ceiling is determined by 
lagged R&D expenditures claimed under the program. In turn, this means that firms are able to claw back 
expenditures that exceed the ceiling in the current period because the overspend has the effect of ratcheting 
up the ceiling in future periods.  
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information as part of the highly complicated Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS). I plan to 
include post-2003 data from the FPDS in future iterations of the paper.   
The file for each FY contains records on approximately 250,000 different contracts 
awarded by all DoD sub-agencies for the purchase of goods and services. The records are drawn 
from a standardized departmental form known as the DD 350 or more eloquently as the 
“Individual Contracting Action Report”. The minimum reporting threshold for purchases is 
$10,000 for FY1966 – FY1983 and $25,000 for FY1984 onwards.  
The data are exhaustive and summarize many details of each contract, such as: the names 
and unique identifiers of the awardees; contracting office within the DoD; types of contracts (e.g. 
competitive versus non-competitive); dates of action; estimated completion date; geographic 
location of the contractor (city, county and state); weapon system code; and importantly a 4-digit 
product code (known as the Federal Supply Code (FSC)). While there is some addition and 
deletion of products the FSC classification is consistently defined from 1966, making it feasible 
to define a 155 product panel across the 1966-2003 period. The NARA data are probably the most 
detailed historical data on government procurement available anywhere and were only released in 
this form in the late 2000s. As a result, research using these military procurement files is still very 
limited. Some examples of work that uses defense procurement data of this type includes Hines 
and Guthrie (2011) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2011), along with the Frank Lichtenberg’s 
program of work in the 1980s and early 1990s (summarized in Lichtenberg 1995).       
5.32 COMPUSTAT Accounts data 
The COMPUSTAT database provides accounts information on stock-market listed firms, 
with annual information available from 1950 onwards. I extracted the raw data for all firms from 
1966 onwards. In cleaning the sample, all accounting and procurement variables were winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The final sample reported in the regressions from Table 5.2 onwards 
drops all firms with fewer than four years of consecutive data. Furthermore, note that the sample 
used from Table 5.2  also conditions on the existence of a 10-year lag for procurement receipts 
and therefore begins in 1976. This is because the proposed exogenous shocks term is based on 10-
year lagged product shares.  
 
In terms of variable definitions, sales (mnemonic SALE) is used as the output measure;  
the net stock of property, plant and equipment (PPENT) is used for the book value of capital, and 
the labour input is represented by employees (EMP). The R&D capital stock is defined following 
the perpetual inventory method (PIM) using a 15% depreciation rate as 1(1 )t t tG R G −= + −
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where 
tR  represents the flow of company-sponsored R&D expenditures (mnemonic XRD). Note 
that this is also the approach taken for the calculation of patent stocks using the USPTO data. The 
return on assets is define as Net Income (NI) over Current Assets (ACT). The return on sales  
from data on Sales,  Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) and Selling and Administrative Costs (XSGA).         
5.33 Measuring R&D 
The measurement of R&D deserves special attention in the context of defense 
procurement spending. The flow of R&D expenditures reported in COMPUSTAT represents the 
sum of company-sponsored R&D. This follows the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) 
definition of R&D as all costs incurred for research and development into new products, 
processes or services. Importantly, this SEC definition excludes customer and government 
sponsored R&D, including the R&D awarded to firms as part of defense procurement contracts142. 
Practically, this means that the COMPUSTAT measure of R&D is not picking up the total 
amount of R&D activities conducted at a firm. In contrast, the Science Research Statistics (SRS) 
branch of the NSF conducts a Survey of Industrial Research and Development (SIR&D) which 
surveys R&D spending according to all types of funds. This survey indicates that the company-
sponsored R&D measured in COMPUSTAT represents around 80% of total R&D expenditures, 
with the remainder made up mainly of government sponsored R&D.  
This measurement issue impinges on some of the econometric models estimated in this 
paper. For example, it means that the implied elasticity between R&D and patenting will be 
biased upwards for firms that receive large sums of defense procurement business. This is simply 
because the full sum of the firm’s expenditure on R&D inputs is not factored into the company-
sponsored measure that is given by COMPUSTAT. 
The extent of this bias can be evaluated by comparing the COMPUSTAT measure to 
other measures of R&D (such as that reported in the SIR&D) that do include government-
sponsored portion of expenditures. However, in lieu of access to the SIR&D survey I construct a 
measure of ‘Company Plus’ R&D that is based on the company-sponsored R&D reported in 
COMPUSTAT plus the value of the procurement contracts reported in the NARA files that are 
                                                          
142 Other items excluded from the COMPUSTAT measure of R&D include: software-related expenses, the 
cost of extractive activities (ie: prospecting, drilling); routine engineering activities directed at product and 
process improvements; inventory royalties; and market research or testing (NSF 2006).    
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product coded as R&D. Results using this ‘Company Plus’ measure of R&D are reported 
alongside results for the company-sponsored only measure143.   
5.34 Patents Data - General 
The final key dataset for the project is the NBER US Patents Database (Hall et al. 2002). 
These data were produced as part of an ongoing NBER project that processes raw USPTO patent 
data and matches patent assignees against the full historical set of stock-market listed firms. The 
data were first produced in 1999 with an update in 2006 and ongoing work to deepen the dataset.  
The NBER Patents data provides the frame for the name matching exercise that I conduct 
across the three datasets. That is, I used the list of the assignees from the NBER database as the 
main source of names to be matched to the NARA procurement database. The string-based name-
matching is implemented using the usual procedures outlined in work such as Hall et al (2002) 
and Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen (2010). The presence of Dun and Bradstreet (DNB) business 
numbers allows me to consolidate establishments in the procurement data to the HQ level before 
matching. For completeness, I match COMPUSTAT company names directly to the procurement 
database to capture cases where firms receive defense contracts but do not necessarily patent. 
Finally, I also manually match assignees and contractors in cases where high-value contracts 
cannot be matched using the automatic method. Final match rates are high in weighted dollar 
value terms. Approximately 78% of contracts by weighted value are matched to either the NBER 
Patents Database or COMPUSTAT. This rises to around 94% for contracts classed under R&D 
product codes.       
5.35 Patents Data – Defining Military Patents 
Given the focus of this paper, it is interesting to ask whether defense procurement has 
induced more innovation directed at defense-based technologies. To look at this I define a 
measure of ‘military-intensive’ patent classes. This measure is meant to represent patents 
produced under conditions where clear DoD interests can be inferred. The logic here is that 
patents falling in these technology classes are more likely to represent specialized military 
technologies.  
 
                                                          
143  While defense-sponsored R&D represents a large fraction of all government-sponsored R&D 
(approximately 50% for the main sample considered in this paper), other federal departments will also 
contribute funds. Future iterations of this paper will match in data on non-defense Federal procurement 
contracts in order to complete this picture of total firm R&D expenditures.  
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These military technology classes are defined following two criteria. Firstly, I filter out 
all private company patents where the DoD holds some shared property rights. This is derived 
using the Government Support field within the USPTO Patent Grant Full Text files144. This field 
notes cases where a patent was ‘made with Government Support’ such that public agencies can 
claim some legal rights to the invention. Typically, the Government Support section of the full 
text files gives the name of the agency concerned (for example, the US Navy) and the 
procurement contract number. An example of a ‘Government Interest’ declaration in a 1987 
Navy-sponsored missile patent by the Hughes Aircraft Company is given in Appendix A.2. As 
part of this work, I extract all cases of government-supported patents involving DoD agencies.  
Secondly, these DoD Government Interest patents are then pooled with the DOD patents 
created in-house by the Army, Navy and Air Force in order to create a group of military 
specialized patents. The patents in this pool are then allocated according to their technology class, 
with these classes ranked according to the proportion of military patents falling within them. The 
distribution of military patents is highly concentrated with over 45% of patents falling into the top 
10% of technology classes by rank. I then classify all patents falling within this top 10% of 
technology classes as the group of ‘military specialized patents’. As discussed, the rationale for 
this is based on the fact that these are the technology classes most commonly associated with 
direct DOD involvement and therefore represent the classes that are closest to the production of 
pure, military specialized goods.  Finally, patents falling in technology classes outside of this top 
10% are then classified as non-military or civilian patents.     
5.4 Modelling Approach 
5.41 Basic Econometric  Approach 
This paper considers two main technological outcomes of interest: patenting and R&D 
spending. Theoretically, these two equations can be motivated using a simple framework. First, 
consider a factor demand for R&D inputs derived from a simple production function 
1Q AG K L  −= where Q is firm output, G is knowledge capital (measured by R&D) and K and 
L  are the labor and capital inputs: 
ln ln ln[ / ]g xG Q p p = −   (5.3) 
                                                          
144 The specific version of the files used is that available from the Google Patents bulk download facility 
located at: http://www.google.com/googlebooks/uspto-patents-grants-text.html. 
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where ( / )g xp p is the relative price ratio between R&D and other types of input. Since 
patents are then produced by the firm mainly using these R&D inputs we can think of a firm-level 
patents production function defined as PAT BG
=  where B is an efficiency parameter. Taking 
logarithms and substituting in our expression for G above, we have: 
ln ln ln ln[ /g xPAT B Q p p   = + −   (5.4) 
 Empirically, note that the price ratio terms in (3) and (4) are constant across firms and 
absorbed by time effects. The most important term for the models estimated in this paper is output 
Q (measured by reported firm sales) which enters directly into (3) and indirectly with a 
coefficient of  into the patents equation defined by (4).   
This term is important because the value of defense contracts received by a firm in a 
given period can be interpreted as a sales term subject to caveats regarding measurement error.  
This sales-based interpretation of defense contracts provides the basis for the two main reduced 
form technology equations I estimate in this paper. Firstly, consider a generic firm-level outcome 
equation as follows:   
1 ( 1)ln ln ' *ijt i ij t ijt j ijtTECH D X sic t u  −= + + + +             (5.5) 
where ijtTECH  is a measure of innovation (either R&D or patents) observed at the level of firm i 
in industry j at time t; i is the firm fixed effect; ijtX   is a vector of explanatory variables;  sicj*t 
stands for industry-level time trends and uit is the disturbance term. The key variable of interest is 
( 1)ij tD − , the amount of defense procurement dollars received by firm i, lagged by one-period here 
to avoid immediate feedback effects.    
The most general issue for this type of reduced form is the potential bias on 1. The DoD 
is likely to award contracts to the most innovative and competitive firms in the market for 
defense-related goods, contributing to an upward bias on 1. Furthermore, the DoD also has an 
interest in acquiring and developing the latest technologies which means it could allocate its Dijt 
funds according to areas of growing technological opportunity. That is, the DoD’s spending could 
be targeting fields and product classes where TECH is already   growing for exogenous scientific 
reasons, again contributing to an upward bias on 1. The inclusion of firm fixed effects i and 
industry trends sicj*t terms are two steps that can be taken to deal with these issues and I discuss 
this more in the next sub-section.        
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A second important issue is the interpretation of 1, the coefficient on the value of 
defense procurement contracts. Extending the interpretation of this variable as a form of ‘defense 
sales’ we can  add a further term to this reduced form as follows:  
1 ( 1) 1 ( 1)ln ln ln ' *ijt i ij t ij t ijt j ijtTECH D C X sic t u   − −= + + + + +             (5.6) 
where ijtC  is the amount of all non-defense or ‘civilian’ customer sales. Practically, the civilian 
sales are calculated by subtracting the value of defense procurement contracts reported in the 
NARA data from total reported sales given by firms in COMPUSTAT. Including civilian sales in 
this way helps interpretation by giving us a benchmark to judge the value of 1. It can be 
expected that 2 1   simply due to the size of civilian sales relative to defense sales. That is, a 
10% change in civilian sales is necessarily larger than a 10% change in defense sales. However, 
the comparison we are interested in is the effect of given changes in defense or civilian sales that 
are of equal size. This is simply a matter of normalizing the elasticities by the defense-civilian 
sales ratio which allows us to test whether the implied coefficient for 1  (calculated as
( ) 2ˆ/ *D C  ) is different to the estimated 1ˆ
145. The implied coefficient here gives us the impact 
that a dollar of defense procurement sales would have on TECH if that dollar affected the firm in 
exactly the same way as any other dollar of civilian sales.   
The main difficulty with this approach to interpreting the effects of defense procurement 
is the measurement error involved in treating procurement as a form of sales. At face-value, the 
procurement contracts reported in the NARA are indeed the administratively recorded ‘sales’ of 
defense goods and services made by a firm to the government. However, the translation of the 
procurement dollars reported in the NARA data to the language of company accounts is distorted 
at two points. Firstly, the procurement dollars reported in the contracts data are aggregated 
according to start-date such that many multi-year projects are recorded up-front146. Secondly, the 
accounting treatment of procurement receipts as they enter into company accounts is very 
complicated (Lichtenberg 1992; Rogerson 1992, Thomas and Tung 1992).  
 
                                                          
145 To see this note that we are interested in ln / ln /TECH D TECH C     . Re-arranging this 
with respect to the elasticities gives us ln / ln ( / )*[ ln / ln ]TECH D D C TECH C     . 
146 The NARA data does contain information on the both the start date and end date of contracts. Hence it is 
possible to allocate the sales from multi-year contracts according to these dates. Future iterations of this 
paper will conduct this exercise. 
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One key matter identified by Rogerson (1992) is the cost-shifting of overheads. Under 
certain contract structures firms can shift their overheads on non-defense projects onto the 
overhead claims made for defense projects. Other accounting issues also include: the treatment of 
procurement receipts as ‘income’ rather than revenue147 ; interactions with non-defense policies 
such as the R&D tax credit; and accounting for sub-contracts within the NARA prime contracts. 
However, the main empirical implication here is that we can expect the measurement error to 
affect account-based variables such as R&D more severely than non-accounting variables such as 
patents. I return to this issue of measurement error in the discussion of results.                
5.42 Analysis of Patents 
Patenting is measured in terms of integer ‘counts’ of the number of applications made in 
a given year. This introduces a non-negligible number of zero observations. I deal with this firstly 
by applying the log ‘1 plus patents’ normalization that is commonly adopted. However, this is an 
arbitrary truncation. In the interests of robustness a more formal count data model is necessary. 
This can be specified as: 
( )1 ( 1) 1 ( 1)exp ln ln *P P P P P Pijt i ij t ij t ijt j ijtP D C X sic t u   − −= + + + + +       (5.7) 
where ijtP is the count of the firm i at time t, with the P superscripts denoting this as the 
patenting version of the general technology equation outlined previously in (6). Since the usual 
Poisson assumption that the variance and mean are equal is not valid in this context (the 
‘overdispersion’ problem), I adopt a negative binomial specification. This is estimated following 
the conditional maximum likelihood approach of Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984).  
5.43 Exogenous Shifts in Firm Procurement Receipts 
As discussed, the allocation of procurement funds is likely to follow some endogenous 
patterns. It is logical that the DoD will award contracts to firms that are already highly innovative 
– indeed  the competitive structure of the procurement process is designed to do this (subject to 
price considerations). It is also plausible that the DoD may target areas of growing technological 
opportunity as part of its objective to build the best military equipment possible. To address these 
endogeniety issues I will take three steps: (i) control for firm-level unobservables with fixed 
effects; (ii) include a full set of 4-digit industry trends; and (iii) adopt an IV strategy based on 
                                                          
147 For example, a firm can record the initial receipts for (say) a helicopter supply contract at first in income 
and then only as revenue when the final units are individually priced and delivered to the DoD. 
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exogenous shocks to firm procurement receipts. This section outlines the construction of the 
exogenous shocks variable.   
The detailed product-level information reported in the DoD prime contracts data provides 
a rich setting for defining identification strategies using a ‘shift-share’ approach. This  approach is 
based on taking the lagged product specialization of a firm or location and then calculating the 
current demand based on DoD procurement spending. Intuitively, the premise is that firms have a 
pre-existing specialization in types of goods purchased by the DoD. As the DoD varies its 
spending year by year then the size of the potential defense market for the firm changes.  If the 
firm’s shares across product groups are defined with a sufficient lag we can limit the influence of 
situations where firms endogenously enter into new product categories where the DoD is 
increasing spending. The lagged pattern of specialization is therefore designed to capture the 
firm’s core products for sale to the DoD.   
We can express this by first defining the historical product shares (here using a 10-year 
lag) for a firm: 
,( 10)
,( 10)
,( 10)
il t
il t
il t
d
d
−
−
−
 =

     (5.8) 
where  ,( 10)il td − represents the amount of procurement dollars received by firm i in product 
category l at lagged time period (t-10). This measures the firm or location’s degree of 
specialization across a basket of products. The level of total product demand for firm i in the 
current period can then be calculated as follows: 
                  ,( 10)
L
it il t iltd D−=                      (5.9) 
where iltD  is the sum of all procurement spending by the defense department in product category 
l during current period t. The expression in (9) therefore measures how the department’s spending 
patterns affect firm or location i based on a predetermined, historical  specialization. A key 
assumption here is that no individual firm can affect the level of demand in product group l (e.g. 
through political lobbying). The efficacy of this assumption can be tested by studying the pattern 
of spending at the product group level and relating it to group characteristics such as 
concentration ratios, market power or political clout.        
5.44 Calculating Magnitudes 
The modeling approach presented up until now has focused on estimating the firm-level 
relationship between procurement and innovation outcomes. Aggregate magnitudes can be 
calculated using these firm-level parameters and nesting them alongside a decomposition of 
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changes in technology. Defense procurement spending will have effects on both the ‘between’ 
firm or industry distribution of technology as well as the level of technology ‘within’ an industry 
or continuing firm. Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994) put forward an industry-level 
decomposition of skilled labor that incorporated the effects of defense-induced demand. Adapting 
this approach, a basic industry decomposition for changes in technology can be defined as follows: 
______
t j j j j
j j
Tech q Tech Tech q =  +                       (5.10) 
where ( )j j jq Q Q=  is the share of industry j output in total output across industries 
and ( )/j j jTech TECH Q=  is a measure of technological intensity per industry (ie: patents or 
R&D per dollar of sales). The tTech  term represents the aggregate change in technological 
intensity summed across all industries. The first term on the right-hand side of (9) then represents 
the change in overall technology that is explained by between industry shifts in output shares with 
industry-level technological intensity held constant. The second term measures the within 
industry shift in technological intensity while holding output shares fixed.  Berman et al (1994) 
modify this basic decomposition to account for three sectors operating within industries: domestic 
civilian production, defense-related production, and production for import and export. For current 
purposes I will focus only on the split between the civilian and defense production sectors. 
Assuming that technological outputs by sector are proportional to the sectoral share of industry 
output we can re-write the between component as:  
______ ______ ______
D C
j j j j j j
j j j
q Tech q Tech q Tech =  +      (5.11) 
where the D and C superscripts represent the defense and civilian production sectors 
within an industry. The within component can then be written in a similar fashion as: 
D C
j j j j j j
j j j
Tech q Tech q Tech q =  +      (5.12) 
with the same convention on the D and C superscripts. Note that the assumption that 
technological outputs are proportional to sectoral industry shares links back to the firm-level 
technology model outlined in equation (5.6).  This earlier model tests whether the within-firm 
production of technology is more responsive to defense procurement sales compared to non-
defense or civilian sales.  If technology is indeed more responsive to defense procurement sales 
then  this means the defense sector contribution measured in equation (5.11) is actually a lower-
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bound. In such a case, the defense sector contribution to industry-level technology will be larger 
than its proportional share in industry output.      
5.5 Results 
5.51 Basic Patenting and R&D Results 
Table 5.1 summarizes the sample constructed from the matching of the NARA, 
COMPUSTAT and NBER Patents data. For this table, the data is divided into three types of firms: 
those who never receive any defense procurement funding; the firms who receive funding in 
some of the years that they are observed but not all; and the firms that receive funding in all of the 
years that they are observed. In this paper my primary focus is on the latter section of the sample 
whose characteristics are reported in column (3). This is to done to capture the effects of intensive 
margin changes and avoid the problems of censoring that occur at zero values of defense sales. 
The main sample based on column (3) is therefore a selected sample, albeit representative of the 
majority of defense expenditures in weighted dollar terms. Of course, it is possible to estimate 
selection models and estimate bounds to evaluate the influence of this sampling choice.     
The data in Table 5.1 indicates that the firms selling goods and services to the DoD in all 
observed years are very research intensive, with more than three times as many patents as the 
firms in column (2), although mean R&D expenditures are comparable if we take account of the 
difference in sales.  On average, defense procurement  is equal to 4.9% of total firm sales for 
column (3) sample and this group of firms is responsible for 84% of  all DOD procurement 
purchases from listed firms. Clearly then, the fact that the ‘All Years’ sample represents such a 
large share of DoD purchases mitigates the sampling choice since most of the government 
procurement spending is encompassed by this definition. 
Table 5.2 then presents the basic results on patenting for variations of equations (3) and 
(4). Column (1) provides a basic specification with SIC4 fixed effects, resulting in a high 
coefficients of 0.320 and 0.409 for  patenting and company-sponsored R&D respectively. This is 
unsurprising insofar that we expect DoD purchases to be associated with the largest and most 
innovative firms ex ante. The second column in Panels (A) and (B) includes firm fixed effects to 
account for the unobservable characteristics of firms. This reduces the coefficient on defense 
procurement by 75% compared to the initial specification. The third column then includes 
SIC4*year industry trends as an additional control since both patenting and R&D have 
experienced strong upward trends in recent decades, with some industries increasing at higher 
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rates than others148. This results in a coefficient of around 0.07 for both outcomes. Applying this 
as an elasticity suggests that a 10% increase in procurement contracts is associated with a 0.7% 
increase in patenting and company-sponsored R&D. This is suggestive of a very high elasticity of 
around 1 between the defense-induced increase in R&D and the similar induced increase in 
patenting. To this end, column(4) of Panel B reports the result of a regression using the 
‘company-plus’ measure of R&D outlined in section III. This measure directly includes defense-
funded R&D in addition to company-sponsored R&D and the result in column (4) indicates an 
elasticity of around 0.70. This is closer in line with the observed elasticity between patents and 
R&D for this sample, which is approximately 0.67 (0.023).  
Finally, note here also that the negative binomial model for patents (column (4)) yields a 
similar estimate to the OLS model which adopts the log ‘1 plus patents’ normalization. Only 
around 15% of observations in this sample record a zero count for patents. As in Hausman, Hall 
and Griliches’ (1984) study of patents, R&D and count data methods it is therefore not surprising 
that the two estimates are similar.   
Table 5.3 tackles the question of whether this elasticity is large in terms of its economic 
context. This table estimates different versions of equation (6) which includes civilian sales as an 
additional term alongside defense procurement. As expected, the coefficient on civilian sales is 
much higher than that for defense sales. For example, the civilian sales coefficient for patenting is 
0.45 in the basic column (2) specification compared to 0.060 for defense procurement. Following 
the discussion in section IV, this is down to the fact that a 10% change in civilian sales is 
necessarily larger than a 10% increase in defense procurement. The implied 1 reported in this 
table therefore normalizes the civilian coefficient by the ratio of defense procurement to civilian 
sales. This provides a benchmark for the effect that defense procurement would have if it were 
just another increment of sales.  
The results indicate that the estimated 1 is significantly higher than the benchmark for 
patenting but not for company-sponsored R&D. Specifically, the estimated 1 for patenting is 
twice as high as the implied benchmark and the point estimate for company-sponsored R&D in 
panel (B), column(3) is over 15% higher than its relevant benchmark, although not significant. In 
contrast, the elasticity is much higher than the benchmark when the ‘company-plus’ measure of 
R&D is used (panel(B), column (4)). Importantly,  this difference in results across the R&D 
                                                          
148 See Hall, Jaffee and Trajtenberg (2001) for full details. For example, Computer and Communication 
related patents increase from around a 5% share in 1975 to over 15% by the mid-1990s. The share for the 
Mechanical category fell from over 25% to around 17-18% in the same time period.   
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measures  gives us some indication of how defense procurement is impacting overall company 
R&D. Specifically, the results show that the additional effect of defense procurement comes into 
play once defense-funded R&D is measured. However, the fact that defense procurement and 
civilian sales have similar effects on the private, company-sponsored portion of R&D (panel (B), 
column (3)) counts as evidence against any ‘crowding out’ of private R&D expenditures by 
defense R&D. Finally, as in Table 5.2, the implied elasticity between ‘company-plus’ R&D and 
patenting is approximately 0.54, which is in range of the baseline estimate for this sample of 0.65.  
To summarise, the results in Table 5.3 do strongly suggest that defense procurement sales 
are a source of demand for high-tech goods. The magnitude of this relationship for patenting 
indicates that this could be a very strong effect, with twice as many patents produced for a given 
dollar of defense sales compared to the same dollar of civilian sales. The effect on R&D is also 
twice as high as the civilian benchmark, although only when considering the expanded ‘company-
plus’ measure of R&D. However, it is notable that (contrary to the ‘crowding out’ hypothesis) a 
dollar of defense sales is associated with at least as much company-sponsored R&D as a dollar of 
civilian sales. 
5.52 Type and Quality of Patents 
Table 5.4 takes the analysis of patents further by studying the quality and type of patents. 
Following the discussion in section III, the total number of patents produced by firm i in year t is 
divided into two groups: military specialized or ‘defense’ patents (ie: those patents belonging to 
technology classes that are the main focus of direct DoD invention); and non-military or ‘civilian’ 
patents (in practice, all patents belonging to technology classes outside of the military specialized 
set). Panel (A) of Table 5.4 provides evidence on the effect of sales on different types of patents, 
with the first column repeating the result for total patents initially reported in Table 5.3. There are 
two points to note about panel (A). Firstly, there is some suggestive evidence that military patents 
are more affected by defense sales than civilian sales. The  civilian sales coefficient is lower in 
column (2) relative to column (3) and the defense sales coefficient in column(2) is further away 
from its implied benchmark value as a result. Secondly, it is clear that defense sales are strongly 
associated with both types of patents. This indicates that defense procurement has an effect on 
innovation outside of a limited set of military patent classes. Specifically, this means that 
increases in defense sales do not strongly favor military technologies over civilian technologies 
but rather there is a general effect on innovation across technology classes.  
Table 5.4 also addresses the issue of patent quality by examining backward citations. This 
represents a measure of scientific importance based on the number of citations made to a patent 
subsequent to its granting. The issue of quality is important insofar that the higher patenting due 
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to defense sales could be a function of firms moving down their investment curves for innovation, 
that is, producing a higher quantity but lower quality of innovations in terms of scientific 
importance. Table 5.4 tests this first by using a count of citations as the dependent variable in 
columns (4). This leads to a coefficient of 0.067 for the specification with industry trends which 
is comparable to the coefficient of 0.059 for patenting in Table 5.3. This estimate for citations is 
still well above the implied benchmark of 0.032 but there is less precision compared to the Table 
5.2 result. The next two columns then distinguish between cite-weighted military and civilian 
patents. Again, the effect of defense sales is well above the implied benchmark for both measures, 
although the effect is stronger for military patents. The overall conclusion from Table 5.4 then is 
that defense procurement stimulates patenting significantly above the civilian benchmark with a 
minimal trade-off in terms of cite-weighted quality.  
5.53 Impact of Exogenous Shocks 
 The results presented so far have dealt with endogeniety issues firstly by including firm 
fixed effects (to deal with unobservables) and then by including a full set of 4-digit industry time 
trends (to capture trends in patenting). Both of these measures reduced the coefficient on defense 
sales across specifications. Table 5.5 reports further evidence based on the exogenous shocks 
variable outlined in section III. Panels (A) and (B) cover patents and the ‘company-plus’ measure 
of R&D respectively, with columns (1) and (4) repeating the analogous OLS models from earlier 
tables. 
Column (2) reports the first stage reduced form equation for patents. This indicates that 
the product market shocks variable is a positive and highly significant predictor of firm 
procurement receipts. This carries through to the reduced form regression of product market 
shocks directly on patents reported in column (2).  These results are consolidated in the IV 
estimate reported in column (3). Interestingly, the estimates here are higher than those for the 
equivalent OLS, within-groups specification (column(1)). A similar pattern of results holds for 
R&D in panel (B).  Given the probable influence of the measurement error in defense sales 
(exacerbated by within groups estimation) the fact that the IV is estimate is higher than the OLS 
can be expected to some extent. Furthermore, the IV estimates in column (4) and (8) are still 
lower than the basic OLS estimates without fixed effects presented in Table 5.2. Finally, the IV 
estimates could conceivably be picking up the effects of spillovers from defense-induced 
increases in R&D and knowledge capital stocks that are external to the firm. I discuss this in more 
detail at the end of the next section. 
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5.54 Validity of IV Strategy 
The validity of the overall IV result depends on the robustness of the identification 
strategy. One of the key assumptions of this strategy is that individual firms (or indeed groups of 
firms operating in the same product area) are unable to affect the level of spending chosen by the 
DoD. Specifically, it would be problematic if large, highly innovative firms were able to 
influence the pattern of the DoD’s spending towards their own industries and product groups. 
Two pieces of evidence on DoD spending patterns are useful here. Firstly, Figure 4 shows how 
the share of spending for the Top 10 product groups has changed over time. As discussed, 
spending is very concentrated on this group of 10 products which unsurprisingly contain the 
major categories for the production of aircraft, ships, engines and electronics. The share of 
spending for the top 10 only begins to trend downwards after the end of the Reagan build-up in 
the late 1980s. Hence, stability in product shares up until this time was followed by a period 
where spending began to shift away from the technologically intensive Top 10 group.  This is of 
course opposite to the expectation that firms in these industries could be influencing DoD 
spending policy in their own favor. 
Table 5.6 provides a second piece of evidence that reinforces the message from Figure 4. 
This table is based on a collapsed 2-digit product panel of all DoD procurement spending. The 
objective here is to test whether spending changes are correlated with the level of market 
concentration in each product group. The independent variable used is a Herfindahl index, 
defined as: 
2
1
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Where ilth  is the market share of a contractor selling goods to the DoD in product group l. 
These shares are calculated for the top 50 contractors in each 2-digit product group. Higher values 
of the index are associated with more concentrated product groups.  The results indicate a 
negative associated between the Herfindahl index and changes in spending at the 2-digit level. 
This is consistent with the trend evident in Figure 4, namely that DoD spending has been trending 
strongly away from the concentrated, technologically-intensive product groups.   This  supports 
the assumption that firms in these industries  are unable to affect the level of spending chosen by 
the DoD in their own favor149.   
                                                          
149 As discussed, another issue for this identification strategy is the potential role of spillovers that are 
correlated with firm-level spending shocks. This issue was outlined in detail in earlier sections and will 
implemented in future iterations of the paper. 
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Finally, another issue for the identification strategy is the potential role of spillovers. As 
outlined in Appendix A, the product market shocks variable could affecting firms indirectly via 
spillover channels as well as directly through increased firm procurement receipts. Put simply, 
any DoD demand shocks that impact a given firm i will affect other firms working in the same 
technology space as i. If these other firms then increase their R&D and patenting firm i could 
benefit following the standard spillovers argument. Hence the spillover provides an extra effect of 
defense procurement in addition to direct effect of firm receipts.  The fact that the IV estimates 
are higher than the OLS bears this out. Hence, future iterations of this paper will test for these 
spillover effects following the approach outlined in Appendix A.1. 
5.55 Historical Magnitudes 
The results up until this point have focused on the firm-level relationship between 
technology and defense procurement sales.  These results can be nested alongside an industry 
decomposition to understand the historical magnitude of the defense sector’s contribution to 
innovation over different policy phases. Table 5.7 reports the results of a SIC3 industry 
decomposition of patenting and R&D intensity for each 4-year Presidential administration. As 
discussed, this decomposition follows the approach of Berman et al (1994) who studied the 
impact of trade, the defense build-up and biased technical change on the demand for skilled labor 
in US manufacturing.  Note that the results in Table 5.7 are calculated using the full, collapsed 
COMPUSTAT database rather than just the sub-sample of firms who receive funding from 
defense contracts at some point. This is in line with the goal of estimating the defense sector’s 
contribution with respect to the whole population of listed, corporate innovators. 
Technological intensity grew strongly over the period being considered. The aggregate 
R&D share of sales grew from 0.014 in the 1977 to 0.024 in 1988 and 0.036 by 2000. Similarly, 
the number of patents per dollar of sales grew from approximately 0.036 per ten million dollars of 
industry sales in 1977 to 0.043 in 1988 and 0.075 in 2000.  The first point to note from Table 5.7 
is the overall breakdown of the within and between components behind this growth in R&D and 
patenting intensity. The first column indicates that between industry shifts account for around 35-
45% which is comparable to other studies of this type150. Columns (2) and (3) then report the 
share of the between and within components that is accounted for by the defense sector. For 
                                                          
150 For example, the Berman et al (1994) study of skilled labor shares estimates a total between component 
of 37% for the 1973-79 period and 30% for 1979-1987.    
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example, 5.5% of the total between share of 43.1% in 1981-1984 is due shifts in the defense 
sector. In turn, this yields the total defense contribution of 2.4% (column 4). In plain english, this 
says that the between industry shifts induced by the defense sector accounted for 2.4% of the total 
rise in patenting intensity in the 1981-1984 period.  
The main qualitative message from Table 5.7 is the big role that the defense sector had in 
the first half of the Reagan build-up. The defense contribution peaked in the 1981-84 period, 
accounting for 11.4% of the change in the aggregate patenting intensity and 6.5% for R&D 
intensity. In the case of patenting, most of the effect (9%) is due to the within component. This is 
consistent with the findings of the firm-level models which showed that defense procurement 
stimulated within-firm patenting by more than would be expected from a conventional sales 
shock. The within industry component for R&D intensity (3.3%) is lower than the analogous 
figure for patenting and again this is consistent with the firm-level evidence of more limited R&D 
effects.   
The figures for the later post-Cold War periods show the predicted impact of reductions 
in defense procurement on patenting and R&D intensity. Specifically, since we are dealing with 
changes over time, these figures show how the reduction in defense spending slowed down the 
growth in technological intensity.   This effect is strongest for the period immediately after the 
Reagan build-up (1989-1992)  where the between industry shift away from defense production 
had a negative contribution of around -2% across both measures of technology. Interestingly, 
these is a persistent, positive within- industry  defense contribution for patenting in the 1989-1996 
period.  Finally, note that while the cuts to defense procurement slowed down the growth of 
technology this was offset at the aggregate level by surges of patenting and R&D investment in 
other parts of the economy151.         
5.6 CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have examined the impact of defense procurement spending on innovation 
and other related outcomes in a long-run sample of US listed firms. The motivation is 
straightforward: defense procurement spending  is one of the major, direct policy channels 
through which the government can affect firms. This has been the case since WWII and the sharp 
increase in defense spending that occurred after 9/11 makes it of continued relevance. The high-
tech composition of procurement spending also makes it a significant de facto innovation policy, 
                                                          
151 See Kortum and Lerner (1998) and the Congressional Budget Office (2005) for discussions of these 
trends for patenting and R&D investment respectively. 
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alongside more explicit policies such as R&D tax credits and government support for basic 
science.   
 
The paper has put forward evidence on two main questions. First is the relative impact of 
defense procurement sales on firm patenting and R&D expenditure, using civilian sales as the 
benchmark. The results indicate that the elasticity between defense procurement and both 
measures of innovation is approximately 0.07. This elasticity is in line with the civilian 
benchmark for R&D but well above the same benchmark for patenting. Furthermore, the patents 
stimulated by defense procurement maintain their level of quality measured in terms of citations.   
Direct evidence on this question has not been available before. It has been often speculated that 
the narrow, mission-focus of defense spending may limit its potential impact on innovation. On 
the other hand, the high-tech composition of defense procurement sales was always likely to skew 
the innovative impact of this spending upwards. The results in this paper strongly support this 
second view of procurement as a source of demand for high-tech products. 
 
However, it must be noted that the results currently compare average defense sales 
against average civilian sales, with no allowance for the composition of civilian spending. The 
availability of data on non-defense Federal contracts allows me to look at this issue in more 
detail152. Future iterations of this paper will therefore test the efficacy of defense sales against the 
sales of comparable goods purchased by other Federal departments. This will allow me test 
whether there is a distinctive effects of defense procurement after controlling for product 
composition.           
 
The second major question discussed has been the magnitude of the impacts from defense 
procurement. The basic magnitudes calculated here indicate that defense procurement accounted 
for 6-11% of the growth in patenting and R&D during the early Reagan-build-up. Cutbacks in 
spending during the Bush and Clinton administrations then acted as moderating influence, 
slowing innovation by up to 2%. Finally, it must be noted that this finding on magnitudes should 
not be considered an endorsement of defense procurement as a primary innovation policy tool. 
The final ledger entry on procurement impacts needs to take account of cost-effectiveness and 
                                                          
152 The National Archive holds also records for all non-defense Federal procurement contracts from 1979-
97.  After 1997 these contract records are kept as part of the Federal Procurement  Data System (FPDS).  
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directly compare dollar-for-dollar impacts from procurement against policy tools such as R&D 
tax credits.   
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FIGURE 5.1: REAL DEFENSE SPENDING. 
 
Notes: Source is Table 6 (Composition of Outlays) in  Historical Tables, Budget of the US Government, 
Fiscal Year 2005. Deflated by the GNP deflator (base year 2003).   
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FIGURE 5.2A: TOTAL DEFENSE PROCUREMENT RECEIPTS, FY1966-FY2003. 
 
Source: National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) Historical Files on military procurement. 
Deflated by the GNP deflator (base year 2003).  
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FIGURE 5.2b: PROCURMENT SPENDING SHARES, TOP 10 2-DIGIT PRODUCTS. 
 
Notes: These top 10 products are: R&D (for Equipment); Aircraft & Airframe Structural Components; 
Communications, Detection and Coherent Radiation equipment; Ships and Small Craft; Engines, Turbines 
and Components; Guided Missiles; Fuel and Lubricants; Ammunition & Explosives; Maintenance and 
Repair; and Subsistence. Note that the R&D (for Equipment) category includes R&D on Aircraft, Missiles, 
Ships, Tanks, Weapons and Electronics. Source is National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) 
Historical Files on military procurement.   
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FIGURE 5.3: DETERMINANTS OF PRIVATE R&D INVESTMENT. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        R&D Investment  
Notes: This figure illustrates the discussion in Section II (Background). Defense contractors receive a 
subsidy as part of the Independent Research and Development (IR&D) program to assist them in 
participating technical bids for DoD design competitions. This subsidy lowers the cost of capital shifts the 
MCC schedule down. Procurement contracts (often occurring as non-competitive follow-ons from design 
competitions) shift the MRR schedule outwards and are quantitatively more valuable than the IR&D 
subsidy.   
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FIGURE 5.4: SHARE OF TOP 10 PRODUCTS IN DEFENSE PROCURMENT,  
FY1996-FY2003 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows the share of the ‘Top 10’ 2-digit products by dollar value in total procurement 
spending. These top 10 products are: Aircraft & Airframe Structural Components; Ships and Small Craft; 
Engines, Turbines and Components; Communications, Detection and Coherent Radiation; Aircraft R&D; 
Ammunition & Explosives; Guided Missiles; Subsistence; Fuel and Lubricants; and Maintenance and 
Repair. Source is National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) Historical Files on military 
procurement.  
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TABLE 5.1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, MATCHED SAMPLE,  
1966-2003 (MANUFACTURING) 
 
  
(1) 
No Defense 
Procurement 
 
(2) 
Receive 
Defense Procurement 
(Some Years) 
(3) 
 Receive 
Defense Procurement 
(All Years) 
Patent Count 1.9 10.4 24.0 
 (21.4) (80.0) (87.6) 
Citation Count 11.4 82.9 216.5 
  (121.8) (656.2) (828.6) 
‘Military’ Patent Count 0.7 4.0 7.2 
 (11.5) (33.0) (24.8) 
Employment (in 1000s) 2.9 5.1 11.3 
  (8.2) (12.2) (18.1) 
Employment (median) 0.51 1.1 3.1 
    
Sales 648.4 1073.3 2272.0 
  (2133.0) (2953.8) (4115.8) 
Sales (median) 93.9 181.2 439.4 
    
Company-sponsored R&D 18.2 39.1 73.1 
  (79.3) (111.3) (170.9) 
Defense R&D na 2.6 12.0 
  (28.8) (55.3) 
(R&D/Sales) 0.045 0.040 0.040 
 (0.123) (0.095) (0.060) 
(Defense Sales / Sales) na 0.014 0.049 
  (0.071) (0.116) 
Defense Sales (DS) na 7.0 52.4 
  (106.5) (238.3) 
SIC35 Share 0.108 0.159 0.188 
SIC36 Share  0.128 0.156 0.217 
SIC37 Share 0.043 0.054 0.080 
SIC38 Share 0.088 0.125 0.174 
Number of Firms 5,976 2,207 664 
Number of Observations 56,394 36,270 19,579 
Column (1) reports statistics for firms who never receive any defense procurement contracts, Column (2) 
reports for firms who receive contracts in some but not all years. Column(3) reports for the sample of firms 
who receive contracts in all observed years. Sales, R&D, Defense Sales in million dollar units. 
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TABLE 5.2: PATENTING, R&D AND DEFENSE PROCUREMENT, 1976-2003. 
(A) Patenting      
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 ln(1+PAT) ln(1+PAT) ln(1+PAT) (PAT) 
     
ln(Defense)t-1     0.320***     0.079***     0.071***     0.080*** 
  (0.029) (0.016) (0.014) (0.008) 
      
Firm Fixed Effects  No Yes Yes Yes 
SIC4*Year Trends  No No Yes Yes 
Number of Firms  664 664 664 664 
Number of 
Observations  7,116 7,116 7,116 7,116 
 
(B) R&D      
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 ln(CR&D) ln(CR&D) ln(CR&D) ln(GR&D) 
     
ln(Defense)t-1       0.409***     0.071***    0.065***   0.095** 
  (0.029) (0.016) (0.012) (0.014) 
      
Firm Fixed Effects  No Yes Yes Yes 
SIC4*Year Trends  No No Yes Yes 
Number of Firms  664 664 664 664 
Number of 
Observations  7,116 7,116 7,116 7,116 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. Column (1) includes SIC4 fixed effects. The 
dependent variable ln(1+PAT) is the log of 1 plus the patent count (patents applied for by firm i in year t). 
The variable ln(CR&D) is the log of company-sponsored R&D expenditures by firm i in year t, as reported 
in COMPUSTAT. The variable GR&D represents the sum of company-sponsored R&D reported in 
COMPUSTAT plus the sum of Department of Defense procurement-funded R&D reported in the NARA 
files for firm i in year t. ln(Defense Sales)t-1 is the log of the total value of procurement contracts received 
by the firm i in year t-1.  Column (4) is uses the count of patents as the dependent variable with the model 
estimated using a negative binomial conditional MLE. 
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TABLE 5.3: BENCHMARKING AGAINST CIVILIAN SALES, 1976-2003. 
(A) Patenting      
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 ln(1+PAT)  ln(1+PAT) ln(1+PAT)  (PAT) 
 
     
ln(Defense)t-1     0.069*** 0.060*** 0.059***    0.041*** 
  (0.019) (0.015) (0.012) (0.007) 
ln(Civilian)t-1  0.638*** 0.446*** 0.396***   0.303*** 
 
 (0.026) (0.051) (0.044) (0.014) 
     
Implied 1  0.038 0.027 0.024 0.018 
Test 1 (p-value)  0.10 0.028 0.003 0.606 
      
Firm Fixed Effects  No Yes Yes Yes 
SIC4*Year Trends  No No Yes No 
Number of Firms  664 664 664 664 
Number of Observations  7,116 7,116 7,116 7,116 
 
(B) R&D      
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 ln(CR&D) ln(CR&D) ln(CR&D) ln(GR&D) 
 
     
ln(Defense)t-1      0.040***        0.039***    0.045*** 0.077*** 
  (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) 
ln(Civilian)t-1    0.941***    0.751*** 0.646*** 0.600*** 
 
 (0.018) (0.043) (0.039) (0.040) 
     
Implied 1  0.056 0.045 0.038 0.036 
Test 1 (p-value)  0.215 0.59 0.499 0.005 
      
Firm Fixed Effects  No Yes Yes Yes 
SIC4*Year Trends  No No Yes Yes 
Number of Firms  664 664 664 664 
Number of Observations  7,116 7,116 7,116 7,116 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. Column (1) includes SIC4 fixed effects. The dependent 
variable ln(1+PAT) is the log of 1 plus the patent count (patents applied for by firm i in year t). The variable (PAT) is 
the count of patents applied for by firm i in year t. The variable ln(CR&D) is the log of company sponsored R&D 
expenditures by firm i in year t, as reported in COMPUSTAT. The variable GR&D represents the sum of company-
sponsored R&D reported in COMPUSTAT plus the sum of Department of Defense procurement-funded R&D reported 
in the NARA files for firm i in year t. ln(Defense Sales)t-1 is the log of the total value of procurement contracts received 
by the firm i in year t-1. ln(Civilian Sales) is the log of ‘Civilian’ non-defense sales calculated as total reported 
accounting sales (from COMPUSTAT) minus the total value of procurement contracts given in the NARA files (ie: 
Defense Sales). The implied 1 is calculated as 2*(D / C), the coefficient on Civilian sales multiplied by the ratio of 
defense to civilian sales. The (D/C) ratio for this sample is 0.060.
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          TABLE 5.4: TYPES OF PATENTS AND CITATIONS, 1976-2003.   
 
 
 
(A) Patents 
 
(B) Citations 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 
 ln(1+PAT) 1n(1+MPAT) 1n(1+CPAT)  ln(1+CITE) ln(1+MCITE) ln(1+CCITE) 
 
        
ln(Defense)t-1    0.059***   0.048***   0.050***      0.067***     0.085*** 0.063*** 
  (0.012) (0.010) (0.012)  (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) 
         
ln(Civilian)t-1    0.396***   0.268*** 0.352***      0.532***     0.435*** 0.496*** 
  (0.044) (0.036) (0.042)  (0.065) (0.061) (0.065) 
         
Implied 1  0.024 0.016 0.021  0.032 0.026 0.030 
Test 1 (p-value)  0.004 0.003 0.011  0.080 0.007 0.097 
 
 
   
 
   Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
SIC4*Year Trends  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Firms  664 664 664  664 664 664 
Number of 
Observations 
 
7,116 7,116 7,116 
 
7,116 7,116 7,116 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. The dependent variable ln(1+PAT) is the log of 1 plus the patent count (patents applied for by 
firm i in year t). The variable ln(1+MPAT) is the log of 1 plus the count of patents belonging to military patent classes following the discussion in 
section III (“Patents Data – Defining Military Patents”). The variable ln(1+CPAT) represents the count of patents in all the remaining non-military or 
‘civilian’ patent classes. The variable ln(1+CITE) is the log of 1 plus the count of citations (ie: forward citations for the patents applied for by firm i in 
year t). The variables ln(1+DCITE) and ln(1+CCITE) are then the defense and civilian analogues of the total citations variable.      
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TABLE 5.5: IMPACT OF DEFENSE PRODUCT MARKET SHOCKS – REDUCED FORM AND IV ESTIMATES, 1976-2003.  
 
 
 
(A) Patenting 
 
(B) R&D 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
  
OLS 
Reduced 
Form First Stage IV 
  
OLS 
Reduced 
Form First Stage IV 
 
  ln(1+PAT) ln(1+PAT) ln(Defense)t-1  ln(1+PAT)   ln(R&D) ln(1+PAT) ln(Defense)t-1  ln(R&D) 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
  ln(Defense)
t-1
   0.071***  
 
0.173**   0.095***  
 
  0.265** 
 
  (0.014)  (0.077)   (0.014)  (0.077) 
 
  
 
 
 
    
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
    
 
 
  
,( 10)ln( )
L
ij t tD−    
 
 0.022** 0.130*** 
 
  
 
 0.034** 0.130*** 
       (0.011) (0.020)       (0.010) (0.020)   
                    
Firm Fixed Effects   Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SIC4*Year Trends   Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Firms   664 664 664 664   664 664 664 664 
Number of Observations   7,116 7,116 7,116 7,116   7,116 7,116 7,116 7,116 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. Estimated for the period 1976-2003 (Fiscal Years) where a 10-year lag of the firm-specific defense shift-
share variable is defined. The dependent variable ln(1+PAT) is the log of 1 plus the patent count (patents applied for by firm i in year t) . ln(Defense Sales)t-1 is 
the log of the total value of procurement contracts received by the firm i in year t-1 . The variable 
,( 10)ln( )
L
ij t tD− is the log of the firm-specific Department 
of Defense (DoD) product market. This is defined as the firm’s share of own sales to the DoD in each 2-digit Federal Supply Code (FSC) 10 years ago multiplied 
by the current, period (t-1) value of DoD spending in each 2-digit category.      
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TABLE 5.6: CHANGES IN DOD SPENDING AND PRODUCT MARKET 
COMPETITION, 2-DIGIT PRODUCT PANEL,1976-2003. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable 
 ln( )L ltD  ln( )
L
ltD  ln( )
L
ltD  
 
    
(Herfindahl)t-2  -0.087 
    (0.092) 
(Herfindahl)t-5  
 
-0.061 
   (0.059) 
(Herfindahl)t-10  
  
-0.024 
  (0.066) 
1-Digit Trends  Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Product 
Groups  154 154 154 
Number of Observations  3353 3353 3353 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by 2-digit product category in parentheses. The data is a 2-digit product 
level panel of NARA procurement data. The dependent variable is the log 1-year change in the total amount 
of procurement spending at the 2-digit level. The Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of the squared 
market shares for the top 50 contractors in each 2-digit product group. There are 34 1-digit groups with a 
trend term included for each group. 
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TABLE 5.7: INDUSTRY SECTOR DECOMPOSITION, 1977-2000. 
Panel (A)     Patents/Sales        
 Period 
 
 
 (1) 
Total Share 
Of  Between 
 
(2) 
 Defense Share 
Of Between 
 
(3) 
Defense Share  
 Of Within 
 
 (4) 
Defense 
Contribution  
Between 
(5) 
Defense 
Contribution 
Within 
(6) 
Defense 
Contribution 
Total 
Pre Build-Up         
1977-1980  0.353 0.041 0.029  0.014 0.019 0.033 
Reagan Build-Up         
1981-1984  0.431 0.055 0.159  0.024 0.090 0.114 
1985-1988  0.381 0.026 -0.001  0.010 -0.001 0.009 
Post Cold War         
1989-1992  0.378 -0.044 0.022  -0.017 0.014 -0.003 
1993-1996  0.370 -0.019 0.014  -0.010 0.009 0.002 
1997-2000  0.344 -0.007 0.004  -0.002 0.003 0.001 
 
 
   
 
   Panel (B)      R&D/Sales 
  
 
   
 Period 
 
 
 (1) 
Total Share 
Of  Between 
 
(2) 
 Defense Share 
Of Between 
 
(3) 
Defense Share  
 Of Within 
 
 (4) 
Defense 
Contribution  
Between 
(5) 
Defense 
Contribution 
Within 
(6) 
Defense 
Contribution 
Total 
Pre Build-Up         
1977-1980  0.43 0.031 0.030  0.013 0.017 0.030 
Reagan Build-Up         
1981-1984  0.348 0.093 0.050  0.032 0.033 0.065 
1985-1988  0.391 0.028 0.032  0.011 0.019 0.030 
Post Cold War         
1989-1992  0.517 -0.040 -0.021  -0.021 -0.010 -0.031 
1993-1996  0.456 -0.020 -0.007  -0.009 -0.004 -0.013 
1997-2000  0.450 -0.005 0.006  -0.002 0.003 0.001 
         
Notes: This table reports the result of a SIC3 level decomposition of the growth in aggregate patenting and 
R&D expenditure. The full COMPUSTAT database is used with sales, patents and R&D collapsed to the 
SIC3 level, as defined by the main SIC code for each listed firm. The technology measures (patents and 
R&D) are normalized by industry sales to construct measures of technological intensity.  Column (1) 
reports what share of the total change in intensity is due to between effects with column (2) then reporting 
what share of this between component is accounted for by the defense sub-sector. Column (4) then 
calculates the total contribution of the defense sector to the aggregate change in technological intensity. For 
example, in 1981-1984 2.4% of total change in patenting intensity is due to between industry shifts 
associated with the defense sub-sector. See section IV (‘Calculating Magnitudes’) for a full description of 
the decomposition.    
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APPENDIX 5.A.1 
Spillovers in the Defense Product Market 
The above shift-share approach to identifying exogenous shocks to procurement spending is 
complicated by the potential role of knowledge spillovers at the levels of industry, product or 
technological class. Empirically, spillovers are best described as a type of ‘outside’ capital that 
benefits the firm (Griliches 1992). The typical approach is to add up the stock of knowledge 
capital (measured most commonly by R&D) according to an external criteria. This basic scheme 
can be formulated as: 
( , )i i i
i
SPILL v G− −
−
=        (9) 
where ( , )i iv − represents the ‘distance’ between firm i and all other firms –i and iG−  is the value of 
the knowledge capital for firm –i. In this paper’s setting distance is a weight on the –i firms that 
can be measured in terms of industry (j), patent technological class (k) or DoD product code (l).  
If a –i firm is in the same industry, technological or product market space as firm i then it has a 
non-zero weight. Following the approach of Jaffe(1986) and latterly Bloom, Schankerman and 
Van Reenen (2011) we can define a measure of closeness in the defense product code space as:  
( )
( ) ( ),
i i
i i
i i i i
D D
PROD
D D D D
−
−
− −

=
 
   (10) 
where ( )1 2 120, ,...i i i iD d d d=   is the vector of firm i’s share of product l in its total defense sales 
across the 155 2-digit product codes.  The term in (8) is therefore the uncentred correlation 
between pairings of firm i and all other -i. The spillover pool is then constructed by applying 
these weights and summing over the relevant firms:  
( , ) ( )it i i i t
i
SPILLPROD PROD G− −
−
=    (11) 
The  main issue here is that both the spillover weights and the share vector for our exogenous 
shocks term in (6) are defined in the defense product space.  Consider the simple case of a firm i 
that specializes in one defense product l over time. Then any DoD spending shock in category l 
affects both the direct procurement receipts of firm i as well as the receipts of all firms also 
selling product l. If all of these firms invest in R&D as a consequence of the shock this will 
increase the accumulated R&D stock in product space l. It is then possible that this additional 
induced R&D at the product space level will go on to affect firm i through a knowledge spillover 
mechanism.  In principle, this could lead to upward bias on the proposed IV estimate since it 
could pick up the indirect spillover effects along with the direct effects of procurement that are 
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the main focus of the paper. Practically, this problem can be mitigated by conditioning  on extra 
spillover terms when estimating the main models.   
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APPENDIX 5.A.2  
EXAMPLE OF FULL TEXT PATENT SUBJECT TO GOVERNMENT SUPPORT 
 
Method and apparatus for a reprogrammable program missile memory  
AbstractA method and apparatus are disclosed for a reprogrammable program missile memory 
module 26 which is placed within a missile 14 in substantially the same manner as the currently 
used programmable read only memory. The reprogrammable program memory module 26 
provides for remote writing of tactical program data thereto while allowing the missile 14 to 
remain in a substantially operational state.  
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